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Abstract
Economic equality in health care continues to be a policy objective that is difficult to 
achieve in many countries. The aim of this thesis is to examine the effect of income 
level and health insurance status on the use of different health services in two 
contrasting funding systems, using the cases of Egypt and Lebanon. Although these 
countries share some similarities, they differ from one another with respect to income 
per capita and public financing systems. Due to these differences, it is hypothesised 
that the nature of economic barriers to access differs in each country. Methods used to 
examine the research question include descriptive and multivariate analyses of cross- 
sectional household survey data from the 2001 Multi-Country Survey Study, a survey 
conducted by the World Health Organization.
Results from the analyses indicate that Egyptian respondents were more likely to use 
health services than their Lebanese counterparts, all other factors held equal. This result 
was especially evident in the case of outpatient care. Having a higher income level and 
health insurance were each associated with a greater likelihood of using health services, 
particularly for outpatient services as compared to inpatient services. These effects 
were also more pronounced in Lebanon. Lower-income groups tended to report worse 
health levels and higher out-of-pocket payments for health care as a share of income 
than did higher-income groups. Greater socioeconomic disparities in health were also 
found in Lebanon than in Egypt. This study shows that greater attention should be paid 
to the role of social safety nets in reducing inequalities, particularly for outpatient care.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
‘What doubtless remained longer than leprosy... was the meaning of his exclusion.’
Michel Foucault (1961)
1.1. Study context
Emerging studies on income inequality point to a paradox. Despite economic progress, 
social inequalities such as disparities in wealth and health appear to be widening in 
many countries (Cobum, 2003). In the case of health, various economic barriers to 
accessing health care services may exist, such as a low ability to pay and a lack of 
access to safety nets. This thesis examines the relationship between economic status 
and the utilisation of health care services in countries with different types of social 
safety nets for health care. In so doing, the thesis explores the reliance on ability to pay 
in countries with differing state involvement in financing health services.
Debates exist regarding the question of the role of the state in health care organisation, 
financing and delivery. These debates relate to the type of financing that should be 
adopted, which services should be funded by the state, and for which groups of society. 
Social values help to shape these debates, ultimately influencing the design of health 
financing policy. The main hypotheses of this thesis is that where health care financing 
is solidarity-oriented, socioeconomic status plays less of a role in accessing health care 
services as compared to the role it plays in privately-oriented systems; and that the 
effect of socioeconomic status on access to health care varies across different types of 
health care services.
How ‘fair’, or ‘equitable’, a system is depends on the eye of the beholder. Equity is not 
necessarily the same ‘equality’. Whilst equality denotes identical components, ‘equity’ 
implies fairness, impartiality, justice, or ‘even-handed dealing’ (Le Grand, 1991; 
Merriam-Webster, 2006). Socio-cultural mores influence what is considered ‘just’ 
(Rawls, 1971; Amin, 2006), which is reflected in the area of health. These mores
13
influence what aspect of health should be the aim of policy and how it ought to be 
distributed across different groups within society.
Equity may be defined as equal levels of health outcomes; but this definition is 
problematic since some illnesses may be due to complex factors, such as personal risky 
choices. Equity may mean the same amount of treatment provided to all; but this 
implies that a person with a headache and person with a broken leg both stay in hospital 
for several days. This thesis adopts the definition of equity as horizontal equity, defined 
as equal access for equal need. This definition refers to the extent to which people with 
the same need get the same opportunity to access health care, irrespective of one’s 
ability to pay for health care (Le Grand et al, 1984; Guillford et al, 2002; Barr, 2004).
The relative policy importance of equity versus efficiency or choice can vary depending 
on social values, but inequity is of particular interest in this thesis due to its association 
with social, economic and moral concerns. Social unrest, including civil war, economic 
recession, and ‘unhappiness’, has been associated with both absolute deprivation and 
relative inequality (Justino, 2004; Layard, 2005; Biancotti and D ’Alessio, 2008). 
Evidence suggests that inequity in health status as well as access to care exists in both 
high- and low-income countries (Baker and van der Gaag, 1993; Cobum, 2003; van 
Doorslaer et al, 2004; Knapp et al, 2006; Oliver et al, 2007). Equity in health can relate 
to different aspects of health care, such as the distribution of health outcomes, access to 
treatment, or out-of-pocket payments; it can mean discrimination based on geography, 
gender, age, or socioeconomic background (Knapp, 2007). This thesis is not 
necessarily concerned with a comparison of all definitions or types of equity. Rather, it 
explores reasons why economic inequity might exist, particularly reasons related to 
health financing systems.
The basis for how health care is financed is largely a value judgment. On the one hand, 
health care may be valued as a quasi-public good, even a right. In this case, services are 
largely covered through collective state financing. There are two general approaches to 
state financing: the Beveridge model, based on taxes and general governmental budgets; 
and the Bismarck model, based on compulsory, social health insurance (Abel-Smith, 
1994). The market may be marginally involved, for example, in terms of incentive 
structures within financing or delivery systems (Titmuss, 1956; Goodin, 1988; Le
14
Grand, 1991; Klein and Millar, 1995). In general, ability-to-pay is thought to play a 
minor role where health care is seen as a public good.
On the other hand, health care may be perceived as a quasi-private good. In this case, 
the market assumes a dominant role in securing access to care (Walker, 1986; Barr, 
2004). Examples are private health insurance and direct out-of-pocket payments.
Private insurance may be either mandatory or voluntary, with the state playing a 
regulatory role (Thompson and Mossialos, 2007).
Demand- and supply-side incentives included in different financing mechanisms impact 
the nature of health care utilisation (Mossialos and Dixon, 2002). State-based systems 
have mainly been met with the criticisms that they restrict choice, reduce incentives for 
high quality of care, and can be inefficient depending on how resources are used (Le 
Grand, 1991 ; Giddens, 1998). Market-based systems have been criticised on the basis 
that they fail to allocate resources equitably in the case of health (Arrow, 1963; Le 
Grand et al, 1984; Kutzin, 2001).
The way the market fails has been used to justify intervention by the state. This is due 
to the nature of health as a ‘commodity’ that violates some of the assumptions of a well- 
functioning market. First, the demand for health care is highly uncertain. Second, 
information about health and health care is uneven between patient, provider and 
payors, leading to information assymetry. Third, the social benefit of health care can 
extend beyond the cost to the beneficiary, known as externalities. These factors have 
been associated with perverse incentives that can reduce equity and efficiency in health 
care, unless appropriate state-based interventions are adopted.
In general, tax-financed systems are considered to be more equitable than other systems, 
as people pay little or no fees at the point of use (Chemichovsky, 1995; Barr, 2004). 
Examples are health systems found in the United Kingdom and New Zealand (Barnett, 
1984; Bloom, 2001 ; Muennig et al, 2005). Income and insurance tend to influence the 
chances of seeing doctors more than the chances of hospital admissions. This has been 
observed in several countries from the United Kingdom to Malaysia (Anderson and 
Benham, 1970; Anderson and Newman, 1973; Phelps, 1975; Heller, 1982; Ware et al, 
1986; Walker, 1986; Van Doorslaer et al, 2004; Morris et al, 2005).
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Whilst provider supply is an important factor, out-of-pocket payments for health care 
can be a barrier to use. Out-of-pocket payments can be official fees or informal 
payments. Research has shown that out-of-pocket payments can deter access and lower 
health status. Some of the most telling evidence comes from a longitudinal study in the 
United States, the Research and Development (‘RAND’) Health Insurance Experiment 
(Keeler, 1992). Similar findings have been found for maternal and mental health 
services internationally (Klavus and Hàkkinen, 1996; Palmer et al, 2004; Ensor et al, 
2005; Knapp et al, 2006).
Out-of-pocket payments can be a significant source of economic hardship, especially 
for the poorest of society (Gertler et al, 1984; Litvack and Bodart, 1993; Segall et al,
2002). Insurance tends to reduce the amount of out-of-pocket expenditure in some 
cases, particularly pharmaceutical expenditure (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2004). Several 
studies have shown that out-of-pocket payments for health care contribute to poverty. 
This has been observed throughout Asian countries (Grogan, 1995; O’Donnell et al, 
2007; Lu et al, 2007; van Doorslaer et al, 2007).
Although health care is one of many factors that influence health (Marmot, 2005), the 
importance of health care is expected to grow. This has been attributed to the rising 
prevalence of chronic health conditions (Cockerham, 2001). These conditions tend to 
require regular, long-term care which can be complex (Fernandez and Knapp, 2004). 
The prevalence of chronic health conditions also tends to be higher amongst the worse- 
off in many societies, and this group is particularly vulnerable in health systems where 
access depends on ability-to-pay (Walker, 1986; Wiener, 2004; Knapp, 2007). The 
rapidly increasing prevalence of chronic conditions is cause for concern from an equity 
perspective.
Hence, economic status appears to pose as a barrier to access to health care services 
where there exists a high reliance on ability to pay as seen in many countries, yet 
relatively little evidence exists on the role of economic status in health care systems 
such as Egypt and Lebanon. Although both countries share social and health system 
similarities in general, the role of the state and the nature of social safety nets in health 
care differ between these countries. The Egyptian state plays a relatively large role in 
the financing and direct provision of health services. The Lebanese health sector relies 
relatively more on private financing and delivery of care. This thesis aims to compare
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empirical evidence on the economic determinants of utilisation for different health 
services from these two contrasting funding systems. Examining how economic status 
affects access to health care can help shed further light on alleviating barriers to health 
care in countries similar to Egypt and Lebanon.
1.2. Research questions
The main research question of this thesis is to evaluate the effect of income and 
health insurance on the utilisation of health services in Egypt and Lebanon, countries 
with contrasting financing and social safety net systems for health care. The probability 
of utilisation and the frequency of health care visits for different types of outpatient and 
inpatient health services are examined. To address this question, the thesis evaluates 
the following sub-research questions:
1. How are health need and out-of-pocket payments for health care distributed across
income levels in different health financing systems?
2. What are the socioeconomic factors that determine the probability of being covered
by social and private health insurance schemes?
3. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance
coverage explain the use of various types of outpatient health services?
4. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance
coverage explain the use of various types of hospital-based health services?
5. Based on the study findings regarding economic determinants of utilisation, what are
the overall policy implications regarding the design of health financing systems 
towards the aim of alleviating disparities in access to health care?
6. For each of the research questions, how does the effect of income and insurance
compare between Egypt and Lebanon and what are the specific policy implications 
for each of these two health systems?
The study adopts a quantitative approach. Economic models of the demand for health 
care are applied to household survey data on Egypt and Lebanon. Each of the countries
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was also visited in order to gather secondary material on the organisation, finance and 
delivery of health care. The study assesses how existing paradigms of economic 
determinants of health care apply to health systems similar to Egypt and Lebanon.
1.3. Thesis structure
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, 
Chapter two reviews the literature on the relationship between social status and health, 
particularly regarding the economic determinants of health care. The chapter is divided 
into two parts. The first part reviews the socio-medical and economic theory regarding 
the impact of socioeconomic status on the demand for health care. The second part 
assesses prior empirical evidence regarding the effect of socioeconomic factors on 
access to health care in different health systems.
Chapter three describes the methods used to examine the research questions. The 
chapter explains operational definitions for the main parameters of interest in the thesis; 
the choice of the case studies and their health care systems, with an emphasis on 
financing arrangements; the main data sources used to examine the research questions; 
variable specification; analytic methods; and data limitations of the study.
Chapter four presents results on the characteristics of the survey respondents and the 
determinants of health insurance. These results are based on analysis using multivariate 
probit regression. The meaning of social status is explored by examining the 
association between income and other socioeconomic characteristics. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion regarding health insurance and health care seeking 
behaviour across socioeconomic status.
Chapter five presents results on the income-related distribution of health and health 
care. These findings are based on three related techniques: (a) for a given indicator, the 
ratio between the highest- and lowest-income group; (b) the concentration index 
approach; and (c) the concentration curve approach. The health indicators that are 
analysed include: (i) health status indicators; (ii) outpatient and inpatient services; (iii) 
insurance coverage; and (iv) out-of-pocket payments for health care. The overall effect 
of out-of-pocket payments on poverty is shown. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of equity patterns in each country.
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Chapter six presents results on how economic factors influence the use of outpatient 
health services. The services that are examined are: (a) ‘any’ use of outpatient 
services; (b) general practitioner visits; (c) medical specialist visits; and (d) pharmacy 
visits. The chapter shows the determinants of the probability and the intensity of care, 
based on multivariate regression. The probability of accessing care is assessed using 
two types of regression models: (i) the probit model and (ii) the recursive bivariate 
probit model. Intensity was assessed using two types of count data models: (i) the zero- 
truncated negative binomial model, and (ii) the zero-inflated negative binomial model. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the economic barriers to outpatient care.^
Chapter seven explores the economic determinants of the use of hospital-based health 
services. This chapter examine the use of services provided through: (a) hospital 
outpatient units, and (b) hospital inpatient units. Similar to the structure of Chapter Six, 
the results explain the determinants of the probability and the intensity of health care 
utilisation. The chapter ends with a discussion of economic barriers to hospital care 
across and within each Egypt and Lebanon.
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by discussing the main implications of the results 
from a policy perspective. The chapter synthesises the main results of the thesis and 
places them within the context of each country. Implications for health financing policy 
are drawn towards the aim of equity in health care by considering wider political and 
economic factors relevant to the health systems found in Egypt and Lebanon. The 
chapter concludes with implications for future research and overall policy implications 
towards improving access to health care.
 ^An earlier version of chapters six and seven was presented at the 14* Annual 
Conference of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, 
December 2007, and is available at: http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/getFile.php?id=l 115. 
A version of chapters six and seven is forthcoming in Health Economics, Policy and 
Law.
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Chapter 2. Economic determinants of health care: a review
To sustain quality social environments with 
diminished resources is a difficult task. It is possible 
that societies with high quality social capital will be 
better able to adjust than will fragmented 
individualistic societies. Societies that have a strong, 
coherent sense of what is important, and a collective 
will, will probably be most successful.
(Frank and Mustard, 1994, pg. 15)
2.1. Introduction
The concept of equilibrium at a social and individual level represents the tension 
between social status and health. The ancient Greeks and Chinese viewed health as a 
state of equilibrium between man and environment (Cockerham, 2001). By linking the 
person’s state of being to surrounding conditions, the ancients were the forerunners of 
social paradigms that relate the environment to well being. In this sense, social 
paradigms of health are not new, but they have evolved over time.
The theoretical framework for this thesis describes the relationship between 
socioeconomic factors and the demand for health care, defined as the use of services in 
this thesis (Anderson and Newman, 1973; Grossman, 1972; Wagstaff et al, 1991; 
Anderson, 1995; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Marmot, 2005). The model for the 
framework is introduced in Figure 2.1 below and will be elaborated later in the chapter. 
The model starts by showing the role of social factors that may negatively affect health 
status. This in turn generates the need for health care, which may lead to the demand or 
use of health services.
As shown, the path between need and use is mediated by economic factors’, these 
factors can enable or bar the use of services. To understand the model, chapter two 
provides a review of (i) the theoretical background to the social gradient in health and 
the role of the state; and (ii) the empirical evidence regarding the impact of income and 
insurance on health and the use of health services.
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2.2. Theoretical framework
2.2.1. Dehnition of health
The concept of health as a state of equilibrium paves the way for examining the 
conditions that affect health status. With the advancement of modem medicine, an 
approach gradually emerged that emphasised the absence of disease as the definition of 
health, considered a ‘negativist’ approach (Leslie, 1980; Cockerham, 2001). For the 
better part of modem history, this approach has dominated notions of health, focusing 
on biomedical determinants of disease.
Relatively recent sociological paradigms broaden the range of influences on health, thus 
adopting the positivist approach. A positivist approach views health as the presence of 
human capital resources, such as overall well-being. For example, the equilibrium 
concept is evident in the World Health Organization’s definition of health. Health is ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity’ (Breslow, 1989; World Health Organization, 1948).
Such differing notions of health have influenced the nature of health promotion, and, 
ultimately, the path of health systems development. The holistic, social perspective of 
health is reflected in a multidimensional approach to health promotion. This approach 
was first described in late nineteenth century, Germany. In 1847, Rudolf Virchow, a 
German physician and anthropologist, recommended that ‘prosperity, education, and 
liberty were the remedy to premature death’ (Terris, 1992). A century later, the term 
‘health promotion’ was probably first coined. Henry Sigerist, a Swiss medical 
historian, stated that ‘health is promoted by providing a decent standard of living, good 
labour conditions, education, physical culture, means of rest and recreation’. 
Importantly, he further advocated for the ‘coordinated efforts of statesmen, labour, 
industry, educators and physicians to this end’ (Terris, 1992). In so doing, the 
recognition of the link between social conditions and health status was becoming clear.
Only in 1986 was the concept of health promotion that included the alleviation of social 
barriers formally acknowledged. The Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion in 1986 put 
forth that ‘good health is a major resource for social, economic, and personal 
development and an important dimension for quahty of life’ (World Health 
Organization, 1986).
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual model of health care utilisation
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•Health care supply
DEMAND FOR 
HEALTH SERVICES:
Sources: Based on Anderson and Newman, 1973, with additional elements adapted from Grossman, 1972; W agstaff et al, 1991; Anderson, 
1995; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Marmot, 2005.
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The Charter distinguishes between three approaches to health promotion. These 
include: (1) the biomedical approach, which focuses on diagnosing disease and 
treatment; (2) the lifestyle approach, which focuses on behavioural attitudes and 
individual education; and (3) the socio-environmental approach, which focuses on 
high-risk social and economic conditions and their alleviation (World Health 
Organization, 1986; Labonte, 1993; Raphael, 2000). The socio-environmental approach 
would be based in part on emerging evidence on the link between ill health and social 
status. While a number of theories exist regarding a vast array of determinants of health 
(Murray and Chen, 1993; Evans, 1994), this thesis focuses on the effect of 
socioeconomic status.
2.2.2. Definition of economic status
The understanding of economic status emerges out the sociological theory of social 
stratification. Contributions made by Max Weber in the early 1920s have helped to 
thrust social status at the forefront of health attainment. In his seminal work Economy 
and Society (1978), he defines social status and social class in terms of the ‘lifestyle’ 
concept (Lebensstil in the original German text). Weber does not consider ‘Lifestyle’ as 
a means to an end; rather, ‘Lifestyle’ is an issue of morality and social responsibility 
regarding the ethics of stratification (Abel and Cockerham, 1993).
Weber defines ‘Lifestyle’ as the combination of two concepts. On the one hand are ‘life 
chances’ (originally Lebenschancen), or class position, a term that entails one’s social 
conditions which are largely structural, economic features that partly determine one’s 
life course, such as income, norms, education, and occupational category (Weber, 1978; 
Abel and Cockerham, 1993).
On the other hand, ‘life-conduct’ (Lebensfiihrung) entails behaviours and choices made 
by the individual, such as smoking habits, eating patterns, and other examples of self­
conduct (Weber, 1978; Abel and Cockerham, 1993). Weber’s theory has since been 
adapted to the concept of health lifestyles, where life chances represent the 
organisational and structural facets of society that influence health (Cockerham, 2001). 
Ultimately, lifestyles are determined by choices, which are dependent upon an 
individual’s potential emanating from environmental conditions.
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Weber’s framework provides an important basis for examining structural inequalities 
that are related to economic deprivation and social exclusion. In this thesis, different 
types of economic characteristics are used to examine social inequality. Although 
measures of poverty and income levels are important indicators of social deprivation, 
they may not indicate the extent to which access to social services are hindered in all 
cases. A broader concept of social deprivation speaks to notions of social exclusion as 
described by Silver (1994) and Dean (2004). Whilst a thorough discussion of social 
exclusion is outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to note for conceptual 
purposes: inequity in access to social services may be rooted in multiple layers of 
social exclusion, beyond financial constraints.
Hence, broader notions of social exclusion and economic-inequality may reveal 
important causes of inequity. As Sen (2004) states, ‘income-inequality’ and ‘economic- 
inequality’ are not necessarily the same. Based on research from Asia, Brazil, and the 
United States, he suggests that ‘inequality comparisons will yield very different results 
depending on whether we concentrate only on incomes or also on the impact of other 
economic and social influences on the quality of life’ (Sen, 2004; pg. 65).
The concept of economic-inequality is closer to the spirit of Weber’s framework than 
that of income-inequality, allowing a broader understanding of social stratification. 
Economic-inequality includes elements of social exclusion, such as unemployment, 
poor education, lack of access to social services, and poor quality of life. For example, 
income redistribution policies alone may not sufficiently compensate for poor health 
financing schemes in reducing inequities in access. The distinction is useful to 
evaluating the causal pathways to inequality and the efficacy of social policies designed 
to alleviate such disparities. Hence, economic status is in this thesis as both income 
level and health insurance status; employment status and educational level will be 
considered as secondary indicators of economic status.
2.2.3. Social gradient in health
Early British and American studies paved the way for research on the social gradient in 
health. These tum-of-the-century studies show that relatively lower social status is 
associated with higher rates of death. This observation seems to hold regardless of how 
‘social status’ was defined. Although the methodology used in these early studies was
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descriptive and relatively basic by current standards, they represent important building 
blocks.
For example, Titmuss (1943) showed that infant mortality rates in 1911 were highest 
amongst the lowest occupational level, based on data from the United Kingdom’s 
Registrar-General. Contrary to the belief that national economic progress alone could 
ameliorate the situation, his study suggested otherwise. For he also found that, not only 
did the inequality persist over a subsequent twenty-year period, but that the degree of 
inequality had grown by 1932. The striking issue is that although the supply of health 
services aimed at maternal and child support grew over this period, these services 
largely catered to the upper classes.
Similarly, Britten (1934) found that the excess mortality rates around the same period in 
the United States were higher for unskilled and lower-skilled workers than they were 
for professional workers. For some causes of death in 1930, the social differential in 
mortality was relatively greater in the United States than it was in England. These 
causes include cirrhosis of the liver, tuberculosis of the respiratory system, and diabetes, 
and to a lesser extent, pneumonia, accidents, suicide, cerebral haemorrhage, and 
nephritis. Notably, such causes also appear to be correlated with both living conditions 
and behaviours.
Indeed, the reverse was also observed: ill health reduces socioeconomic status. In one 
of the earliest studies to show this, Laughton (1948) assessed cross-sectional panel data 
for 1923 and 1943 from over 1,300 households from a survey study. Some households 
reported chronic conditions at neither time point, at one of the time points, or at both 
time points. ‘Economic status’ was defined using both reported income as well as asset 
information relevant at that time, such as taxable value of dwelling, type of 
employment, number of persons per room, sanitary conditions, and milk supply. The 
study found that those households that reported chronically ill members had lower 
socioeconomic levels. But it also showed that households whose socioeconomic status 
became lower over time were either: (i) initially ill and remained so, or (ii) were not ill 
but became so.
By the middle of the twentieth century, two things were becoming evident First, being 
on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder can be detrimental to one’s health. But, 
second, falling ill can take one down the ladder even further.
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The social gradient in health began receiving greater attention at a policy level in a few 
countries by the end of the 1970s, such as the United Kingdom. The Black Report, a 
government-commissioned inquiry into health inequalities in Britain published in 1980, 
was met with controversy but helped to raise political awareness of the concept of social 
status-driven inequalities (Townsend et al, 1992). The report found a similar social 
gradient in mortality as that observed in earlier studies, particularly for deaths due to 
respiratory illnesses. The report also suggested that the use of preventative services was 
concentrated amongst the better-off, defined as professional occupations, compared to 
manual or unskilled workers. These trends persisted into the early 1980s (Townsend et 
al, 1992).
Yet not until the mid-1980s was the link between social status and ill health to be 
causally established. The most telling example of the causal link would come from 
Marmot’s evidence on the social gradient in mortality amongst British civil servants, 
based on the Whitehall I Study. Over a ten-year period during which a group of 
workers was followed, mortality and occupational ranking were inversely correlated 
(Marmot et al, 1984). This association existed for all causes of death examined, but the 
association was especially strong in the case of cardiovascular-related death. The 
Whitehall II Study provided further evidence of the way in which social factors work to 
influence morbidity (Marmot et al, 1991).
Owing in large part to studies such as the Whitehall study, the concept of the ‘social 
determinants of health’ has lent weight to the non-biological factors affecting health 
(Evans, 1994; Frank and Mustard, 1994). Marmot (2005) describes the social 
determinants of health as the environmental and social conditions that influence health. 
These determinants include the social gradient, stress, early life, social exclusion, work, 
unemployment, social support, social services, addiction, food and transport. The 
recognition and growing importance of the social determinants of health is evident in 
the World Health Organization’s establishment of the ‘Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health’ (World Health Organization, 2005). Although it is difficult to 
accurately rank the influence of social factors, economic status captures the effect of 
many social factors simultaneously.
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2.2.4. Relevance of chronic health conditions
With the rising prevalence of non-communicable chronic health conditions, the role of 
social determinants is expected to grow. This is particularly true for the role of health 
services (Cockerham, 2001; WHO, 2005; Boutayeb and Serghini, 2006; Adeyi et al,
2007). The social determinants framework is particularly relevant to the case of older 
individuals, lower-income groups, and those diagnosed with chronic health conditions.
Cockerham (2001) explains that medical sociology has assumed a more important role 
in explaining the prevention, onset, and course of diseases. This is due to the shift that 
has occurred over the past century in population health. The century has witnessed a 
shift from communicable and acute needs to a growing need to address non- 
communicable conditions. Some of the most important factors that have been linked to 
the prevention of chronic health conditions are societal and structural in nature (Graham 
and Reeder, 1979). These conditions include socioeconomic status, migration, cultural 
change, and behavioural patterns.
The burden of chronic health conditions extends beyond mortality. Disability due to 
chronic illness has implications for the broader society. The World Health Organization 
(2006a) estimates that the number of deaths attributed to chronic conditions will 
increase by 17% by 2015. Disability has been associated with poor self-assessed health, 
affecting older individuals and lower-income groups disproportionately (Sprangers et al, 
2000; Molarius and Janson, 2002). Long-term conditions are not homogeneous in their 
perceived impact, but they generally require long-term, regular care. Although chronic 
conditions generally account for about 20% of the disease burden, these conditions 
account for over 70% of health care spending in many high-income countries (Yu et al,
2003). Much of this spending is due to end-stage treatment.
Enabling access to earlier, preventative treatment across social status is emerging as a 
policy priority in many countries, such as the United Kingdom (Department of Health, 
2004; 2007). This commitment is evident by the establishment of (i) universal access to 
health services with a regulated general-practitioner gate-keeping system between 
primary and secondary/tertiary care; (ii) exemptions from pharmaceutical payments for 
vulnerable groups such as older persons, persons with long-term conditions, and lower- 
income groups; and (iii) National Service Frameworks for chronic conditions such as 
mental health, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease (Knapp et al, 2005). In this respect.
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the state plays a role in helping to overcome economic barriers to care, elaborated 
below.
2.2.5. Social justice and the welfare state
The importance of health is typically not a contentious issue amongst most policy­
makers, but the extent of public investment in its promotion is the focus of great debate. 
Good health can be seen as an investment in human development, a means to progress. 
Whether such investment is promoted by the state is another issue. The way that social 
determinants of health are addressed at a national policy level depends on underlying 
social values regarding social justice and the role of the state.
The role of the state in the allocation of social goods such as health care can be assessed 
through a welfare state typology. ‘Welfare state’ refers to the state’s involvement in the 
organisation, provision, and/or financing of social goods such as cash benefits, health 
care, education, food, housing, and other social services (Barr, 2004). The level of 
involvement varies widely, as does the meaning of the ‘welfare state’ and its impact on 
personal liberty (von Hayek, 1959).
The development of a welfare state reflects a given country’s history, political 
institutions, and values; this means they are path-dependent to an extent (Esping- 
Andersen, 2000; Klein, 2001; Klein, 2003). Underlying the development of the welfare 
state is the underlying notion of citizenship, which has implications for how policy 
makers approach social policy (Marshall, 1950). How comprehensive a welfare state is 
depends on how the aim of social policy is defined. In selecting a social welfare 
function. Sen (1979, 2004) contends that there may be other principles of social 
judgement that require non-utility information, such as liberty, non-exploitation, and 
non-discrimination. Therefore, in designing redistributive policies, a broader 
understanding of deprivation is needed. This further supports the need to evaluate 
economic or social inequalities beyond income inequality.
Based on various notions of social justice, four main schools of thought regarding the 
aim of social policy can be demarcated. These are based on four approaches to 
distributive justice regarding the allocation of public goods. The first school of thought 
views the aim of policy as the maximisation of total welfare, known as the utilitarian 
approach, which forms the basis of economic theory on the subject (Barr, 2(X)4). The
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central assumption of the utilitiarian school of thought concerns the notion of 
interpersonal comparability of utility, elaborated in detail outside of this thesis. 
Generally, the assumption is that the welfare gain from a given increase in a social good 
is the same for all members of society. However, many contend this assumption is 
inaccurate on theoretical and philosophical grounds, (Sen, 1979), lending support to the 
second school of thought in social policy.
The second school of thought is John justice-as-fairness theory of social justice,
characterised by Rawls’ maximin-based theory of distribution, or the difference 
principle (Rawls, 1971; Freeman, 2007). This approach contrasts with the utilitarian 
school on the assumption of interpersonal comparability of utility (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 
1979, 2004). Two main principles define the Rawlsian school of thought: (a) each 
person has an equal claim to basic liberties; and (b) the distribution of public goods and 
liberties should be such that they (i) provide equality of opportunity and (ii) satisfy the 
maximin criterion. In contrast with the utilitarian view that the benefits accrued from 
social goods are the same to all members of society, Rawls’ formulated the maximin 
criterion as a test of whether social policy meets its aims. This criterion states that the 
optimal social welfare function is that which improves the welfare of the worst-off in 
any group.
The third and fourth schools of thought lie relatively outside the welfarist, or utilitarian, 
framework. These schools include the libertarian and socialist frameworks, 
respectively. Generally, the extra-welfarist approaches assume that the objective of 
social policy is the attainment of principles that may extend beyond utility- 
maximisation.
Libertarians value individual freedom and view state intervention as morally corrupt 
based on the role of the market espoused by Adam Smith (Esping-Anders on, 1989). By 
contrast, socialists adopt a collective perspective influenced largely by Marxist thinking 
on social classes and modes of production (Esping-Anderson, 1989; Barr, 2004).
Hence, they largely advocate egalitarianism and social solidarity, although many 
versions of the socialist-Marxist approach exist (Barr, 2004). Egalitarian principles 
often emphasise equality o f opportunity. This approach has influence the development 
of more progressive, intermediate models that represent the nexus of Rawlsian, 
libertarian, and egalitarian principles, known as social democratic models.
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The political economy of various types of welfare states mirrors the spectrum of these 
four distributive schools of thought. The classic typology of the welfare state shows a 
spectrum of state intervention in welfare redistribution (Figure 2.2). This classification 
was introduced by Titmuss (1958, 1974), and distinguishes between three general types 
of intervention. On one side of the spectrum is relatively little intervention, known as 
the ‘residual’ welfare state. The next type is based on a system of earned benefits such 
as a social security system, known as the ‘industrial achievement/performance’ state.
On the other end of the spectrum is the most comprehensive type of welfare state, 
offering a wide array of benefits largely on the basis of citizenship, known as the 
‘institutional redistributive’ model.
Esping-Anderson (1989) would later develop a similar typology that emphasises the 
historical and political-economic path of development. Importantly, this typology 
combines economic principles of distributive justice with political concepts of 
collectivism and democracy. Looking at expenditure patterns for social services alone 
will fail to accurately describe the nature of the welfare state. Instead, a typology that 
captures the criteria for selecting beneficiaries, which services are financed, and how 
financing is arranged is more useful (Castles, 2004).
The first cluster proposed by Esping-Anderson represents the most conservative 
approach to social benefits, considered the ‘liberal welfare state’. Benefits are provided 
through means-testing and relative modest transfers or social insurance. This model 
incorporates elements of Titmuss’ ‘residual’ model and Rawls’ maximin criterion; it 
encompasses the ‘poor law tradition’ in which those who are particularly deprived 
receive certain types of temporary provisions (Titmuss, 1974; Castles, 2004). The 
United States and, in some respects, Canada and Australia fall within this group, 
according to Esping-Anderson (1989). Here, some elements of Rawls’ ‘maximin’ 
criterion are evident.
The second cluster is the ‘corporatist-statist’ welfare state, found in France, Germany, 
Italy, and Austria. Social stratification per se is not seen as the object of reform, but, 
rather, ensuring traditional family-oriented lifestyles and resources is the aim of social 
policy. This model is based on the ‘industrial achievement-performance’ scheme that 
Titmuss (1974) described, which emphasises the active participation of citizens in
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‘earning’ social services. The corporatist model thus harks to the Bismarkian social 
security approach (Castles, 2004). Citizens are provided with entitlements, which are 
discrete in nature and often conditional upon employment.
The final type is generally the smallest cluster, considered the ‘social-democratic’ 
regime. Largely found in Scandinavia, the goals of social policy are considered to be 
universalism and ‘de-commodifying social rights extended to new middle classes’ 
(Esping-Anderson, 1989). The United Kingdom falls in this cluster to a degree, 
incorporating some aspects from the liberal model. The social-democratic regime 
model promotes equality to the greatest extent. It is similar to the Beveridge model, in 
which the role of the market is almost entirely absent from social provision.
The ‘institutional redistributive’ type that Titmuss (1974) proposed is closest to the 
social-democratic model. In these models, the state ensures that social benefits are 
accessible to all. In most parts o f Scandinavia, the state system achieves this 
universalism to such a high standard that there is virtually no ‘opting-out’ by middle 
and upper classes due to a high satisfaction with the quality of services. By contrast, the 
British system includes regional variation in quality and a small, private health 
insurance market for those who are willing to pay for supplementary services or higher 
quality.
Figure 2.2 Typology of welfare states
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Sources: Titmuss, 1956; Esping-Anderson, 1990; Esping-A nderson, 2000, p .85; C astles, 2004.
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2.2.6. Role of public fînancing
In terms of health services, a growing body of research has illustrated the importance of 
the role of the state in overcoming economic barriers to access. Navarro and Shi (2003) 
show through a cross-national analysis that ‘political traditions more committed to 
redistributive policies (both economic and social)... were generally more successful in 
improving the health of populations’ (p. 195). The 1985 Bellagio conference on health 
highlighted a number of critical factors for health improvement. Amongst these were a 
social welfare orientation to development and a commitment to health as a social goal, 
as manifested in national policies within and outside of the health sector (Rosenfield, 
1985). These factors have been echoed by Frank and Mustard (1994), Stevens (2001), 
Navarro and Shi (2003), and Knapp et al (2006). As Stevens (2001) states.
Priority setting and rationing are not pure technical 
operations. The course and direction of these activities is 
influenced by the dominant belief system of a nation. Many 
European countries try to find ways to combine the values 
of equity, efficiency, and autonomy (Stevens, 2001, p. 161).
The societal perspective towards health largely defines the role of the state in financing 
the health system. On the one hand, society may value health as a private good akin to 
any other commodity, with the role of the state limited as far as health care. Left to the 
private domain, however, the market fails to deliver services efficiently at the technical, 
allocative, and equity levels for a variety of reasons. Fundamentally, the nature of 
health differs from other commodities that may be distributed by the market efficiently. 
It is associated with uncertainty of demand, information asymmetry between consumer 
and seller/provider, and externalities. These failings render the private market 
inefficient in the absence of some level of state intervention (Titmuss, 1963; Arrow, 
1963; Le Grand and Robinson, 1976; Barr, 2004).
On the other hand, health may be viewed as a public good, with coverage of health care 
seen as the responsibility of the state. In this case, health care needs are met through 
collective provision in the interests of society (Titmuss, 1956; Barr, 2004). The state 
assumes the roles necessary to administering a functional and effective health care 
system. These may include any or all of the following: financing, provision, and 
regulation of health care services. The welfare state may be entirely comprehensive, or 
may include quasi- or mimic markets (Le Grand, 1991; Klein and Millar, 1995; Kutzin, 
2001). In theory, the role played by ability to pay in accessing services varies with the
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nature of the public sector’s role in health care as well as other factors. Ability to pay 
can be explored further within a behavioural framework that helps to explain the 
demand for health care.
2.2.7. Behavioural model of utilisation
Health care-seeking behaviour is defined as the interrelationships between various 
factors that influence ‘access’ to personal health services. The term ‘access’ to health 
services can be misleading. Depending on the purpose of measurement, ‘access’ can 
mean ‘service availability’, ‘utilisation’, ‘effectiveness’, and ‘equity in use’ (Guillford 
et al, 2002). Within the context of this thesis, access to health care is used to refer to 
utilisation, or the ‘realised’ access to health services. Health care seeking behaviour is 
viewed as the choice to use health services, resulting in access to care.
The role played by economic status in models of health care seeking behaviour has been 
represented in various ways. One of the most widely accepted and applied models of 
access to health services is the Anderson (1995) framework. The framework is 
generally considered to be robust yet simple in conceptualising the nature of decision­
making in health service use.
Andersen’s (1975) behavioural model of utilisation characterises the choice to use 
services as a function of three types of factors. These groups of factors include: (a) 
predisposing factors, or demographic characteristics, social structure and health beliefs; 
(b) enabling/flcfor^, or the ability to secure resources in order to access services; and (c) 
medical need, which can be perceived or evaluated (Anderson 1975; Anderson, 1995). 
Enabling factors can be viewed as components of the aforementioned ‘socio- 
environmental approach’, which includes factors such as income, health insurance 
systems, the distribution and availability of health care providers and treatments, and 
the prevailing health financing system.
An important contribution of the Anderson (1975) model is its recognition of way in 
which the relative importance of factors can change across the type of health service.
For example, the effects of different factors have been found to vary depending on how 
discretionary the service is perceived by beneficiaries and providers. Previous research 
has found that acute, inpatient care is typically less influenced by enabling factors than 
is preventative, outpatient care (Anderson and Newman, 1973).
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The applicability of the Anderson model to various social structures is critical to assess. 
‘Enabling factors’ may be defined or behave differently across societies. The nature of 
social safety nets is one such critical factor that may increase or decrease the role of 
other enabling factors. Understanding the general political-economic basis for social 
safety nets will help to unravel broader causes and possible policy responses to 
structural inequalities.
2.2.8. Demand for health care
Economic models of health care demand provide a framework for measuring the impact 
of economic status on utilisation, described in greater detail in Chapter Three, 
‘Methods’. The modelling problem begins with a question: Is health is a consequence 
of factors, or is it produced by investments! This dichotomy parallels the dichotomy 
between the negativist and positivist approaches towards defining ‘health’.
The choice between the two approaches depends on the perspective of the researcher. 
This thesis assumes the investment approach. This approach signifies a more active 
stance in addressing socio-economic conditions that may be modified through policy.
As Mushkin (1962) states, the health-as-investment framework posits the demand for 
health care as a matter of building human capital. Good health comprises an important 
facet of human capital (Sen, 2001).
Whilst the ultimate outcome of interest is health, the demand for health is difficult to 
directly access, so proxy measures are used instead. This difficulty arises from its 
unobservable properties, or its latent nature: the demand for health is primarily 
observed indirectly through the need for health services (Culyer, 1976; Williams, 1978). 
Therefore, the demand for health care is a derived demand for health.
Grossman (1972) expanded the notion that health is a commodity that is produced by 
investments. Classic production theory describes output as a function of labour and 
capital (Estrin and Laidler, 1995). Grossman translates this concept to show that health 
(‘output’) is a function of investment ( ‘labour’) and an initial stock of health ( ‘capital’). 
The choice to seek health and health care under constraints is then posited within an 
intertemporal utility maximising function. Here, an individual’s total utility is a 
function of the utility derived from their inherited initial ‘stock of health’, the ‘stock of
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health’ over time, and the consumption of other commodities over time (Grossman, 
1972).
Grossman’s model can best be described as deterministic and dynamic (van Doorslaer, 
1987). In other words, it does not explicitly account for uncertainty, but does take into 
account changes over time, respectively. Whilst such a description is important to note 
for conceptual purposes, the theoretical detail to the economic models is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Central to Grossman’s argument is the notion that the stock of 
health over time is modifiable, a matter of investment. Expressed algebraically, the 
stock of health in the ith time (//,) is subject to the amount of investment in related 
goods in the period immediately preceding it:
Hi^i - Hi = Ii - ôiHiy Equation 2.1
where /,• is gross investment in health and Si is the rate of depreciation during the ith 
period.
Van Doorslaer (1987) describes a number of derivations of Grossman’s model, which 
can be summarised as stochastic or deterministic, and may be static or dynamic. The 
‘multiple-indicators multiple-causes model’ explicitly introduced the latent property o f 
health (Jones and O’Donnell, 2002). In its simplest form, it describes health as 
unobservable and ‘fully characterised by its causes and by its indicators’ (van de Yen 
and Hooijmans, 1991). These ‘causes and indicators’ include morbidity, mortality, self­
assessed health, and the use o f health services.
Overall, the demand for health services is a function of enabling, predisposing, and 
medical factors that are context-specific. Three fundamental principles are relevant to 
understanding the nature of this demand. First, the demand for health care is a derived 
demand for health. Second, health is an uncertain and latent variable, represented by an 
array of indicators. Third, the production of health is a function of health status at a 
given time and other inputs such as medical care, income, education, environmental 
hazards, and other socio-economic determinants. The relative importance of social 
status, in turn, depends on the nature of the health system and the underlying welfare 
state, the subject of emerging empirical research.
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2.3. Evidence
2.3.1. Effect of social status on health
Although this thesis focuses on access to health services, a brief look at some empirical 
research on health status shows important Hnkages to health services. The research 
reveals two important findings. First, health status appears to be associated with social 
status. Second, the relationship between social and health status is mediated by health 
care as well as numerous other factors. Although the relative magnitude of the 
influence of health care on health outcomes continues to stir debate, its role is 
nonetheless important.
As early as the 1920s was access to health care associated with better health. In the 
United Kingdom and the United States, higher income and coverage by some form of 
health insurance was correlated with lower mortality rates (Stevenson, 1923; Dublin, 
1928). An individual’s income level has been correlated with health status in a number 
of international studies (Deaton, 2002; Muennig et al, 2005b; Ross et al, 2006; 
Hemândez-Quevedo et al, 2006).
The most telling evidence of the relationship between health insurance and health 
outcomes came several decades later in the first randomised, controlled trial. This trial 
was the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, conducted over five years in the United 
States, between 1977 and 1982 (Newhouse, 1993). The study randomised hundreds of 
famihes to different types of private health insurance plans. These plans ranged from 
those that did not charge any fees for accessing services, considered ‘free care’ plans, to 
those that charged high co-payments and included high deductibles. The study revealed 
that some health outcomes appeared to be worse amongst some individuals randomised 
to the co-payment plans, as compared to those in the ‘free care’ plans. Strikingly, there 
was a greater risk of death amongst the former group on average. Other health effects 
included poorer cholesterol levels, poorer vision, poorer oral health, and lower general 
health ratings (Ware et al, 1986; Keeler, 1992).
Other studies support these findings by showing the association between the type of 
health financing system and self-reported health in chronic conditions. In a four- 
country comparison by Cutler and Mas (2003), better health was associated with 
pubhcly financed systems in which out-of-pocket payments were negligible, as 
compared to systems that rely heavily on private financing. Individuals with diabetes
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reported higher levels of self-assessed health in the former. Likewise, higher quality of 
life has been associated with having health insurance, as well as a higher education and 
a higher income, in asthma and lung and prostate cancer (Apter, 1999; Camacho et al, 
2002; Montazeri et al, 2003; Penson et al, 2001).
Overall, evidence on the social determinants of health suggests that social status plays a 
significant role in health. A question logically follows. How should economic barriers 
be overcome? In answering this question, two schools of thought can be considered 
(Deaton, 2002). On the one hand is that which advocates for redistributing income.
The implicit assumption is that individuals ought to improve their own welfare through 
material gain. On the other hand is that which calls for better health policy. One such 
example is the development of more comprehensive social safety nets, although other 
health and extra-health policies are to be pursued. To weigh the options, we turn to 
evidence regarding the impact of income and insurance on service use.
2.3.2. Effect of income on utilisation
Since the early 1970s, a growing body of research has demonstrated that income and 
health insurance are strong predictors of health service use, but the evidence is far from 
homogenous. A review of the evidence points to three main considerations to keep in 
mind. First, their effects depend on the nature of underlying social safety nets for 
health. Second, income and insurance may operate complementary to one another; at 
other times, they each exert independent effects. Third, their influence varies by the 
type of services. This complexity highlights the necessity of understanding the broader 
health-financing context within which economic factors operate.
An important facet of income-related inequity is the disproportionate burden of out-of- 
pocket payments on lower-income groups. Generally, tax-based financing schemes 
tend to be the most equitable systems, in which there are generally no out-of-pocket 
payments charged at the point-of-use. Research suggests the systems found the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand tend to be more equitable than those found in other highly 
advanced countries (Barnett, 1984; Chemovsky, 1995; Bloom, 2001; Muennig et al, 
2005a). Furthermore, health systems primarily financed through social health insurance 
have been shown to exhibit greater income inequity in financing and utilisation than 
those that are tax-based (Xu et al, 2003; van Doorslaer et al, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007;
Lu et al, 2007).
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Several studies have shown the difference in the effect of income and insurance on 
acute versus preventative care. Whilst acute needs may be met regardless of financing 
method due to the nature of their urgency, Cutler and Mas (2003) suggest that this may 
not be the case for preventative care. Using the example of chronic health conditions, 
they explain that chronic health conditions require regular, preventative care, where 
reimbursement gains are lower than for high-technology equipment for more acute 
cases. As such, providers in privately financed schemes may not have as much of an 
incentive to attend to preventative needs as to acute needs.
Regular care by a health provider is critical both for ensuring equity and for improving 
overall health status. For example, regular care for asthma sufferers has been found to 
decrease rates of in-patient hospitalisation and emergency care, whilst improving 
overall health (Sin et al, 2004; Wisnivesky et al, 2005). The use of general practitioners 
has been correlated with lower rates of obesity and higher self-assessed health (Morris 
and Gravelle, 2006; Gravelle et al, 2008). Therefore, the effect of economic status on 
certain types of health care is particularly useful to understand.
Given the generally discretionary perception of outpatient care, income has been found 
to play a large role. A higher income has been associated with a greater use of 
outpatient care, but had a negligible effect on inpatient care. These studies suggested 
that income was a greater determinant of outpatient use than of inpatient use (Anderson 
and Benham, 1970; Phelps, 1975; Ware et al, 1986; Van Doorslaer, 1987). This is 
especially the case for specialist physicians and dental services (Dowd, 1991; Noro et 
al, 1999; van Doorslaer, 2004). The effects of a higher education and being employed 
have also been found to be similar to that of income (Lourenço and Ferreira, 2005; 
Propper et al, 2005).
In some studies, a higher income was found to be associated with a lower likelihood of 
using certain types of outpatient services, largely due to preferences or opting-out for 
other types of care. The use of general practitioners has often been associated with 
lower incomes. At the same time, hospital outpatient care and specialist care have been 
associated with higher incomes. These observations have been found in Germany 
(Lengerke et al, 2000), the United Kingdom (Morris et al, 2005), Spain (Gomez and 
Nicolas, 2007), and elsewhere.
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2.3.3. Effect of insurance on utilisation
Likewise, insurance coverage generally increases the use of outpatient care, but can 
have less of an effect on the likelihood of using inpatient care. It is important to note 
that the use of outpatient and inpatient care can be complementary or substitutions for 
one another. This depends on the system of referrals in a given health scheme. In 
general, however, these findings substantiate Anderson’s framework of the economic 
determinants of non-discretionary versus discretionary services.
Income may indirectly influence the use of health services depending on how privatised 
the insurance and supply markets are. A sizeable market for voluntary, private health 
insurance can exacerbate inequity, including cases where social safety nets exist but are 
relatively weak (Thompson and Mossialos, 2007). In the United States and Spain, 
income has been found to exert most of its effect through health insurance, where it can 
be purchased voluntarily (Gemmill et al, 2006; Costa-Font et al, 2007).
Even where health financing is largely public, the supply of private providers can also 
introduce social inequities in access to health care. In the early 1980s, governments in 
the United States, South Africa, and Finland began promoting the privatisation of 
hospital providers (Walker, 1986; Price 1988; Keskimaki, 2003). The main aims of 
such efforts were to increase efficiency and reduce the burden on the public purse. In 
some cases, private providers were still contracted by public entities, with beneficiaries 
often covered fully. In the case of Finland, primary care hospitals found it more 
lucrative to move to wealthier locations within cities, catering to higher-income groups 
who could afford to pay for more services. These results were controversial. Socio­
economically disadvantaged areas now faced a triple burden: ill health, a low ability to 
pay, and fewer local providers. Similarly, in Italy and Malaysia, a higher income has 
been associated with a lower use of public services, but a greater use of private services 
(Heller, 1982; Fabbri and Monfardini, 2005).
The distribution of public financing and criteria for coverage can also determine the 
likelihood of utilisation for different groups. For example, in the United Kingdom and 
Canada, the use of general practitioner care was directly associated with income, 
partially explained by the relatively higher supply of physicians in wealthier areas 
(Bago d’Uva, 2005; Asada and Kephart, 2007). O’Donnell et al (2007) also
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demonstrated that aggregate public health expenditure tends to be concentrated amongst 
the relatively well off in several Asian countries. These observations mirror the 
observation found in England at the turn of the century, regarding the distribution of 
maternal health services.
Walker (1986) offers a compelling argument against mal-aligned health financing 
reforms that favour market forces, using empirical evidence available in the mid-1980s. 
Reforms proposed in the United States affected the extent to which state funding and 
provision would be shifted to the private sector. Medicare, the federally funded 
insurance scheme for older citizens, would contract with private providers and private 
health insurance companies to administer Medicare benefits on behalf of some 
beneficiaries.
As Walker (1986) points out, the resulting reforms had grave consequences many 
beneficiaries. These effects were particularly worse for those with a higher-than- 
average medical need and often could not afford treatment. In particular, access to 
health services decreased for older people and those with chronic health conditions 
following reforms. At the same time, some forms of insurance may increase the 
likelihood of certain services whilst decreasing others. In the case of the United States, 
private insurance has been associated with higher inpatient admissions. Yet coverage 
by public insurers, such as Medicare, has been associated with higher pharmaceutical 
and outpatient care, but lower inpatient care (Gemmill et al, 2006). This highlights the 
importance of considering demand- and supply-side incentives to use care, which 
ranges from cost-sharing schemes to provider payment mechanisms.
2.3.4. Effect of out-of-pocket payments on utilisation
Evidence of the financial burden of health care is found even in schemes with insurance 
coverage. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment showed the price sensitivity of co­
payments associated with the point-of-use (Keeler, 1992). To some, results were 
surprising. The study found that the level of co-payment did not inhibit use as much as 
the very existence of a co-payment. This suggests both an affordability issue as well as 
social aversion regarding out-of-pocket payments for health care.
Although the price-elasticity of demand was higher amongst lower-income groups, the 
effect was apparent across all income levels. The message was clear: cost sharing
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tends to reduce service utilisation, holding other factors equal; even with the charge is 
considered low. Clearly the effect of out-of-pocket payments can vary depending on 
the incremental benefit to the beneficiary, but these results suggest the general role of 
cost sharing.
Evidence from lower-income countries has demonstrated similar effects regarding 
privatisation. In the 1990s, the Chinese government began a process of radically 
reforming its health system, which ultimately disadvantaged lower-income groups 
(Grogan, 1995). The emphasis of reforms was privatisation of both funding and 
provision. Reforms saw the collapse of traditional, community health care that was 
especially valuable to rural communities. These communities were largely outside of 
the formal employment sector and relatively poorer than their urban counterparts. In 
time, this led to a growing disparity in access to care between urban and mral 
populations.
In the absence of comprehensive coverage, user fees have been associated with reduced 
access to care in less developed countries. Evidence spans a variety of health services, 
from maternal services to mental health care (Klavus et al, 1996; Palmer et al, 2004; 
Ensor et al, 2005; Knapp et al, 2006). In a seminal study on user fees in Peru, the 
introduction of co-payments was associated with a reduction in health service use 
(Gertler et al, 1984). Importantly, there was a disproportionately greater decrease in 
demand amongst people at lower socioeconomic levels. Amongst those who did use 
services, living standards were more negatively affected amongst lower-income groups.
One argument in favour of co-payments suggests that they may not necessarily always 
decrease utilisation, but the evidence is still far from conclusive. For example, in a 
study in the Cameroon, the introduction of user fees in conjunction with the 
introduction of previously unavailable medicines was examined (Litvack, 1993). The 
study found that utilisation increased immediately in cases where fees were associated 
with medicines. The introduction of fees alone decreased the utilisation of services 
(Litvack 1993). Whether such an effect can be generalised is questionable, since the 
study was relatively small in scale and did not cover a long-enough period.
Importantly, evidence from the Rand study provides more robust evidence that does not 
support any long-term benefits of user fees.
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Ultimately, lower-income groups face the choice of paying relatively higher opportunity 
costs to access care, or foregoing care altogether. Indeed, the burden of out-of-pocket 
health expenditure has been found to exacerbate poverty levels (Lu et al, 2007; van 
Doorslaer et al, 2007). This suggests that lower-income groups often face no other 
choice but a relatively higher financial burden in seeking care.
Public financing that is equitably allocated yields a way out. For example, in the case 
of Vietnam, the introduction of governmental, health insurance in 1992 was associated 
with a reduction of out-of-pocket payments by 200% (Jowett, 2003). This led to 
improved access to care and better levels of self-assessed health. Therefore, the role of 
appropriately targeted public financing in health can offer substantial benefits.
2.4. Chapter summary
The role of economic status in access to health care depends on (i) societal perspectives 
towards health; (ii) the role of the state in health financing; and (iii) the relative impact 
of other social factors on the demand for health care. A social orientation towards 
health is associated with comprehensive social safety nets for the provision of health 
services.
Economic inequity in the use of health services, particularly outpatient care, tends to be 
lower in health systems in which social safety nets are comprehensive. Inequity has 
been attributed to several factors such as the distribution of supply and fees charged at 
the point-of-service. The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that health 
insurance and risk pooling schemes that are not based on ability to pay tend to reduce 
financial barriers to accessing health care. Therefore, enabling factors such as income 
level and social or private health insurance coverage become more important in systems 
where social safety nets do not exist or fail to provide adequate coverage for health care. 
The conceptual model adapted for the thesis will be explained in the next chapter, 
showing how the role of economic status in health care can vary depending on the 
underlying health care financing system, amongst other factors such as supply of health 
care and behavioural attitudes.
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Chapter 3. Methods
3.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the methods used to examine the research questions for the thesis. 
First, a brief overview of the methodological approach used to address each of the 
research questions is presented. Second, the choice of countries used for the analysis is 
explained. Third, the theoretical framework for the analysis is discussed. Fourth, the 
descriptive and multivariate methods applied to the data are presented. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the main limitations of the thesis.
3.2. Summary of research questions
The central research question of the thesis is to evaluate the impact of income and 
health insurance on the demand for health services in different health systems. This 
overall question is addressed in the thesis by examining a set of individual, inter-related 
research questions, presented in Chapter One and in Table 3.1 below. The first research 
question assesses health need in a broad sense, including levels of ill health as well as 
rates of health care use as reported different income groups. In addition, the financial 
cost of using health care bome by households is described. It is assumed that health 
insurance coverage lowers financial barriers for households; the assumption is that out- 
of-pocket payments may impinge on essential spending for poorer households, 
representing a barrier to care.
The second question further explores whether income status affects utilisation through 
the effect of health insurance, by examining if it is a significant determinant of health 
insurance through regression techniques.
The third and fourth questions examine the relative effects of income and insurance in 
explaining health care use, through regression methods designed to assess the 
probability and intensity of utilisation.
The fifth question assesses the results and their overall policy implications, in terms of 
whether economic factors affect the probability and/or intensity of care; whether they
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have more of an effect on certain services over others; whether these results are 
consistent with the literature; and the general health policy implications that result for 
most health systems.
Finally, the sixth question examines policy implications specific to health financing 
systems in Egypt and Lebanon. Based on differences in the country results, 
implications for financing systems are drawn that pertain to each country’s political and 
economic circumstances.
Table 3.1 Research Questions______________________________________________
1. How are health need and out-of-pocket payments for health care distributed across 
income levels in different health financing systems?
2. What are the socioeconomic factors that determine the probability of being covered by 
social and private health insurance schemes?
3. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance coverage 
explain the use of various types of ouQiatient health services?
4. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance coverage 
explain the use of various types of hospital-based health services?
5. Based on the study findings regarding economic determinants of utilisation, what are the 
overall policy implications regarding the design of health financing systems towards the aim 
of alleviating disparities in access to health care?
6. For each of the research questions, how does the effect of income and insurance compare 
between Egypt and Lebanon and what are the specific policy implications for each of these 
two health systems?
3.3. Country selection
Egypt and Lebanon are used as case studies for four main reasons. First, there is 
relatively little empirical evidence on the topic in these countries. Second, their health 
systems differ from one another with respect to the role of the state in health care 
financing. Third, they share linguistic, social, historical, and cultural backgrounds, 
allowing the researcher to control for unobservable factors to the extent possible. Since 
health care practice is also similar, the meaning of the variables is assumed to transcend 
borders. Fourth, quantitative data required for each country were available from a 
single international survey, which offers the advantage of direct, cross-national 
comparability. This data forms the basis of the thesis, supplemented by background 
information collected from the literature and visits to the countries.
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3.4. Contextual background
Egypt and Lebanon are located where three continents meet at the Mediterranean, 
sharing elements of social values found in Southern Europe, Western Asia, and North 
Africa (Figure). In particular, this section focuses on the role of the state and citizen in 
health financing. A comparison of all aspects of the health systems is beyond the scope 
of this thesis; the main interest is the underlying state-society framework and how this is 
reflected in health financing systems.
Both Egypt and Lebanon have been engaged in reforming their health care systems 
since the early 1990s, particularly in the area of quality of care and population coverage. 
One of the reasons has been a recognition that social outcomes, such as education and 
health, have lagged behind economic development in comparison to other similar 
economies. Amongst many possible explanations, lagged social outcomes have been 
attributed to weak state-society relationships (Turner, 1984; Issawi, 1989; Karshenas 
and Moghadam, 2006).
Early scientific and philosophical traditions in the region supported the equilibrium 
concept of health from a holistic perspective. As early as the ninth century, physicians 
and philosophers from Cordoba to Cairo recognised the complex relationship between 
social conditions and well-being (Gran, 1979). The role of the state was seen as 
necessary to providing the conditions for productive activity according to Ibn-Khaldun, 
considered to be the forefather of modem production theory (Boulakia, 1971).
The concept of health in the Arab world has since shifted to one that focuses on the 
‘sick role’ and acute illness (Leslie, 1980; Gallagher, 2001; Adib, 2004). This 
perspective resembles the negative approach to health that emphasises ‘disease’, as 
described in the previous chapter. The nature of the health sector in the modem Middle 
East generally reflects a social emphasis on ‘disease’, rather than on ‘health’. As such, 
since the creation of modem health systems in most countries in the Middle East during 
the 1940s-1960s, there has generally been a relatively high proportion of health 
expenditure on secondary and tertiary care. Preventative and primary health care, with 
some exceptions due to vertical or selected public health campaigns, have tended to 
receive relatively little govemmental expenditure, with the private sector involved to 
varying extents.
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Egypt and Lebanon share similarities and notable differences in overall health status 
and health system structures (Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). Both countries currently face a 
dual burden of communicable- and non-communicable chronic health conditions, due to 
epidemiological changes (WHO, 2006; Akala and El-Saharty, 2006; Adeyi et al, 2007). 
A relatively limited political and economic national discourse on health system policy is 
found in Egypt and Lebanon. Specialists and acute care providers generally dominate 
the provision of health services, as they do in much of the Middle East (Karshenas and 
Moghadam, 2005; Jabbour et al, 2006; Maziak, 2006). Family support and social 
arrangements also play important roles in health care in the Middle East (Zurayk et al, 
1997).
Despite many similarities in the epidemiological profile and some dimensions of the 
health care economy, the role of the state in financing health services differs between 
Egypt and Lebanon. The next section examines the health financing arrangements 
against the backdrop of the broader political and economic context in each country.
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Figure 3.1 map showing Egypt and Lebanon
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Table 3.2 Egypt and Lebanon; Social and Health Indicators
Indicator Egypt Lebanon
Population (thousands) 74 000^ 4 050*
Date of independence 1923^ 1943^
Political system 1923-52 parliamentary 
monarchy; 1952-present, 
multi-party democracy^
1943-present, multi­
party confessional 
democracy^’®
Orientation to economic development State-mediated / 
liberal^'*
Liberal, laissez- 
faire®’^
Gross national income per capita (PPP $) $1260 ' $6320 *
Unemployment rate (%) 10.2%^ 11.5%’°’’*
Poverty rate (%) 17%^’^ 28.5%*^
Literacy rate, adult average (% literate) 71%* 87%*
Health status
Life expectancy at birth, adult average 
(years)
71* 72.5 *
Infant mortality rate 
(deaths /1,000 live births)
28* 3 0 ’
Sources: 1. World Bank, 2008 (Egypt: 2005 values. Lebanon: Population and gross national 
income, 2(X)6; Literacy rate, 2003; health indicators, 2005). 2. Office of the Presidency, 
Government of Egypt, 2008. 3. Hinnebusch, 2001. 4. El Badawi and Makdisi, 2007. 5. 
Handoussa et al, 2004 (2000 values). 6. El-laithy et al, 2003. 7. Office of the Presidency, 
Government of Lebanon, 2008. 8. El-Badawi and Makdisi, 2007. 9. Gaspard, 2004. 10. 
Kasparian, 2(X)3. 11. World Bank, 2005 (PER). 12. Laithy et al, 2008.
Table 3.3 Egypt and Lebanon; Health System Indicators
Indicator Egypt Lebanon
Supply of health care providers*
Physicians (density per 1 (XX) population) 0 .9 f 3.25
Nurses (density per 1 000 population) 1.55^ 1.18
Pharmacists (density per 1 000 population) 0.14^ 0.95
Hospital beds (per 10 000 population) 21.5^ 36
National health account indicators*
Total expenditure on health (THE) as % GDP 5.5^ 11.2^
General government expenditure on health (GGHE) as % THE 38.4 28.3
Private expenditure on health (PvtHE) as % THE 61.6 71.7
General government expenditure (GGHE) on health as % GDP 1.8^ 1.0^
Social security expenditure on health as % GGHE 28.6 34.8
Out-of-pocket spending on health as % PvtHE 94.6 82.1
Private prepaid plans expenditure on health as % PvtHE 0.3 15.4
Externally funded expenditure on health as % THE 0.9 1.7
Expenditure on inpatient care as % THE 20.7 30.6
Expenditure on preventative and public health care as % THE 9.6 1.9
Notes: GD P= gross domestic product.
Sources: (1) World Health Organization Statistical Informatic System, 2008. Health supply 
values shown for Egypt: physicians, 2003; nurses and pharmacists, 2004; hospital beds, 2005. Values for 
Lebanon, 2001, except hospital beds, 2005. Expenditure values shown for 2005, except expenditure on 
inpatient and preventative care: Egypt, 2002; Lebanon, 2003. (2) Ministry of Health and Population,
Egypt, 2007. (3) Ministry of Finance, Egypt, 2007. (4) Ministry of Finance, Lebanon, 2007. (5) World Bank, 2005.
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3.4.1. Egypt
3.4.11. Organisation and coverage of health services
‘The basis of society is social solidarity... [and] the State shall guarantee cultural, social 
and health services and shall work to ensure them ...’, states the Egyptian Constitution 
(1923/1952, Articles 7 and 16). At nearly eighty million inhabitants, Egypt is one of the 
oldest nation-states in the world. Many consider it the most politically stable country in 
the Middle East (UNDP, 2005; El-Zanaty and Way, 2006; World Bank, 2007). This has 
been attributed to a relatively autocratic style of government combined with a 
constitutional parliamentary system of government (Fahmy, 2002).
The Egyptian population faces similar challenges as other lower-middle-income 
countries, such as relatively high rates of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy 
(UNDP, 2005; World Bank, 2007). Egypt has managed to eradicate most infectious 
diseases and greatly improve and maternal and child health since the 1960s, largely due 
to targeted public health campaigns (El-Zanaty and Way, 2006). This effort has been 
supported by an emphasis on primary care and nursing training (M. Amin, personal 
communication, 23 July 2008).
The Ministry of Health and Population oversees the organisation, financing and 
provision of the Egyptian national health service, as well as other governmental 
agencies providing separate systems of social health insurance. The Egyptian 
government finances and provides health care through a universal social safety net 
system, although many other fragmented, social health insurance schemes operate in 
parallel. The government runs and operates a universal health system, directly 
providing services to all citizen through Ministry of Health-operated facilities. The 
universal national health service system of health care was established in 1952 and 
reflects the State’s commitment to social solidarity and universal coverage as outlined 
in the Egyptian Constitution (1952). However, since the 1970s, progress in social 
policy has been relatively fragmented and services have been under-resourced, owing 
largely to the shift towards liberal economic strategies which have brought the growth 
of private provision and direct, fee-for-service payments to private providers (Bayat, 
2006).
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In addition to the universal national health system providing a social safety net to all 
citizens, numerous other systems operate in parallel (Figure 3.3). In effect, the Ministry 
of Health network of free care has become the choice of last resort for citizens unable to 
afford higher-quality care. Coverage of health service benefits and quality of care 
varies widely between funding schemes (A. Elgazzar, personal communication, 15 Sept.
2008). The Ministry of Health is a general revenue-based service provider offering free 
care to any citizen. However, quality of care is generally perceived as poor, especially 
for public outpatient services (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999; Salem, 2002). Published data 
on the number of public providers is thought to be underestimated by many in Egypt, 
but the amount of public expenditure on health is considered relatively low (H. 
Handoussa, personal communication, 29 December 2007).
The Health Insurance Organisation, established in 1964, operates as a social health 
insurance scheme under the auspices of the Ministry of Health. Eligibility was initially 
open to those employed in the formal sector excluding family members, with pensioners 
and enrolled students later added; half of the Egyptian population is enrolled in the 
scheme (Salem, 2002; Leila, 2006). The scheme is mainly financed through premiums 
and employer contributions, supplemented by general revenue funding due to deficits 
(Abd El Fattah et al, 1997; Nandakumar et al, 1999). Services are provided through 
integrated facilities or purchased from external providers.
3.4.1.2. Finance and Provider Payment Mechanisms
Funding of the health care system in Egypt derives from five main sources, including 
the Ministry of Health, the Health Insurance Organisation (General Authority for Health 
Insurance), specific ministries such as Transport and Defence, non-governmental 
organisations, and households. Private health insurance covers only one percent of the 
population (UNDP, 2005). Total spending on health care in Egypt is approximately $60 
per capita and 5.5% of gross domestic product, of which 60% is out-of-pocket (Ministry 
of Health, 2005; Ministry of Finance, 2007; WHO, 2006b). Total health expenditure is 
relatively similar to other lower-middle income countries (Figure 3.2). Yet the 
proportion of out-of-pocket expenditure is relatively high compared to other countries 
with higher or lower income levels, shown in Table 3.4.
Sources of health expenditure in Egypt are a mix between public and private sources 
(Table 3.5). In 1995, the majority of total health expenditure came from private and
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mainly out-of-pocket (55%), followed by general revenue sources (25%), and social 
insurance-based financing (20%) (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999). In 2006, sources of 
expenditure were similar to those in 1995: private expenditure (62%), general revenue 
(27%), and social health insurance (11%) (WHO, 2006b). Health Insurance 
Organisation spending per capita is approximately double that of Ministry of Health 
spending (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999).
The proportion of out-of-pocket spending in Egypt exceeds the World Health 
Organization-recommended threshold of 50% of total health care spending (WHO, 
2006b). Overall, formal and informal out-of-pocket expenditures make up the single 
largest source of revenue, mainly spent on outpatient services and pharmacy care.
The proportion of out-of-pocket expenditure in Egypt is relatively high by international 
standards, which is tied to the way in which the vast majority of providers are paid. 
Most physicians are employed by the public sector and are salaried employees of the 
Ministry of Health. However, salaries are generally considered too low for basic 
subsistence in Egypt, and therefore, the government permits most physicians to work in 
private clinics or own and operate their own private clinics. Within public hospitals 
and private sector for both outpatient and inpatient care, payments are made on a fee- 
for-service basis directly to providers for those who are not enrolled in social or private 
health insurance schemes. There is a weak regulatory system regarding tariffs, fee 
schedules or utilisation reviews, effectively resulting in a direct, fee-for-service system 
without any incentives for efficiency or high performance in terms of quality of 
outcomes.
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Figure 3.2 International comparisons of total health expenditure
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Table 3.4 International comparisons of health status indicators
Country Private 
expenditure 
as % total 
health 
expenditure 
(%)
Adult 
literacy 
rate (%)
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
(per 1,000 
live births)
Health life 
expectancy at 
birth (years)
Age-standardized 
mortality rate for 
cardiovascular 
diseases (deaths 
per 100,000)
Low- and Middle-Income Countries
Egypt 61.6 71 .4  
Lebanon 71.7 87.0
30
28
59
60
560
463
Tunisia 55.7 74.3 20 62 417
Turkey 28.6 87.4 26 62 542
Sri Lanka 53.8 90.7 12 62 314
Malaysia 55.0 88.7 10 63 274
High-Income Countries
Greece 57.2 96 .0 4 71 258
Portugal 27.7 93.8 4 69 208
France 20.1 99 .0 4 72 118
Switzerland 40.3 99 .0 4 73 142
United 12.9 99 .0 5 71 182
Kingdom 
United States 54.9 99.0 6 69 188
Source: World Health Organisation Statistical Information System, 2008. Data are for 2002-2006. 
Cardiovascular deaths shown as an indicator of the burden of non-communicable diseases in each 
country.
3.4.1.3. Provision of care and utilisation
Provision of health care services is split between private and public providers. Although 
95% of the population is within five kilometres of a medical facility, most public 
outpatient services are inadequately equipped and staff poorly motivated (El-Zanaty and 
Way, 2006; Salem, 2002). As a result, seventy percent of outpatient care is obtained
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privately, largely by the well off, whilst poorer groups who cannot afford private care 
rely on the Ministry of Health (Ellis et al, 1994). Overall, the wealthy report up to four 
times as many outpatient-visits and one and a half times the length of inpatient stays as 
the poor (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999).
Evidence on the equity effects of financing schemes is limited, but research suggests 
that the system is associated with income-related inequity in financing and access. In 
terms of financing, the burden of health expenses is much higher for poorer citizens 
than their richer countrymen; as a share of household income, the poorest quintile spent 
10% as compared to 2% by the richest in 1999 (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999). Whilst 
Ministry of Health spending is fairly evenly distributed across income, evidence 
suggests that Health Insurance Organisation spending for the richest quintile is double 
that for the poorest (Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999).
In terms of reforms aimed at improving access to services, the expansion of Egyptian 
social health insurance to enrolled children in the early 1990s does not appear to have 
evened income-associated distribution of utilisation or health spending (Rannan-Eliya et 
al, 1999). User fee exemptions in the Family Health Fund were considered poorly 
managed, leading half of all enrolees to opt out of the scheme (Dcegami, 2007).
3.41.4. Reform measures for health policy
As part of the Health Sector Reform Programme initiated in the 1990s, the Ministry of 
Health has been focused on improving access to high quality care, efficiency, choice of 
providers, alleviating the oversupply of specialists, and strengthening the system’s 
financial sustainability (World Bank, 1998; Ministry of Health, 2005; ADB, 2005;
Leila, 2006; Leila, 2007; Egypt SIS, 2007).
The 2007-2008 reform proposals in Egypt primarily call for expanding the Health 
Insurance Organisation scheme, including the following measures: the separation of 
funding and provision through the creation of a fund-holding entity in lieu of separate 
Ministry of Health and Health Insurance Organisation pools; the introduction of a basic 
benefits package; the introduction of user fees to cover up to one-third the cost of 
approved medications, ambulatory and hospital services; and the introduction of 
managed care and competition between providers based upon quality of care (Ministry 
of Health, 2005; Egypt SIS, 2006; Leila, 2007; Egypt SIS, 2007).
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With such major financing proposals under review, a debate has ensued around the 
expansion of social health insurance and the introduction of strategic purchasing, with 
concerns voiced regarding equity and provider autonomy effects (Khalil and Ebeid, 
2006; El-Khashab, 2007). Overall, the disparity in expenditure and access in Egypt has 
resulted in a three-tiered system in Egypt: an underlying system based on citizenship, a 
parallel system based on social insurance, and a complementary system based on 
ability-to-pay.
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Figure 3.3 Egypt: Health Financing System
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Figure shows flow of funds from the main sources of financing directly or indirectly through intermediaries to providers of health care.
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Table 3.5 Egypt: Health Financing Coverage
Financing Scheme/Eligibility Benefits Main sources of financing Main providers Coverage rate
Government health services: Comprehensive: • General revenues, central • M O H P prim ary health 100% of
• Prim ary preventive care governm ent budget allocated care units citizens eligible
All citizens are eligible for • Hospital inpatient care to M inistry o f Health and • M O H P hospitals for free services
free subsidized care at • M edications Population (M OHP) (central • For tertiary care.
designated public providers • Laboratory/diagnostic and govem orate) university and teaching
services. • D irect budget transfers from hospitals/institutes.
• Dental care M inistry o f Finance (M OF)
• Lim ited long-term care • Budget transfers from
• Referrals to tertiary care M inistry o f Higher
providers Education
• Lim ited overseas treatm ent • Nominal user fees
Health Insurance Comprehensive: • Employee and em ployer • Health Insurance 48%
Organisation (social health • Prim ary care /  general contributions (payroll tax) O rganisation facilities
insurance): practitioner • Tobacco consum ption tax • H ealth Insurance
• Public em ployees • Prim ary care /  specialist for student scheme O rganisation-contracted
• Private em ployees o f services • Household prem ium  (LE4) physicians, clinics and
form al sector • Physician home visits • C o-paym ents hospitals, including
• Enrolled students • Hospital inpatient care • General revenues (M OF) C urative Care
(infants through • M edications O rganisation, M O HP,
voluntary schem e) • Dental care and private providers.
• Pensioners • Prosthesis
• Excludes dependents • Physiotherapy
Private sector: Variable: • D irect household out o f • M ainly am bulatory care M ajority pay
• H ouseholds • D ependent on individual’s pocket payments provided by private out-of-pocket
• Lim ited private health ability to pay and availability • Limited insurance prem ium s physicians and clinics paym ents
insurance market o f services. • Private em ployer • Lim ited num bers o f
Private health insurance: contributions. private/non­ 1 % have private
• M ainly supplem entary and governm ental hospitals health insurance
com plem entary services
Sources: Abd El Fattah et al, 1997; Rannan-Eliya et al, 1999; Loewe, 2000; Nandakumar et al, 2000; Salem, 2002; Boggatz and Dassen, 2005; Loffredo, 2005; El- 
Zanaty and Way, 2006; World Bank, 2006; WHO, 2006e; A. Elgazzar, personal communication, 15 September 2008).
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3.4.2. Lebanon
3.4 2.1. Organisation and coverage of health services
‘With no natural resources... it has leaned heavily on the export of its services to pay 
its way in the international market,’ wrote historian Philip Hitti (1967). Lebanon’s 
history in social policy is a history in entrepreneurship. Its ancient status as a 
Phoenician centre of free trade has transcended time; today, it remains the only country 
in the world whose economy is considered to be freely laissez-faire (Gaspard, 2004). 
The Lebanese enjoy a relatively high income per capita and can claim to be the freest 
democracy in the Middle East (El-Badawi and Makdisi, 2007). Yet the country has also 
witnessed one of the longest civil wars in world history, between 1975 until 1990.
Ongoing political instability challenges reconstruction efforts, including health policy 
reform (A. Mroueh, personal communication, 24 April 2007; R. Naaman, personal 
communication 25 April 2007). Lebanon’s modern-day health system was established 
in 1943 just after independence from the French, with a series of subsequent piecemeal 
reforms in the midst of recurrent periods of political and economic upheaval (Ammar, 
2003; World Health Organization, 2006b).
3.4.2.2. Finance and Provider Payment Mechanisms
In Lebanon, over 70% of total health expenditure is private, whilst 30% is public.
Health care is largely financed through social health insurance and private sources, with 
means-tested benefits provided through general revenues for selected medical 
treatments. Public expenditure in the Lebanese health system derives from six different 
sources (Figure 3.4). The Ministry of Public Health finances approximately 48% of 
expenditures, followed by the National Social Security Fund at 15%, with the remainder 
of expenditure financed through the Civil Servants Cooperative, State Security, Internal 
Security Forces, General Security, Army and Ministry of Social Affairs (Ammar, 2003). 
Occupational group largely determines eligibility to each of these schemes (Table 3.6). 
However, some civil servants, professionals, and the relatively well off seek 
supplemental insurance coverage from other schemes due to incomplete coverage for 
most health care, particularly outpatient services (Lerberghe et al, 1997).
The majority of health expenditure in Lebanon is direct private, household expenditure. 
In 2005, approximately 80% of this expenditure was comprised of out-of-pocket 
payments, with the remainder for health insurance premiums (Ammar et al, 2000;
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Ammar, 2003). Approximately 14% of total household expenditure goes towards 
health, and ranges from 20% amongst the poorest quintile to 8% amongst the richest 
(Ministry of Public Health, 1999). Nearly all providers are paid on a fee-for-service 
basis through direct, out-of-pocket payments or contracts with social and private health 
insurance schemes. However, little incentives exist for high quality performance or 
efficiency.
Amongst 13 categories of household expenditures, health comprised the second-largest 
expenditure, after food, for the poorest groups, and the fifth for the richest groups.
Most out-of-pocket payments to health care in Lebanon go towards outpatient services, 
but a considerable amount is still spent on hospitalization and pharmaceuticals. On 
average, 37% of household health expenditure goes towards ambulatory, outpatient 
care; 15% on pharmaceuticals; 15% on health insurance premiums; 2% on hospital 
outpatient care; and 22% on dental care (Ministry of Public Health, 1999).
Although the social health insurance schemes should cover the majority of the 
population, figures suggest that the majority of public financing benefits a relatively 
small minority. 46% of the population are enrolled in social health insurance schemes, 
but are largely located in predominately urban, wealthier regions, with private health 
insurance operating in parallel (Jurjus, 1995; World Bank, 2000; Ammar, 2003).
3.4.2.3. Provision of care and utilisation
Whilst the Ministry of Health should cover uninsured groups, most people do not seek 
care from Ministry facilities due to a perceived low quality of care. In 1999, the 
majority of its funds, nearly 78%, were spent on inpatient care and high-technology 
procedures (World Bank, 2000; Ammar, 2003). In 2006, hospitalisation accounted for 
72% of the Ministry’s budget, providing hospital care for 4% of the Lebanese public 
(Ministry of Health, 2007; Ministry of Finance, 2007). Nearly half of the Ministry’s 
hospital budget comprises of reimbursement for services provided through the private 
sector, which account for 90% of all hospitals (Ministry of Health, 2007). In 2007, the 
hospital budget was spent nearly evenly between surgical (41%) and medical care 
(59%).
Pharmaceuticals are increasingly becoming a concern in Lebanon, due to rapidly 
inflating prices, an increasing reliance on the black market, and the lack of generics.
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Nearly 6% of the population receive medications subsidised by the Ministry, accounting 
for 13% of its budget (Ministry of Finance, 2007). The remainder of the population 
purchase medicines directly over-the-counter at private pharmacies, with limited 
coverage offered by social health insurance schemes (Ammar, 2003; Ministry of Health, 
2007). Of the citizens who receive medications, 11% received high-cost drugs for 
chronic health conditions and the remainder received medications listed as essential 
drugs. Amongst individuals who receive chronic medications, the majority are 
dispensed cancer-related medications (27.3%) and mental-health related medications 
(26.7%); the remainder comprise treatments for renal disease, hormonal replacement, 
organ transplant, and other long-term conditions (Ministry of Health, 2007).
The Ministry of Health does not directly fund primary health care services. Nearly 20% 
of the public receive primary health care services through the 147 primary health 
centres in the country, mainly private or charitable organisations (Ministry of Finance, 
2007). Of these facilities, 8 centres (5%) are Ministry of Health facilities operated by 
these organisations. Other basic and health services funded by the Ministry amounted 
to nearly 5%, and 10% of the budget was administrative.
Since approximately half of the population is not covered for either primary or 
secondary care, an estimated 14% of all households are enrolled in private health 
insurance, as of 1995. Between 2003 and 2007, estimates have ranged from 10% 
(Ministry of Finance, 2007) to 15% (Ammar, 2003). Most of the beneficiaries are 
pensioners and those with chronic health conditions who face formal or informal 
exclusion criteria in obtaining public insurance (Jurjus, 1995; Ammar, 2003).
3.4.I.4. Reform measures for health policy
The biggest challenges faced by the Lebanese health sector are related to inefficiency 
related to a fee-for-service reimbursement system that is relatively unregulated. These 
include a growing deficit; rapid cost escalation; and a lack of sufficient coverage for the 
majority of the population (Ammar, 2003; Ministry of Health, 2007). Overall, the 
problems with macro-inefficiency and lack of coverage have been attributed to a 
fragmented financing system and a relatively unregulated market for hospital and 
pharmaceutical services (Ammar, 2003; Ministry of Finance, 2007; A. Mroueh, 
personal communication, 24 April 2007).
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As far as coverage, the spectrum is vast. On the one hand, approximately half of all 
citizens have relatively adequate coverage for inpatient care and limited outpatient care, 
but lack coverage for pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, one-third of the population 
have no coverage whatsoever. Approximately 4% receive coverage for hospital care 
provided by the Ministry of Health, and 20% receive primary health services through 
charitable organisations.
Recent calls for reforms have focused on developing a comprehensive funding system 
that does the following: (i) targets vulnerable groups who are uninsured and (ii) 
regulates purchasing and delivery of health services on behalf of health insurance 
schemes (Ammar, 2003; Ministry of Finance, 2007). According to the Government of 
Lebanon, vulnerable groups are defined as households headed by females (14.2% of the 
population, of which 3% are considered very poor); working children (10% of children 
aged 10-19 years); citizens aged over 65 years (8%); people with disabilities (2%, or 
25% of individuals aged over 65 years); agricultural and fishery workers (9%); and the 
unemployed (2%) (Ministry of Finance, 2007).
Through the establishment of a ‘strategic purchasing authority’ and referral systems, 
these reforms would help to control cost escalation through regulating which and where 
services are provided, particularly high-cost treatments at hospitals (Ammar, 2003). 
Many have echoed calls for improvement in primary health care since this is relatively 
under-utilised in Lebanon. This under-utilisation has been attributed partially to a lack 
of investment in facilities, and partially to a low shortage of nurses and general 
practitioners who practice primary health care, despite the over-supply of specialist 
physicians (Abyad and Mehio Sibai, 1992; Kassak et al, 2006; El-Jardali et al, 2008; M. 
Amin, personal communication, 23 July 2008).
Current reform measures are focused on improving efficiency in the hospital and 
pharmaceutical sectors (Ministry of Health, 2007). These issues are related to the 
performance of primary health care in (i) gate-keeping care to secondary and tertiary 
facilities and (ii) prevention of illness requiring such care. Although reform measures 
for improving efficiency may help contain cost escalation, the uninsured populations 
remain a concern.
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Figure 3.4 Lebanon: Health Financing System
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Table 3.6 Lebanon; Health Financing Coverage
Financing Scheme / Eligibility Benefits Main sources of fînancing Main providers Coverage rate
Government reimbursement:
Lim ited to exceptional cases
Selective:
• Selected diagnostic procedures + co-pay
• 100% for high-cost treatm ents (open- 
heart surgery, cancer/drugs, renal 
dialysis, organ transplantation)
• Lim ited hospitalisation + 15% co-pay
• Free vaccination
• G eneral revenues, central 
governm ent budget allocated 
to M inistry o f H ealth and 
Population (M OH) (central)
• Private hospitals -13%
(C itizens with 
dem onstrated 
financial need, 
typically elderly, 
unem ployed, low- 
incom e.)
National Social Security Fund (social 
health insurance):
• Public em ployees
• Private em ployees o f form al sector
• Perm anent agricultural em ployees
• U niversity students
• Includes dependents (partial coverage)
• Public teacher, vendors, medical 
professionals
Mainly curative care + <10-20% co-pay:
• H ospital inpatient care -t- 10% co-pay
• Lim ited outpatient care reimbursed + 
15% co-pay
• Lim ited dental
• Em ployee and em ployer 
contributions (payroll tax)
• Household prem ium
• General revenues
• Co-paym ents
• Private 
hospitals.
18%
Governmental and mutual funds
• Perm anent governm ental / Uniform ed 
staff
• C ooperatives’ mutuals
• Includes dependents (partial coverage)
Mainly curative care + 25% co-pay:
• Hospital inpatient care + 10% co-pay
• L im ited outpatient care reimbursed + 
25% co-pay
• Army: fully com prehensive
• General revenues
• 1 % payroll tax
• Mutuals: Households, 
governm ent subsidies.
• Private hospitals 23% (in total)
Private sector:
• H ouseholds
• Sizeable private health insurance 
m arket
Variable:
• D ependent on individual’s ability to pay 
and availability o f services.
Private health insurance:
• C om prehensive: physician and hospital 
care
• D irect household out o f 
pocket paym ents
• Sizeable household 
prem ium s
• Private em ployer 
contributions.
• Specialist care 
at private clinics
• Private hospitals
M ajority pay out- 
of-pocket 
paym ents 
-10-15%  have 
private health 
insurance
Sources: Kronfol and Bachshur, 1989; Kronfol, 2002; Lebanon National Health Accounts, 1998; World Bank, 2000; Ammar, 2003; Consultation and Research 
Institute, 2005. WHO, 2006f; Ministry of Finance, Lebanon, 2007.
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3.4.3. Comparative analysis
Egypt and Lebanon share a similar social and cultural orientation, but the overall 
organisation of the health sector differs between the two countries (Table 3.7). On the 
one hand, both countries are middle-income countries, although income per capita is 
considerably lower in Egypt than in Lebanon. In both countries, this economic and 
social development seems to have been unbalanced, allowing social inequalities to 
persist. Their common social heritage also translates into similar health perceptions and 
medical practice.
On the other hand, the underlying political frameworks at a national and health system 
level contrast between the two countries. Egypt reflects a relatively ‘solidarity-based 
social system, led by a series of powerful leaders. Economic development has generally 
been state-led, with a combination of nationalisation and privatisation. By contrast, the 
Lebanese political system is highly fragmented, with powered divided between 
approximately eighteen different political factions. Its mercantile, laissez-faire 
economic development has continued through civil war, leaving much of the 
responsibility for social support to private and non-govemmental actors.
The nature of the health financing systems in Egypt and Lebanon also reveals stark 
differences. Whilst a universal system of health care provisions exists for all citizens to 
use in Egypt, no such system exists in Lebanon. Social health insurance schemes 
operate in both countries and are mandatory for most civil servants. Where the private 
health insurance market is negligible in Egypt, it is relatively thriving in Lebanon, 
where approximately 15% of the population have voluntarily purchased this type of 
insurance.
Considerable public provision is found in Egypt, although citizens prefer to go to 
private outpatient providers. In contrast, the vast majority of provision in Lebanon is 
private and dominated by hospitals. Furthermore, providers in both countries are 
generally paid on a fee-for-service basis, and neither health system incorporates 
substantive systems of performance-based payments. Understanding such similarities 
and differences between the Egyptian and Lebanese health systems help to unravel 
demand- and supply-side incentives to utilise certain types of health services over 
others.
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Table 3.7 Summary: Comparison of health system organisation, Egypt and 
Lebanon
Param eter Egypt Lebanon
Overall organisation
Degree of centralised policy­ Relatively centralised Relatively fragmented
making and planning by
Ministry of Health
Financing
Sources of financing
•Direct governmental National health service Means-tested coverage for
revenues finance universal provides free care to all selected treatment provided to
health system operated by citizens 13% of citizens
Ministry of Health
• Social health insurance Operates in parallel to • Social security fund cover
national health service (48% 18% of citizens
of citizens enrolled) • Other social health insurance
cover 23% of citizens
•Private health insurance Voluntary, supplementary; Voluntary,
1% of citizens enrolled. comprehensive/supplementary;
15% of citizens enrolled.
•Household out-of-pocket Most households; 58.3% of Most households; 58.9% of
payments total health expenditure. total health expenditure
Provision
Outpatient care: % delivered -70% >95%
through private providers
Inpatient care: % delivered -30% -90%
through private providers
Presence of functioning gate- Relatively weak Negligible
keeping system
Predominant provider
payment mechanism:
•Public outpatient clinics Salary irrespective of output Not applicable
•Private outpatient clinics Fee for service Fee for service or charitable
• Public inpatient hospitals Fee for service Fee for service
•Private inpatient hospitals Fee for service Fee for service
3.5. Conceptual framework for the analysis
The effect of economic determinants on utilisation is assessed by applying a theoretical 
and empirical model of the demand for health care, based on the work of Grossman 
(1972), Anderson (1975), Wagstaff et al (1991), Pohmeier and Ulrich (1995), and 
others. The conceptual model introduced in Chapter Two is based on the behavioural 
model of utilisation proposed by Anderson and Newman (1973), shown in Figure 3.5 as 
adapted in more detail for the analysis in this thesis.
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Figure 3.5 Conceptual model used in the thesis: Effect of economic status on utilisation
DEMAND FOR 
HEALTH SERVICES: 
UTILISATION
PREDISPOSING
FACTORS:
Age 
Gender 
Marital Status 
Education
Health
effects
HEALTH CARE 
NEED
Overall Self- 
Assessed Health, 
Pain, Chronic health
Choice to use services
ENABLING FACTORS:
• ECONOM IC STATUS: 
•Personal financial protection: 
Enrolment in social/private health 
insurance 
•Ability to pay: income level 
•ACCESS TO SOCIAL SAFETY  
NETS: Coverage through universal 
health care coverage/social safety 
net (unobserved factor)
Choice of service
Choice of provider
Choice of amount of 
care
Sources: Adapted from Anderson and Newman, 1973, as well as Grossman, 1972; W agstaff et al, 1991; Anderson, 1995; 
Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Marmot, 2005.
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The conceptual model used in the thesis frames the analysis for examining the effect of 
enabling factors, such as economic status, which mediate the relationship between 
health care need and the demand for health services. The additional elements for the 
model that are proposed in this thesis include: (i) the intermediate component entitled 
'health effects’ and (ii) the various associations between enabling factors and various 
components of the demand for health care.
Grossman’s (1972) model for the demand for health is based on a human capital 
approach, in which health is a matter of investment (Mushkin, 1962; Van Doorslaer, 
1987). The model stems from production theory and describes health (output) as a 
function of investment (labour) and an initial stock of health (capital) (Estrin and 
Laidler, 1995).
The choice to invest in health is posited within a utility maximizing function under 
constraints, where an individual’s total utility is a function of the utility derived from 
their inherited initial ‘stock of health’, the ‘stock of health’ over time, and the 
consumption of other commodities. In Grossman’s model, the stock or amount of 
health at a given time t is subject to the amount of investment in related goods in the 
period immediately preceding it, such as medical care, length of time, and human 
capital (Grossman, 1972), expressed as:
Ht+i - H t  = It~ ÔiHi, Equation 3.1
It = It (Mt, Tt; Et) Equation 3.2
where It is gross investment in health, ôt is the rate of depreciation during the r-th 
period, M, is medical care, 77/, is time input, and E, is the stock of human capital 
(Grossman, 1972). In effect, the demand for health is only observable through the 
demand for health care given its latent properties (Culyer, 1976; Williams, 1978).
In this thesis, demand for health care is conceptualised as depicted in Figure 3.4. Based 
on predisposing factors, such as age, gender, employment status and educational level, 
and the need for health care, the individual’s choice to access, or utilise, health services 
arises. The bridge between the need for health care and the realised use of services is 
represented by a set of enabling factors; in this thesis, these are indicated by ability to 
pay, represented by income level, and coverage of health care services through social or
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private health insurance; and coverage through universal safety nets. The existence of 
universal safety nets, such as Egypt’s national health system that is available to all 
citizens, is unobserved in the dataset used for the analysis but is known based on 
information regarding the health care systems in each country.
The application of this model contributes new evidence to the body of knowledge 
regarding the economic determinants of the demand for health care in two contrasting 
funding systems from the Middle East region. The model is applied to the case of 
various outpatient services and inpatient services. It is also applied to the probability of 
using services and, conditional upon use, the number of visits to health care providers. 
In this way, the theory that the determinants of health care vary depending on how 
discretionary the service is and whether the decision is that of the individual or the 
agent (provider) is tested in two countries from which such evidence is lacking.
3.6. Empirical framework for the analysis
Following this logic, the demand for health is latent and only observed through the 
demand for health care (Culyer, 1976; Williams, 1978), where the demand for health 
care, Mt, is expressed as a function of Anderson’s social determinants:
Mt =  fitXt + CtHt +  V , Equation 3.3
where X is a vector of observed characteristics, i.e., predisposing and enabling factors, 
i/, represents stock of health/medical need at time t, p and c represent parameter 
estimates, and v represents unobserved disturbance terms (Van de Yen and Van der 
Gaag, 1982; Wolfe and Behrman, 1984).
Depending on the role of enabling factors such as ability to pay, as indicated by income, 
the relative importance of socioeconomic status in securing health services and overall 
equity implications can thus be evaluated.
Empirical Model for the Thesis Equation 3.4
UTIUSATION = ^{(COUNTRY, AGE, MALE, MARRIED, EDUCATION, 
EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, INSURANCE) + a(PAIN_LEVEL, 
SELF_ASSESSED_HEALTH, CHRONICJCONDITIONS) + i = I, 2, ...,n
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3.7. Data sources
To address the research questions, this thesis is based on the author’s analysis of 
household survey data from the 2001 Multi-Country Survey Study conducted by the 
World Health Organization. Several country-specific and international surveys were 
inventoried on which to conduct analysis, but wide variability in the choice of 
instruments and questions used to assess self-assessed health, utilisation, and financing 
were found which could render low inter-comparability.
The 2001 Multi-Country Survey Study was an international survey on health system 
responsiveness and was found to contain the necessary data for the countries of interest 
to this thesis. The survey was conducted by the World Health Organization to assess 
various elements of health system performance with respect to citizens’ satisfaction 
with health care provision in over sixty countries, representing all continents and 
income levels. Data from the survey have been used to examine reporting bias and 
disparities in self-reported health (Bago d’Uva et al 2008) and catastrophic expenditures 
and poverty (Van Doorslaer et al 2006; Van Doorslaer et al, 2007; Jones et al
2007).Samples consisted of men and women aged 18 years or over, non­
institutionalised, and living in private households. Multi-stage, stratified random cluster 
sampling procedures were used to identify eligible respondents, with samples de fact 
representative of the target populations. One respondent per household was randomly 
selected using Kish tables, by which an equal probability of selection is given to each 
eligible individual within a household (Üstün et al, 2003).
To ensure the samples represented the populations from which they were drawn, age 
and sex distributions were compared to population data from the United Nations (U.N.) 
database. Deviations were measured using the U.N. Sample Population Deviation 
Index and adjusted where necessary by applying sample and post-stratification weights 
to the data prior to release for analysis by researchers (Üstün et al 2003). The sample 
size for Egypt is n = 4,490 and for Lebanon, n= 3,246. The dataset was not adjusted 
further as a result, since no additional sample or cluster weights were provided in the 
dataset made available by the World Health Organization.
The survey instrument is presented and described in detail by Üstün et al (2003). The 
survey is cross-sectional and was conducted in over sixty countries using a single 
standardised questionnaire, via face-to-face, telephone, or computer-assisted interviews.
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The questionnaire is a module-based instrument that captures a combination of 
household- and individual-level information, described in subsequent sections in this 
chapter.
Household-level information includes household composition in terms of age and 
gender, income, and selected expenditure data. Individual-level information includes 
demographic characteristics, health insurance, health state descriptions, prevalence of 
chronic health conditions, utilisation of health services, and perceptions of health 
system responsiveness such as respect and dignity. Demographic characteristics 
include age, gender, marital status, education, employment status, and employment 
type.
3.8. Variable specification
Based on Anderson’s (1972) framework adapted for this thesis as shown in Figure 3.4 
and Equation 3.4, variables for the analyses were selected that represented the 
dependent, explanatory, and control factors of interest in this thesis. The variables used 
in the analysis are summarised at the end of the chapter (Table 3.7 and Table 3.8). 
Primary dependent variables of interest were the probabilities of using inpatient and 
outpatient services, whilst primary explanatory variables of interest were income and 
insurance status. Although enabling factors also include supply-side factors such as 
distance to providers, public versus private providers, and waiting time (Gravelle et al,
2006), this information was not available from the survey. Control variables included 
predisposing and medical need factors.
3.8.1. Demographic characteristics
Household-level information includes household members’ age and gender. Individual- 
level information about the respondent includes age, gender, marital status, educational 
level, employment status, and occupational type. These variables were included in the 
analysis as control variables.
3.8.2. Health service utilisation
Data were available from the survey concerning the proportion of respondents who had 
used any outpatient and inpatient health services over a twelve-month recall period, 
followed by information on the intensity of specific types of services over a one-month 
recall period. The survey did not collect information on whether services were obtained 
from private or public providers.
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Respondents were asked to indicate if they had used ‘any outpatient care' in the 
questionnaire, defined as ‘any place outside your home where you did not stay 
overnight’, such as a doctor’s consulting room, clinic, or hospital outpatient unit. This 
question was intended to capture the aggregate outpatient utilisation.
The intensity of using certain specific services was assessed over a one-month recall 
period. The number of visits to general practitioners, medical specialists, pharmacies, 
hospital outpatient units, and hospital inpatient units were assessed. Inpatient care was 
defined as an overnight stay at a health care centre or hospital.
An attempt was made to create a composite indicator of ‘all outpatient visits over one 
month’ and ‘all physician visits’ to test whether the determinants remain similar after 
aggregating all types of services. The rationale for aggregating physician is due to the 
possibility that the roles of physicians and speciahsts may not differ in all systems. In 
Egypt and Lebanon, the gate-keeping system between general practitioners and 
specialists is considered weak, such that individuals often visit specialists directly 
without a general practitioner’s referral. Therefore, general practitioner care may be 
substituted by specialist care. However, the aggregate indicators consisted of a 
truncated sample since a large proportion of observations contained missing data for 
one or more of the services. This truncation resulted in considerable loss of 
information. Using the aggregate indicators would have resulted in potentially biased 
and unreliable estimates, as was the case in exploratory analysis. As such, the question 
posed on ‘any outpatient use over twelve months’ and the separate physician variables 
were used to analyses utilisation.
Other information that was collected included whether access to care was refused due to 
lack of affordability, and whether the respondent did not seek care due to lack of 
affordability. Information regarding the nature of care that was collected included the 
general reason(s) for the respondent’s last visit and the types of medical service(s) 
received at the last visit.
3.8.3. Income and expenditure
Data on socioeconomic status available from the survey included self-reported 
household income and limited information on household expenditure. Generally,
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information on consumption expenditure or asset information is preferable to self- 
reported income as a proxy for household living standards, due to measurement error 
and systematic reporting biases associated with self-reported income (Ferguson et al, 
2003; Roy and Howard, 2007).
Household income was used for the analysis as the indicator of household living 
standards, since data was not available regarding total household expenditures or 
permanent income indicators. Information on average household income earned per 
month included income earned from wages, pensions, social insurance benefits, child 
allowance, and other types of income like rents, before taxes and other deductions. 
Missing data on income were detected for approximately 17% of the observations from 
Egypt and 30% of those from Lebanon, found to be missing-at-random and largely due 
to respondent non-response due to a reluctancy to reveal sensitive income information 
(N. Naidoo, personal communication, 1 December 2006). In order to preserve the most 
observations as possible for the analysis, missing values were imputed using 
multivariate imputation for a single variable of interest (Schenker et al, 2006; Horton 
and Kleinman, 2007).
Measures of household expenditure are the amount spent on accommodation and food 
over the last month and on health care over the last year. The amounts spent on 
insurance, medications, visits to doctors, or ‘other’ expenditures were captured. This 
information does not differentiate between other specific types of health expenditures or 
between expenditure per household member.
In order to allow for cross-national comparisons, expenditure and income data were 
converted to international dollars using 2001 purchasing power parities and adjusted for 
household composition (UN Stats, 2007). Adjustments for household composition and 
size were made by applying an adult equivalency (AE) scale, defined as: AE = (A + 
aK)®, where A represents the number of adults in the household, K the number of 
children, a the cost of children relative to adults, and 0 the degree of economies of scale 
for an average household, ranging from 0 to 1 (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). For 
developing countries, values for a  typically vary between 0.3-0.5, with values for 0 
approaching 1 since food is a relatively large share of overall consumption (Deaton and 
Zaidi, 2002; Wagstaff et al, 2003). In this analysis, values were based on those
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previously used to assess health equity in Asia, where a = 0.5 and 0 = 0.75 (Deaton, 
1997; Equitap, 2002).
3.8.4. Health need
Health need was represented by variables that capture health status. The underlying 
assumption was that health status variables capture the majority of health need, 
although age, gender and unobservable factors may be considered as health need factors 
(Gravelle et al, 2006).
Health status was defined using ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measures, although both 
were self-reported. Objective measures included the proportion of respondents who 
were diagnosed or had suffered from at least one of sixteen types of chronic health 
conditions over the past year. Two separate questions were asked of respondents as to 
whether they had been ‘diagnosed’ or had ‘suffered’ from chronic health conditions 
over the past year, with responses to both questions revealing similar patterns.
Therefore, the responses for ‘had suffered from chronic health conditions’ was used to 
retain the largest sample size, as there were approximately 10% fewer responses for the 
question regarding ‘diagnosis’. Subjective measures included respondents’ ratings on 
self-assessed health questions. Although self-assessed health represents a useful policy 
tool that encompasses functionality and perceptions and has been correlated to future 
changes in health and mortality (Zimmer et al, 2000), some limitations include reporting 
bias across socioeconomic status and cultural setting (Sutton et al, 1999; King et al, 
2003).
The definition and measurement of self-assessed health varies depending on the 
perspective and theoretical approach regarding measurement and valuation. 
Psychometric and decision theory approaches yielding two related yet distinct concepts 
of subjective perceptions of health. Although they represent similar concepts, the terms 
‘self-assessed health’ and ‘quality of life’ are distinct. Self-assessed health represents 
an individual’s description of their health at a given time. Health-related quality o f  life 
builds on self-assessed health by incorporating an individual’s valuation of that health 
state (Kaplan 2004). Increasingly, instruments representing both concepts have been 
used together to measure an individual’s perception of their health status.
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From a policy perspective, both concepts are indicative of a subjective perception of 
functionality. Therefore, they can be used interchangeably to indicate levels of illness 
or disability for purposes of evaluating broader issues related to disparities. Clancy and 
Eisenberg (1998) describe the power of self-perceived health as a tool for evaluating 
health system performance. Self-perceived health has been proposed as a tool for 
determining which populations should be the focus of resource reallocation policies 
(Sprangers et al, 2000; Payers and Bjordal, 2001). The concept encompasses an 
individual’s health perceptions, symptoms, functioning, preferences, and values. In this 
sense, self-perceived health represents the ‘continuum of effects of health services on 
health and well-being, ranging from mortality to patient satisfaction’ (Clancy and 
Eisenberg, 1998).
The self-assessed health module is based on the World Health Organization’s 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (WHO, 2002). The 
health states that were measured in the survey are global health status, pain, mobility, 
self-care, cognition, interpersonal activities, vision, sleep, and affect. For each state, 
respondents were asked to rate their health on a five-point ordinal scale.
The choice of self-reported health indicators for the regression analysis was based on
(a) the distribution of respondent ratings, and (b) the correlation between various 
indicators and utilisation based on the literature and results of various regression models 
tested in this thesis. In addition, the choice of the ‘objective’ self-reported indicator for 
chronic health conditions was made in a similar way. The effect of using an aggregate 
indicator for chronic health conditions was compared to the effect of using 
disaggregated indicators. This was evaluated by including indicators that were most 
prevalent amongst respondents.
3.9. Descriptive analyses
3.9.1. Respondent characteristics
Sample characteristics were evaluated for all main variables of interest using two-tailed 
tests of significance where appropriate. Bivariate analyses were used to examine the 
relationship between income and health status, insurance coverage, and out-of-pocket 
payments. Income-associated inequity in the incidence of catastrophic expenditures 
was assessed using methods developed by van Doorslaer and Wagstaff (1992) and 
others (Wagstaff et al, 1991; Wagstaff et al, 2003).
73
3.9.2. Equity: the concentration index approach
The distribution of health indicators can be examined in several ways, ranging from 
tabulations by income group to numeric indices of total inequality. In this thesis, 
income-related equity in health need, access, and the economic burden of health care 
was quantified using the concentration index approach developed by Wagstaff et al 
(1991). Other approaches include those developed by Kakwani (1977), Le Grand 
(1978), Collins and Klein (1980).
The concentration index approach, through the convenient regression technique, was 
applied to measure inequity in health status, use, insurance, out-of-pocket payments, 
and catastrophic expenditures (van Doorslaer et al, 1993). The main advantages of 
using the concentration index approach in this thesis is the ability to simultaneously 
adjust for demographic need factors and to produce a single numeric indicator that 
quantifies the degree of inequity (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993; O’Donnell et al,
2008).
The concentration curve is a measure of how equally a variable of interest is distributed 
across a given population (Wagstaff et al, 1991; van Doorslaer et al, 2000; van 
Doorslaer and Jones, 2004; van Doorslaer et al, 2004). In this thesis, the distribution of 
‘total ill health’ across ‘total population income’ is measured. Similar to the Lorenz 
curve of the distribution of income, the concentration curve is defined as the cumulative 
rate of the incidence of the health variable against cumulative levels of income. To 
evaluate whether the concentration is skewed towards a particular income group, the 
curve is compared to the ‘line of perfect equality’, which indicates a perfectly equal 
distribution of the health variable against the distribution of income.
In the concentration curve diagrams, the line of perfect equality is a straight diagonal 
line; a concentration curve that lies along this line represents an income-neutral 
distribution. A concentration curve that lies above the line represents a health 
distribution that is skewed towards lower-income groups, or ‘pro-poor’. A 
concentration curve that lies below the line represents a distribution that is concentrated 
amongst higher-income groups, or ‘pro-rich’.
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The concentration index represents twice the difference between the line of equality and 
the concentration curve for the health care variable. Values equal to zero suggest an 
income-neutral distribution; values less than zero denote a pro-poor distribution; and 
values greater than zero denote a pro-rich distribution.
Regarding health status, utilisation, and insurance coverage, inequality and inequity in 
the health variables are compared in this thesis. Inequality exists if some groups use 
more health services than others, which is captured in the ‘actual’ concentration indices 
in this thesis. However, this inequality may be due to a genuine difference in the need 
for health care. To test whether this inequality is attributed to differences in health 
need and/or socioeconomic status, the health variables are also adjusted for need and 
compared to actual values. After controlhng for need, differences that persist across 
socioeconomic groups indicate that the system is inequitable rather than unequal.
The distribution of the health variables is therefore assessed before and after 
standardising for need. The distribution of health need, indicated by self-assessed 
health, pain, and chronic health conditions, was standardised for demographic factors 
including age and gender. The use of services and health insurance coverage were 
standardised for health need and demographic factors.
Two types of standardisation techniques exist, direct and indirect (Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer, 1993; O’Donnell et al, 2008). The direct method provides general trends by 
comparing the use of health services by ‘matching’ demographics across socioeconomic 
status. However, indirect standardisation is generally preferred as it is a more accurate 
way of assessing how well need matches utilisation. This approach calculates the rate 
of health care use that would be expected for a given health need, by regressing health 
care use on demographic and health need variables (van Doorslaer et al, 2000; 
O’Donnell et al, 2008). This rate is compared to the actual rate. If utilisation is below 
what is expected, this constitutes inequity that disadvantages the poor (‘pro-rich’). If 
utilisation is above what is expected, this represents inequity favouring the poor (‘pro­
poor’).
The standardised concentration index summarises the standardised distribution. The 
same approach is adopted for ill health and health insurance. There was insufficient 
information on all household members in order to adjust for ‘household’ health need.
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As mentioned, out-of-pocket payments were adjusted for household composition to 
calculate the amount per capita (per adult equivalent). An attempt was made to adjust 
for individual-level health need, which showed identical results to the unadjusted 
concentration index and curve, as expected.
Regarding out-of-pocket payments, the degree of vertical equity is used to assess 
fairness in financial contributions made by individuals with different levels of ability to 
pay. Vertical equity captures the notion that those with dijferent levels of ability-to-pay 
are treated differently (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993). This means that poorer 
groups would pay a smaller share of their income for the same amount of care than 
richer groups. In a progressive financing system, health care payments rise as a share of 
income as income rises. Payments are thus linked to income (van Doorslaer and 
Wagstaff, 1993).
Equity in the number of households that face exceptionally high health expenditures 
that are expected to impinge on living standards was also assessed. This measure is the 
incidence of ‘catastrophic expenditures’. The threshold for catastrophic health 
expenditures is typically set at a value between 5% and 25% of total household 
consumption, expenditure, or income; or can be set at approximately 40% of non-food 
expenditure (Wagstaff et al, 2003). In this thesis, the threshold was set at 10% of total 
household income, as neither total household expenditure nor types were available. 
Therefore, an amount of out-of-pocket payments that exceeds this threshold is 
considered catastrophic.
3.9.3. Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments
It was important to understand whether the extent of out-of-pocket payments and 
catastrophic expenditures would impinge on living standards. Where health care is 
ideally considered a public or merit good, out-of-pocket payments or exceptionally high 
payments would violate notions of social justice. This violation would be particularly 
unacceptable where payments impinge on welfare and disproportionately so for the 
poorest groups. Most poverty measures do not typically take into account health care- 
related expenditures or do not explicitly show the contribution of health care payments 
to poverty levels (Van Doorslaer et al, 2006). Therefore, in this thesis, the poverty 
headcount was estimated before and after accounting for out-of-pocket payments for
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health care (Wagstaff et al, 2003). The poverty headcount indicates the percent of 
households that fall below the poverty line, defined in relative or absolute terms.
Three analyses were conducted to test the sensitivity of using different poverty lines. 
Three poverty lines were used: a relative poverty line and two absolute poverty lines. 
The relative poverty line was set equal to one-third the mean national income per capita 
(Wagstaff et al, 2003). Absolute poverty lines were set according to international 
poverty lines estimated by the World Bank, although other approaches by which to 
measure poverty exist as described elsewhere (Coudouel et al, 2002; Wagstaff et al, 
2003).
Analysis was conducted using poverty lines of 1993 US$1.08 and US$2.15 per capita 
per day inflated to 2001 values using average annual consumer price indices for each 
country, shown in the Appendix A (UN Stats, 2007). Generally, the lower absolute 
poverty line is used for low- or lower-middle income countries such as Egypt, with the 
higher line used for upper-middle income countries such as Lebanon (Coudouel et al, 
2002).
Using the dollar-a-day poverty line, conversions produce an Egyptian poverty line of 
US$49.22 per capita per month and a Lebanese poverty line of US$10.23 per capita per 
month at 2001 prices.
3.10. Multivariate analyses
3.10.1. Background
The use of regression analysis is a recognized tool for evaluating the correlation 
between an individual factor on an outcome controlling for other factors, and the 
relative relationships between those factors (Dougherty, 2007). In conjunction with 
other econometric techniques, it proves valuable in helping to draw causal inferences 
from cross-sectional data (Winship and Morgan, 1999). Multivariate regression models 
have been used to address similar questions within the field of health services research 
(Zimmer et al, 2000; Erbsland et al, 2002; Hotchkiss et al, 2007; Roy and Howard,
2007).
The choice of the regression method is based on the type of assumptions needed to 
accurately specify the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
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The linear regression model is the most fundamental type of regression, typically 
estimated using the method of ordinary least squares. However, in the case of most 
real-world data on health care use, two main drawbacks to applying ordinary least 
squares regressions are: (a) the assumption of a normal distribution, and (b) the 
possibility that the model predicts negative values. The first assumption is rarely true 
for health care utilisation. The second assumption is not applicable. The majority of 
health care use is typically concentrated amongst a small minority, with long, right tails 
typical of most distributions. Some techniques that have been used to address these 
limitations include log transformation and dichotomisation of dependent variables 
(Welch, 1985; Diehr, 1999; Farrington and Loeber, 2000; Barnett and Franks, 2002). 
However, the use of alternative regression models have proven more efficient and to be 
a better fit than transforming the variables alone (Streiner, 2002; Cantoni and Ronchetti, 
2006; Royston et al, 2006).
The four regression models used in the analysis are discussed in the next sections. For 
the probability of using services, two types of regression models were used to assess the 
binary choice of whether or not to use health services for questions. These models are 
the recursive bivariate probit and the probit models. For the intensity of using services, 
two types of models were used to assess the number of health care visits, characterised 
as count data. The first type is the hurdle model, composed of a binary and a count 
regression model, with the latter represented by the zero-truncated negative binomial 
model. The second type of model is the zero-inflated negative binomial model.
3.10.2. Probability of use
Binary regression models are useful in estimating the probability of an event occurring 
by assuming either a logistic or normal distribution of the error terms. These 
distributions give rise to the logit and probit model, respectively (Greene, 1997). The 
choice between the two is generally arbitrary, as both tend to yield equally satisfactory 
results in most cases (Amemiya, 1985). The binary regression relationship is denoted 
by the expression:
y,* = p, JCi + Ilf, i = 1 ,2 ,..., fi, Equation 3.5
where:
y = 1 if y, * > 0 and 
y = 0 if otherwise.
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Here, ji*  represents the main outcome variable of interest, or utilisation; /?, ' represents 
the set of estimate coefficients for a given set of explanatory variables, denoted by m,- 
represents the error term, and i represents a given observation. The probit models are 
used in this thesis. As such, the coefficients /7/are called probit indices and are on a 
latent scale. The latent scale represents the unobserved propensity for one of two 
possible outcomes, and therefore the coefficients are not directly interpreted 
quantitatively, but qualitatively (Jones et al, 2007).
Therefore in the probit model, the coefficients do not directly represent a given percent 
change in yi* for a unit change in fii\ which is the case in linear regression. In probit 
regression, the coefficients are interpreted qualitatively by assessing (i) the relative 
magnitude of the coefficients to other coefficients, and (ii) the sign of the coefficient 
which may be negative (-) or positive (+). For purposes outside the scope of this thesis, 
the coefficients may also be translated into marginal effects in order to predict outcomes 
for certain combinations of values given to the covariâtes.
To ensure the reliability of parameter estimates, it is important to test for possible 
endogeneity amongst explanatory factors. Endogeneity is said to occur if the error term 
of the independent variables determine the value of the dependent variable, biasing the 
estimated effects of the independent variables on the outcome (Waters, 1999; 
Dougherty, 2007). In this case, health insurance was suspected of being endogenous to 
the model since the likelihood of having insurance may be influenced by unobservable 
factors, such as the decision of where to live, the type of employment sought, or 
behavioural attitudes towards risk (Waters, 1999; Ekman, 2007).
To test for endogeneity of the health insurance dummy variable, the recursive bivariate 
probit model was adopted given its utility in similar analyses elsewhere (Waters, 1999; 
Fabbri et al, 2004; Jones et al, 2004; Jones, 2007). Elaborated in the literature regarding 
simultaneous equations, the general two-equations model takes the form: 
yii* = h i y 2 i  + yiiXii + U u  Equation 3.6
J 2i* =  h i y i i  +  y i i x 2 i  + U2iy Equation 3.7
where the main outcome of interest, y;, *,and the ‘treatment’ or endogenous variable, 
y2i*, are simultaneously determined (Maddala, 1983). In this analysis, the main 
outcome of interest, y/, *, represents the likelihood of utilisation, while the endogenous
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variable, yzi*, represents whether or not the individual is covered by health insurance. 
The probit model was therefore chosen on the basis that the recursive bivariate probit 
model incorporates the probit, and not logit, model.
3.10.3. Frequency of use
To assess the determinants of the number of visits, the hurdle model was chosen. Count 
data regression relates to the relationship between the number of events of interest in a 
given time interval and a set of covariates (Cameron and Trivedi, 1996). The hurdle 
model was introduced within the context of health care to model the principal-agency 
nature of health care (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Santos Silva and Windmeijer, 2001). 
A fundamental assumption of other count regression models is that a single process 
determines the occurrence of an event. However, in health care, the principal-agency 
theory has been used to distinguish between two processes underlying an event.
In this framework, the determinants of making the first contact with the health system 
are considered to be distinct from those determining subsequent events. The hurdle 
model thus relaxes the assumption of most count models that events are produced from 
a single process (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Cameron and Trivedi, 2001). The hurdle 
model consists of two parts associated with each process. The model may comprise the 
same explanatory factors that are interpreted differently depending on the stage of the 
decision-making process (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995).
The first part of the hurdle model examines factors predicting the probability of having 
at least one visit as compared to zero visits, also known as the ‘contact decision’. This 
decision was assessed using the recursive bivariate probit model or the standard probit 
model if the insurance variable was not found to be endogenous to the model.
The second part of the hurdle model examines factors predicting the intensity or 
frequency of visits conditional upon having at least one visit, assessed using the zero- 
truncated negative binomial model. In this thesis, estimates from each part assessed 
separately in order to examine each decision-making process.
3.10.3.1. Zero-truncated model
For the second part of the hurdle model, the zero-truncated negative binomial model 
was used to analyse the data amongst respondents with at least one visit. The rationale
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for using the zero-truncated negative binomial model lies in its advantage in accurately 
modelling health care count data for purposes similar to this thesis (Cameron and 
Trivedi; 1991, Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Fabbri and Monfardini, 2003; Economou et 
al, 2007; Asada and Kephart, 2007). Given the fundamental issues regarding linear 
regression and count data in health care, the Poisson regression model is typically the 
starting point for modelling utilisation. Poisson regression denotes the analysis of 
discrete random variables under certain conditions (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The 
main advantages to its use are that count data are allowed to have non-normal 
distributions, and predictions are restricted to non-negative values.
However, three main conditions of the Poisson distribution are rarely upheld in the case 
of health care use. The econometric background to these conditions is elaborated in 
detail in Cameron and Trivedi (1986; 2001), Long and Freese (2006), Winkelmann 
(2005) and others. These conditions include: (a) that the data exhibit equidispersion;
(b) that the same number of zero counts as predicted by the Poisson model; and (c) that 
the data are not truncated from the left of the distribution. Yet in reality, most health 
care use data exhibit the following characteristics: (a) overdispersion; (b) excess zeros; 
and (c) truncation of observations with zero counts.
Equidispersion implies that the mean of the distribution is equal to its variance, where 
the probability of an event occurring is constant across observations or at any given 
time in an interval. The mean is often referred to as the expected value of a given 
variable, and represented by p.. The variance measures the spread of the distribution, 
with the square root of the variance equal to the standard deviation. However, health 
care use data often exhibit overdispersion, considered to be the main problem that 
precludes the use of the Poisson model. Inappropriately applying the Poisson model has 
been shown to lead to particularly small standard errors, loss of efficiency and 
consistency, and poor predictions and fit (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986,1996; McKenzie 
et al, 1998; Long and Freese, 2006).
Overdispersion has been the source of considerable investigation due to its relatively 
large role in biasing estimates. Overdispersion implies that the variance of the 
distribution of events is greater than its mean, and has been attributed to three main 
causes (Cameron and Trivedi, 1999). First, there may be unobserved heterogeneity that 
is not accounted for in many Poisson models. This problem is often overcome by
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adapting the Poisson model, generating the negative binomial model. Second, there 
may be two processes underlying the event, one that determines the first event, and one 
that determines subsequent events. The hurdle model has been used to address this 
issue. Third, overdispersion may be caused by interdependence between the 
occurrences of events, where the probability of one event occurring influences the 
probability of another event. Interdependence of events is common in health care; for 
example, multiple visits may be related to the same spell of illness. The negative 
binomial relaxes the assumption of independence of the occurrence of events.
The negative binomial also addresses the problems of excess zeros and truncation-at- 
zero. Poisson models have been shown to underestimate the number of zeros in a 
sample, where the sample exhibits excess zeros than that predicted by the model. This 
problem has been attributed to the fact that the Poisson model is a function of a single 
parameter, //, taking into account only observed heterogeneity in a sample with error 
term f. The negative binomial model is derived from the Poisson distribution primarily 
by relaxing its assumptions regarding overdispersion.
The negative binomial accounts for over-dispersion in two ways: (1) the introduction of 
an additional parameter a  that represents unobserved individual heterogeneity; and (2) 
the variance, now a function of a , is not necessarily equal to the mean and can vary 
across observations. To illustrate the model, the Poisson model is first described, 
represented by the following expression for a given observation i: 
p, = E(y,lx,) = exp(xf'p), Equation 3.8
where p, is the expected (E) count of a given outcome y, conditioned on a set of 
covariates with y, assuming a Poisson distribution, and P representing unknown 
parameters or semi-elasticities (Cameron and Trivedi, 1996; 2001). The conditional 
variance V of the distribution of events Y is equal to the conditional mean, as shown by 
the following expressions:
E[Y] = p  and V[Y] = p  Equation 3.9
The negative binomial introduces an error term e that represents unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, expressed as:
p* = E(y,lxi) = exp(xf'p + e,) Equation 3.10
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The conditional mean remains the same as that of the Poisson distribution, where both 
models would typically yield the same expected rate for a given level of covariates 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1986; Long and Freese, 2006). However, the conditional 
variance is a function of the degree of overdispersion in the model, expressed as: 
E[y,ljJ,,a] = |i< and V[y,lp«,a] = \u (1+ a]J«) Equation 3.11
Whilst y, assumes a Poisson distribution, the variance is influenced by the distribution 
of the dispersion parameter a , typically the gamma distribution (F) (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1996; Cameron and Trivedi, 2001; Long and Freese, 2006). The combination 
of distribution gives rise to the mixture class of count data models that characterises the 
negative binomial model. The classic probability density function for the model is 
expressed as:
(y . + q - y  g-' \  /  i^, \
,!F(a'^) V q ‘^+|i, /  Va'^+^i/ /
Pr (y, W  = F( ,
y r(q' a  V |i \ ‘^ +p,  foryf = 0,1^...^ ' Equation 3.12
where a  > 0, which denotes overdispersion in the predicted distribution. As the 
magnitude of a  increases, the degree of dispersion in the predictions increases (Long 
and Freese, 2006). The model was estimated through maximum likelihood estimation, 
restricting the predictions to non-negative values (Cameron and Trivedi, 1996).
To allow for truncation in the second part of the hurdle model, the negative binomial 
model was applied only to those observations with non-zero visits. Hence, the zero- 
truncated negative binomial model follows the same logic behind the classic negative 
binomial model, but differs in that zeros are excluded from the analysis (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1996; Long and Freese, 2006). The endogeneity of the health insurance 
variable was not assessed in the count data models. This is due to two factors. First, 
the data did not contain sufficient information on factors that could be used as 
instrumental variables (Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997; Kenkel and Terza, 2001; 
Romeu and Vera-Hemandez, 2005; Terza et al, 2008). Second, since the health 
insurance variable was generally not endogenous in the first part of the hurdle models in 
this thesis, it was assumed that any bias arising from endogeneity in the second part 
would be minimal.
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3.10.3.2. Latent class model
The classic principal-agency theory may not be applicable in all cases in health care. 
Therefore, an alternative approach as represented by the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model was explored for methodological purposes in the thesis. Previous research 
shows that (Noro et al, 1999; Santos Silva and Windemeijer, 2001) the hurdle model 
may not fit count data as well in cases where the visits are due to multiple spells of 
illness, as compared to a single spell of illness. The zero-inflated model was developed 
to try to overcome this limitation.
The zero-inflated model has gained popularity in addressing the issue of excess zeros in 
cases where the number of zeros in the sample is larger than that predicted by the 
classic negative binomial. The model has been applied and found to be superior to its 
negative binomial cousin in some cases, particularly with longitudinal studies and 
relatively large datasets (Freund et al, 1999; S arma and Simpson, 2006). In brief, the 
zero-inflated binomial model departs from the classic principal-agency approach by 
analysing the binary choice and the intensity simultaneously, rather than in two distinct 
parts.
The zero-inflated model is a specific type of mixture model that is characterised as a 
latent class model (Mullahy, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 2001). Rather than 
distinguishing between users and non-users based on observed use, observations are 
grouped according to the latent classes of high or low users, sometimes referred to as 
not-always zeros and always zeros depending on the purpose of the analysis (Long, 
1997).
One of the main advantages of latent class models over hurdle models is the more 
accurate estimation of some effects. Some effects may be estimated more accurately 
than in hurdle models, as found in seminal research using longitudinal data from the 
Rand Health Insurance Experiment and other large, cross-sectional datasets (Deb and 
Trivedi, 2002; Bago d’Uva, 2005, 2006; Lourenço and Ferreira, 2005).
The latent nature of the model is its defining feature. The probability of being in each 
class is based on unobservable characteristics, modelled as a binary choice, followed by 
analysis of the probability of the number of events. The parameters from both 
components are assumed to be multiples of one another. The zero counts may arise
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from members of either class, with extra weight given to the probability of a zero count 
(Winkelman and Boes, 2006). The parameters for each component are modelled in a 
single step, which simultaneously produces separate sets of estimates for each 
component in the output (Long, 1997). The top half of the output shows the 
determinants of the probability of being an always zero user, relative to being not- 
always zero, or a high user, the lower half of the output shows the determinants of the 
intensity of use amongst high users.
In this thesis, the intensity of use was primarily examined by applying the hurdle model 
that incorporates the hurdle approach. However, the zero-inflated model was also 
applied to test the appropriateness of this technique in comparison to the primary 
method. Estimation results from the zero-truncated negative binomial and those from 
the zero-inflated models were compared using goodness-of-fit tests described earlier, 
including the AIC, BIC and Vuong statistics (Appendix H).
The Vuong statistic compares the predictive value of the zero-inflated negative 
binomial model with the negative binomial regression model, which does not inflate 
zero-probability (Long and Freese, 2006). The zero-inflated model is preferred if 
p<0.05. Where the zero-inflated model is preferred, results from both models are 
compared briefly. The coefficients from the zero-inflated models for each type of 
health service are summarised in Appendix I. The full output for hospital outpatient 
visits is shown as an example of the model (Appendix G).
3.10.4. Interaction effects
The interrelated effects between country, income, and insurance were explored through 
the use of interaction terms, which explore the interdependency of effects between 
variables (Norton et al, 2004). Due to the nature of health care financing in each 
country, it was hypothesised that the effects of the main explanatory variables may be 
interrelated in four ways.
First, the effect of insurance on utilisation may depend on income level, leading to the 
term ‘income*insurance’. Second, the effect of insurance on utilisation may vary across 
countries, generating ‘country*insurance’. Third, the effect of income may also be 
moderated by country, generating ‘country*income’. Finally, the relationship between
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insurance and income may itself depend on the country, leading to 
‘country*income*insurance’.
The interaction effects were tested iteratively. Four versions of the pooled model and 
two versions of the country-specific model per health services were used to assess the 
effects. In the pooled analyses, the first model included the country variable alone, 
denoted as Model 1. For the pooled probit model for outpatient care. Model 1 is 
expressed as:
[Model 1] Equation 3.13
yi “  f — 1, 2, « . «; tlf
or, OUTPT = fiicouNTRY(^OUNTRY + w,, i=  1,2,...,/%
The addition of the other explanatory variables leads to Model 2, the main effects 
model:
[Model 2] Equation 3.14
OUTPT = ^icouNTRYCOUNTRY + PiAGgAGE + ^uoaleM ALE  + fimiARRiED^ARRIED + 
^iemplydEAIPLYD  + ^ujogincLO G INC  + ^iopim O PIN S  + ^îpainPAIN  + ^isah^A H  + 
^iCHRONicf^HRONIC + M„ i = 1, 2, ..., n
The three pair wise interaction terms were added to form Model 3, including the 
interactions between income*insurance, country*insurance, and country*income:
[Model 3] Equation 3.15
OUTPT  =  ^icouNTRYCOUNTRY +  PiageAGE +  ^imaieM ALE  +  ^imarriedMARRIED +
^iemplydE^PTYD  + ^iwciNcLGGINC + ^iopinsOPINS +  ^ipainPAIN + ^iSAnSAH + 
^ ichronicCHRONIC + ^aNc*iNstNC*INS + ^iCNTRY*iNsGNTRY*INS + 
^iCNTRY*INC^NTKY*INC +  M„ /  =  1 , 2 ,  . . . ,  Al
Finally, the addition of the triple interaction term, country*income*insurance, generates 
Model 4:
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[Model 4] Equation 3.16
OUTPT = ^ îcountryCOUNTRY + ^ îagfÂGE  + ^ imaleMALE + ^iMARRiErM^PPJED + 
^iEMPLYoEMPLYD + ^iioGfNcLOGINC + ^{qpinsOPINS + ^ipainPAIN  + ^îsahSAH  + 
^iCHRONicCHRONIC + ^hi^ c*ins^^C*INS + ^ îcntry*insGNTRY*INS + 
^iCNTRY*iNcCNTRY*INC + fiiCNTRY*iNC*iNsGNTRY*INC*INS + Ui, i = 1,2, n
The country-specific models explored the interactions in a similar way. In each 
country-specific regression model. Model 1 denotes the main effects model. Model 2 
denotes the main effects model with the addition of the income ^ insurance interaction 
term.
3.10.5. Summary of multivariate methods
A summary of all regression models that were developed for the thesis is shown at the 
end of this chapter (Table 3.7). Determinants of health insurance were assessed using 
three models, for ‘any insurance’, ‘outpatient insurance’, and ‘inpatient insurance’.
Probability models were developed separately for overall outpatient care, inpatient care, 
and ‘any care’ over the twelve-month recall period. Probability models were also 
developed for each of the separate outpatient services as well as overall inpatient care 
over the one-month recall period. Results are discussed regarding outpatient and 
inpatient health services in order to address the main research questions, as these results 
are viewed as more relevant to informing policy implications for health financing. 
Multivariate probit results for ‘any care’ are shown in Appendix C.
Count models were developed for each of the separate outpatient services and for 
overall inpatient care over the one-month recall period. In order to examine the effect 
of country setting on utilisation, models of health service utilisation were applied by 
pooling observations from the two countries, and consequently, by applying the models 
to separate country samples.
The criteria used to select variables for inclusion in the model were based on (i) the 
distribution of responses; (ii) previous literature on the predictive value of a variable; 
and (iii) the correlation between variables. The choice of health need variables is based
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on the regression models shown in Appendix E. Based on the results, the use of 
‘overall self-assessed health’ and ‘pain’ as the subjective health indicators appear to be 
more closely correlated with utilisation than ‘difficulty moving’, ‘difficulty with daily 
work’, ‘difficulty with self-care’ or ‘feeling sadness’. In addition, the addition of these 
four variables does not substantially change the effects of income and insurance on 
utilisation. The use of disaggregated variables for chronic health conditions also does 
not appear to substantially change the effects of income and insurance on utilisation 
(Appendix F). For purposes of the main questions for this thesis, health need is 
therefore represented by ‘self-assessed health’, ‘pain’, and ‘chronic health conditions’. 
These results are discussed in Chapter Six.
The degree of multicoUinearity, or correlation between the explanatory variables, was 
assessed using (i) the variance inflation factor test (Rabe-Heskith and Everitt, 2007); 
and (ii) excluding and including in a step-wise fashion income, insurance, or 
employment status variables (Dougherty, 2007), in order to test for collinearity between 
these variables in particular as they are central to the analyses. The results of the 
variance inflation factor test indicate there is a moderate degree of multicoUinearity, as 
the variance inflation factor is less than 10 (Appendix B). The variance between 
specific combinations of variables central to the analysis was also tested. These results 
show that the variance is barely above 1, suggesting a small degree of collinearity that is 
not expected to substantially alter results.
To test the measure of fit for each model as a whole, log-likelihood measures were 
used, with the addition of model comparisons for the two types of count regressions 
(Long and Freese, 2006; Dougherty, 2007). These measures include (i) log-likelihood 
for maximum likelihood estimation (ML); (ii) likelihood ratio test of chi-squared, 
testing if coefficients in the model are zero (p<0.05, reject hypothesis); and (iii) for 
count-data models, in addition to the chi-squared test, the Akaike’s and the Bayesian 
information criteria (AIC and BIC, respectively). The AIC and BIC are two different 
measures used to compare the fit of the zero-truncated and zero-inflated negative 
binomial models. The smaller the AIC, the better the fit; the more negative the BIC, the 
better the fit (Long and Freese, 2006).
Regression models were developed using a forward strategy based on the likelihood 
ratio test (criterion 0.05). Estimates include probit indices, beta coefficients, robust
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standard errors, p-values, and 95% confidence intervals. Examples of the full Stata 
output based on the case of outpatient care are shown in Appendix D. The RESET 
functional form test results are presented in the output tables in each chapter. Marginal 
effects for the main inpatient and outpatient models are presented in the Appendix. All 
analyses employed two-tailed significance levels of p<0.05 and were conducted using 
Stata 10 SE (StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas, USA).
3.11. Data limitations
The limitations of the data are introduced in this section, with further limitations 
discussed in the final chapter based on additional findings gleaned from conducting the 
analysis. First, cross-sectional data poses some challenges for inferring causality, as 
longitudinal panel data are preferred. However, the multivariate methods used in this 
thesis and knowledge of previous longitudinal research allow the researcher to draw 
conclusions regarding the associations between the dependent and independent 
variables (Winship and Morgan, 1999).
Next, data on the use of health services were not available for all time frames or for all 
types of health services. Data were available regarding the probability of care over 
twelve months for aggregate outpatient and inpatient measures; and on the intensity of 
care for services over one-month recall. Data were not available on the intensity of care 
over a longer time frame, or whether the service was obtained at a private or public 
facility. Early in planning the thesis, there was an interest in evaluating the determinants 
of utilisation amongst chronic health conditions such as chronic kidney disease and 
diabetes, given their significant health and economic burdens. However, in light of the 
lack of survey data with which to assess these aspects, the present research questions 
were deemed important in their own right, prior to addressing more detailed, condition- 
specific issues.
Data on length of stay for hospital inpatient care were not collected in the thesis.
Instead, the number of inpatient visits is examined. Data on the probability of inpatient 
care over a twelve-month period may be more rehable than over a one-month period. 
Since few respondents were hospitalised (less than 10%), the longer recall period 
provides a larger sample size. Visit-specific information regarding the illness or injury 
and the severity of disease for which care was sought was not available.
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Income and expenditure data were collected at an aggregate, household level, with no 
information collected on either income or expenditure of individual household 
members. It is assumed that all members in a given household share the same economic 
status. Other researchers in the field have dealt with this limitation by using this 
assumption and incorporating adjustments for household size and age structure as 
necessary (Roy and Howard, 2007). The survey did collect information on aggregate 
out-of-pocket payments but did not distinguish by type of specific service or by sector, 
such as public or private providers. Information was not available on all types of 
household expenditure, and regarding health, only physician and medication payments 
were collected.
A minority of respondents (less than 1%) provided information on ‘other’ costs, but 
whilst this information was included in the aggregation of ‘total out-of-pocket health 
expenditures’, the sample size was considered too small to conduct equity analyses. In 
addition, the degree of missing income data may be due to respondents’ reluctance to 
provide information, as observed by the interviewers (personal communication, N. 
Naidoo, World Health Organisation, 1 December 2006). This issue was addressed 
through the use of imputation to complete the data.
Finally, cross-national comparisons may be imperfect, since interpretability by 
respondents can vary across difference cultures (King et al, 2003). The relationships 
between variables may also differ across countries, as pointed out in a critique of the 
2000 World Health Report on equity (Nord, 2002). Some factors may also be unique to 
certain settings. Aye finds that ‘social capital’, or informal social solidarity, in the 
Ivory Coast is a determinant of access to health care particularly for individuals unable 
to afford out-of-pocket payments (2002).
Since the Egyptian and Lebanese societies are relatively similar, these limitations are 
not considered significant. Also, although the population samples collected in the 
Multi-country Survey Study were weighted to represent population distributions on age 
and gender, residual bias may still exist. In sum, the limitations of the data provide both 
important caveats in interpreting results, as well as interesting avenues for future 
research in the area of health care utilisation.
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Table 3.8 Variable definitions
Variable Type Definition
______________(Statistics by country are presented in Chapter 4)
Dependent variables
•  Any care Binary*
• Any Outpatient care Binary
• General practitioners Binary
• Specialists Binary
• Pharmacy Binary
• Hosp Outpatient Binary
• Hosp Inpatient-12-mo Binary
•  Hosp Inpatient-1-mo Binary
• General pract visits Count
• Specialist visits Count
• Pharmacy visits Count
• Hosp Outpatient visits Count
• Hosp Inpatient visits Count
Dependent and Independent variables 
Enabling factors
• Any health insurance
• Outpatient insurance
• Inpatient insurance 
Independent variables 
Demographic factors
• Country
• Log income
• Age
• Male
• Married
• Secondary education
• Employed
• Gov employee
• Non gov employee
• Self-employed
• Unpaid work
• Student
• Homemaker
• Retired
• Unemployed-Unable
• Unemployed - Able
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Continuous
Continuous
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Dummy variable =1 if respondent has visited any health 
care providers over past 12 months.
Dummy variable =1 if visited any type of outpatient 
provider over past 12 months.
Dummy variable =1 if visited general practitioners over 
past month.
Dummy variable =1 if visited medical specialists over past 
month.
Dummy variable =1 if visited pharmacists over past month. 
Dummy variable =1 if visited hospital outpatient units over 
past month.
Dummy variable =1 if visited hospital inpatient units over 
past 12 months.
Dummy variable =1 if visited hospital inpatient units over 
past month.
Number of general practitioner visits over past month. 
Number of hospital inpatient visits over past month. 
Number of pharmacy visits over past month.
Number of hospital outpatient visits over past month. 
Number of visits to hospital inpatient units over past month. 
(12-month not available)
Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has insurance coverage 
for any type of health care.
Dummy variable = 1 if coverage for outpatient care. 
Dummy variable = 1 if coverage for inpatient care.
Dummy variable = 1 if respondent resides in Egypt, 0 if 
resides in Lebanon
Log of reported household income per adult equivalent over 
past 12 months.
Years of age
Dummy variable =1 if male 
Dummy variable =1 if married 
Dummy variable =1 if completed at least secondary 
education, 0 if less than secondary education 
Dummy variable =1 if respondent is employed 
Dummy variable = 1 if governmental employee 
Dummy variable = 1 if employee in private sector or non­
governmental organisation 
Dummy variable = 1 if self-employed 
Dummy variable = 1 if employed as volunteer 
Dummy variable = 1 if student 
Dummy variable = 1 if homemaker 
Dummy variable = 1 if retired
Dummy variable = 1 if unemployed and unable to work 
Dummy variable = 1 if unemployed but able to work_______
*For binary variables, reference category = 0.
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Table 3.7 Variable definitions (continued)
Variable Type Definition
Independent variables (continued)
Health need factors
• Self-assessed health Categorical Self-assessed health, i.e., ‘In general, how would you rate 
your health today?’ 1 = Very good; 2 = Good; 3 = 
Moderate; 4 = Bad; 5 = Very bad.
• Pain Categorical ‘Overall in the last 30 days, how much pain or discomfort 
did you have?’ 1 = None; 2 = Mild; 3 = Moderate; 4 = 
Severe; 5 = Extreme.
• Chronic Binary Dummy variable =1 if diagnosed with at least one chronic 
health condition over past 12 months.
• Depression Binary Dummy variable =1 if depression
• High blood pressure Binary Dummy variable =1 if high blood pressure
• Heart disease Binary Dummy variable =1 if heart disease
• Diabetes Binary Dummy variable =1 if diabetes
Interaction terms
• lncome*OP Interaction Log income by outpatient insurance.
Insurance term
• lncome*IP Insurance Interaction
term
Log income by inpatient insurance.
• Country*lncome Interaction
term
Country by log income
• Country*OP Interaction Country by outpatient insurance
Insurance term
• Country*lP Interaction Country by inpatient insurance
Insurance term
• Country*lncome*OP Interaction Country by log income by outpatient insurance
Insurance term
• Country*lncome*IP Interaction Country by log income by inpatient insurance
Insurance term
Out-of-pocket payments (descriptive analyses only; not used for multivariate analyses)
• Total payments Continuous Total out-of-pocket payments for any health care over past 
12 months (PPP $)
• Physicians Continuous Amount of out-of-pocket payments for physician visits 
over past 12 months (PPP $)
• Medications Continuous Amount of out-of-pocket payments for medications over 
past 12 months (PPP $)
• Catastrophic Percentage Proportion of households surveyed that spent equal to or
expenditure greater than 10% of total household income on out-of- 
pocket payments for health care over past 12 months.
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Table 3.9 Summary of multivariate regression models developed
A nalyses Pooled C oun try -spec ific
M odel N um ber I I 1 i L I D isaggregation
tests
M ulticollinearitv
tests
D escription Income
only
Main 
effects: ail 
main 
independent 
variables
M odel 2 + 
income*insur, 
country*insur, 
country*income
M odel 3 4- 
country*inc*insur
Main
effects
M odel I + 
income*insur
Effect o f  
disaggregating  
em ploym ent and 
chronic health 
(5 M odels)
Effect o f  
including /  
excluding 
insurance/income 
(5 models)
IN SU R A N C E :
PR O B A BILITY
Any health insurance
O utpatient insurance n/a n/a n/a n/a
Inpatient insurance
U T IL IS A T IO N :
PRO BA BILITY
Any care
Any O utpatient care
G eneral practitioners
M edical specialists
Pharm acists
Hospital outpatient
Inpatient (12 month)
Inpatient (1-m onth)
IN TEN SITY
G eneral practitioners
M edical specialists
Pharm acists
Hospital outpatient
Inpatient (1-m onth)
Shaded represents models developed for the thesis, n/a = not applicable.
93
Chapter 4. Determinants of health insurance
4.1. Introduction
This chapter examines health status and health insurance coverage in Egypt and 
Lebanon. Two fundamental questions are examined in this chapter. First, what is the 
nature of economic status and health need in each country? Second, what determines 
the likelihood that people are covered by group health insurance schemes?
Results presented in this chapter include: (i) the general characteristics of the 
respondents; (ii) the association between socioeconomic status and health status; (iii) 
health insurance coverage rates across different occupational categories; and (iv) 
estimates from multivariate analyses showing the determinants of health insurance, with 
an emphasis on socioeconomic status. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of 
how health status and health insurance coverage compare between the two countries.
4.2. Demographic characteristics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for each sample, with tests of significance 
shown where applicable. The mean age of the Egyptian sample was 39 years, ranging 
between 18 and 96 years. In Lebanon, the mean age was 42 years, ranging between 18 
and 101 years. Males accounted for half of all respondents in each country. More 
respondents in Lebanon had completed secondary education than had respondents in 
Egypt (53% versus 40%, respectively). These figures show that the samples are 
relatively similar in age and gender, although the Lebanese group appears relatively 
more educated the Egyptian group.
The employment rate in each country was approximately 44%, which includes 
governmental employment, non-governmental employment, and self-employment. This 
employment rate is relatively low by international standards. Half of all Egyptian 
respondents lived in urban areas; information on geographic location was not collected 
in the Lebanese survey. Average annual household income was calculated using data 
from (i) actual values reported by households and (ii) imputed values for households 
where information on income was missing.
94
For actual values, the Lebanese sample reported twice the mean per capita income as 
the Egyptian sample ($2,989 versus $1,579, respectively). Average income was also 
calculated after imputing values for most of the observations with randomly missing 
income data. Average imputed income in Egypt was $1,580 per capita and $3,480 per 
capita in Lebanon, similar to the observed values. These figures are also consistent with 
published data. For example, the World Bank (2001) estimated that gross national 
income per capita for 2001 was $4,010 in Lebanon and $1,530 in Egypt at international 
exchange rates.
4.3. Health characteristics
Regarding health status, the Lebanese sample reported a relatively lower health status 
on average than did the Egyptian sample (Table 4.2). For example, twice as many 
respondents in Lebanon as in Egypt reported a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ self-assessed health 
status (8.4% versus. 4.5%, respectively). The same was found for ‘severe’ or ‘extreme’ 
pain (8.3% versus 4.7%, respectively). Similarly, the aggregate incidence of chronic 
health conditions was similar between samples, with 57% and 58% reporting at least 
one chronic health condition in Egypt and Lebanon, respectively.
A closer look reveals important differences regarding specific types of conditions 
(Table 4.3). The incidence of several individual conditions was higher in the Lebanese 
sample, such as heart disease, high blood pressure, asthma, back problems, depression, 
and vision problems. At the same time, the incidence of arthritis and ‘other’ conditions 
was higher among Egyptian respondents. Conditions classified as ‘other’ were 
specified in the Lebanese sample only and include conditions such as allergy, anaemia, 
bone disorders, diabetes, thyroid problems, kidney disease, uterine/prostate problems, 
and rheumatism.
More respondents in Egypt than in Lebanon utilised health services overall, as shown in 
Table 4.4 (61% versus 42%, respectively). Of those who sought care, outpatient 
services were more frequently utilized in Egypt than in Lebanon (56% versus 35%, 
respectively), while less inpatient care was sought in Egypt than in Lebanon (6% versus 
13%, respectively). More respondents in Lebanon than in Egypt reported foregoing 
care due to affordability (25% versus 12%, respectively). The number of visits to health 
care providers over the past month was between 0 to 2 visits in general. As is common 
to health care data, the distributions of visits across the population were skewed in both
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countries. Given that the standard deviations shown in Table 4.4 are relatively high in 
both countries, the data are skewed to similar degrees in Egypt and Lebanon.
Histograms for the pooled sample show relatively high proportions of observations with 
zero number of visits, representing a skewed distribution with a long right tail (Figure 
4.1 through Figure 4.5).
Regarding health care affordability, the majority of respondents in both samples were 
not covered by any health insurance (Table 4.5). 47% of Lebanese respondents had 
some form of insurance, compared to only 32% in the Egyptian sample. These figures 
are relatively similar to published data showing that social health insurance covers 
45.9% of the Lebanese population and 45% of the Egyptian population (WHO, 2006a; 
WHO, 2006b). At the same time, Lebanese respondents reported higher average out-of- 
pocket payments than Egyptian respondents as shown. This result may reflect both the 
degree of financial risk as well as inherent differences in the price of health care. It is 
important to note that in the Arabic-administered version of the questionnaire, ‘health 
insurance’ was distinguished from ‘free care’, such that these figures should capture 
enrolment in social or private health insurance exclusively.
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Table 4.1 Demographic characteristics
mean
Egypt
sd (min, max) n mean
Lebanon
sd (min, max)
Age* (years)
Male* (%)
Married* (%)
Secondary education* (%) 
Employed (%)
Government employee* {%) 
Annual income (PPP $), actual
Richest 20%
2"  ^richest 
Middle 
2"*^  poorest 
Poorest 20%
Annual income (PPP $), imputed
Richest 20%
2"  ^richest 
Middle 
2"*^  poorest 
Poorest 20%
Log of annual income, imputed
39 
56 
74
40 
44
41
$1,579
$3,795
$1,608
$1,224
$931
$581
$1,580
$3,910
$1,836
$1,321
$928
$362
7.14
14(18, 96)
$1,707 
($21, $29,557)
$1,718 
($21, $29,557)
0.73 (0, 10.3)
4480
4479 
4484
4480 
4478 
4478 
3703
4342
4342
42 
51 
63 
53
43 
14
$2,989
$7,863
$2,916
$2,090
$1,484
$838
$3,480
$8,852
$3,762
$2,413
$1,624
$801
7.75
17(18, 101)
$14,050 
($1.25, $597,730)
$11,698 
($1.25, $597,730)
0.90 (0.22, 13.3)
3220
3245
3236
3211
3218
3218
1960
2899
2899
*Difference is significant with a 95% confidence interval, ‘n’ = sample size, ‘sd’ = standard deviation. For binary variables, percentages for the 
reference category are shown. A two-tailed t-test was used to test for significant differences between means for continuous variables; the z-statistic 
was used to test for differences between proportions for binary variables. Significance test was not applied to income.
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Table 4.2 Self-reported health characteristics
Egypt (N=4485) Lebanon (N=3243)
% %
Self-assessed health
Very good 37.8 33.2
Good 34.8 33.2
Moderate 22.9 25.3
Bad 3.4 6.8
Very Bad 1.1 1.6
Self-reported pain
None 58.2 57.4
Mild 23.2 19.7
Moderate 13.9 14.5
Severe 4.1 7.5
Extreme 0.6 0.8
Difficulty with moving around
None 63.6 75.6
Mild 19.0 12.2
Moderate 12.8 8.2
Severe 4.1 3.6
Extreme/cannot do 0.6 0.5
Difficulty with self-care
None 81.6 87.9
Mild 9.9 6.5
Moderate 6.4 3.8
Severe 1.7 1.3
Extreme/cannot do 0.4 0.5
Difficult with work or household activities
None 66.4 72.8
Mild 17.5 13.3
Moderate 11.4 8.3
Severe 3.7 4.2
Extreme/cannot do 1.0 1.4
Amount of distress, sadness, or worry
None 59.8 59.7
Mild 23.6 18.3
Moderate 12.1 13.8
Severe 4.0 7.3
Extreme 0.5 0.8
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Table 4.3 Prevalence of chronic health conditions
Egypt
Percent
Lebanon
Chronic health conditions 
Arthritis/arthrosis*
Heart disease/coronary disease/heart 
attack*
Asthm a*
Depression/anxiety*
Diabetes
High blood pressure/hypertension* 
Chronic bronchitis*
Back pain/disc problems*
M igraine
Stroke*
Sleep problem s*
Hearing problem s*
V ision problem s*
G astritis/ulcer
Tum our/cancer
Other*
Percent n
5&2 4416 57.1 3174
25 4451 12 3195
4 4444 7 3192
6 4441 8 3191
7 4444 17 3189
5 4445 5 3192
12 4447 14 3192
2 4442 3 3191
19 4448 22 3196
13 4443 13 3191
0.4 4442 1 3187
6 4444 12 3190
3 4445 5 3190
11 4446 18 3191
16 4443 15 3194
0.5 4436 0.3 3180
20 4124 14 2668
*Difference is significant with a 95%  confidence interval, 
conditions.
See text for description o f ‘o ther’
Table 4.4 Characteristics of health care use
Egypt Lebanon
m ean/ sd n mean sd n
% (m in, max) /% (min, max)
V isited any health care provider 61 446 42 3246
over past 12 months* (%) 6
O utpatient care* (%) 59 449
n
39 3246
Inpatient care* (%) 6
V
449
Q
13 3246
N um ber o f visits to providers over
past m onth (no./person/m onth);
G eneral practitioners 0.87 1.49 672 0.53 1.28 1136
(0, 15) (0 ,2 5 )
M edical specialists 1.39 1.25 126 0.69 1.14 1139
(0, 12) 7 (0, 12)
Pharm acists 1.40 1.89 745 0.74 1.60 1120
(0, 15) (0 .1 5 )
Hospital outpatient unit 1.11 1.66 701 0.16 0.70 1090
(0, 20) (0, 12)
Hospital inpatient unit 0.41 0.99 517 0.12 0.96 1085
(0, 10) (0 ,2 5 )
♦Difference is significant with a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.1 Histogram of general 
practitioner visits, pooled sample
Proportion with zero count; 65%
o
5  10 15 20
in last 30  d ay s , num ber of tim es you went to  general p ractitio ne rs
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Figure 4.3 Histogram of pharmacy visits, 
___________ pooled sample___________
Proportion with zero count: 59%
IrrI'A.I
f,' k i
 “T - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r -
0  5  10 15
in la s t  30  d a y s ,  n um be r o f t im e s  you  w en t to  p h a rm ac y
Figure 4.2 Histogram of medical 
specialist visits, pooled sample
Proportion with zero count: 37%
fi'o
5  10
in la s t 30  d a y s , num ber of tim es you went to  spec ia lis ts
150
Figure 4.4 Histogram of hospital outpatient 
________ visits, pooled sample__________
Proportion with zero count: 72%
0 5 10 15 20
in last 30 days, number of times you went to hospital outpatient units
Figure 4.5 Histogram of hospital inpatient visits, pooled sample
Proportion with zero count: 88%
0 5 10 15 20 25
in last 30 days, number o f tim es you went to hospital inpatient sendees
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Table 4.5 Characteristics of health care coverage and payments________
E gypt Lebanon
mean n mean
Insurance (% )^ ®
A ny coverage*
O utpatient care*
Inpatient care*
Both outpatient and inpatient care* 
O utpatient only*
Inpatient only*
No insurance coverage*
O ut-of-pocket paym ents as a share o f 
household incom e (% )
Foregone health care visits (%)
W as refused care because could not afford* 
Did not seek care because could not afford*
32.5 4352 47.8 3223
25.1 4352 35.2 3223
27.4 4352 47.1 3223
20.0 4352 33^ 3223
5.1 4352 0.8 3223
7.4 4352 12.8 3223
67.5 4352 52.5 3223
8.5 3680 16.9 2445
12 4490 5 3246
12 4490 20 3246
*D ifference is significant with a 95%  confidence interval. Significance test was not 
applied to out-of-pocket paym ents. N .B. = N ote below; Insurance covers refers to 
coverage by social or private health insurance. A state, national health service exists in 
parallel in Egypt autom atically to all citizens, and hence was not included in questions 
regarding ‘health insurance’.
4.4. Income distribution across socioeconomic characteristics
To explore how income is distributed, income level across age, gender, marital status, 
educational level, and employment status is shown in Table 4.6. Mean income in 
Egypt and Lebanon did not appear to vary substantially by age. Average income was 
somewhat higher in the 18-26 years’ group and the 43-54 years’ groups as compared to 
other age groups in general. Regarding education, there were noticeable differences in 
income by different educational levels.
Respondents who had completed a secondary level education or reported an average 
income that was double that of respondents who had a lower level of education. This 
result was found in both countries. Income appears to vary by gender and marital 
status. The average per capita income reported by females was somewhat higher than 
that reported by males in both countries. Likewise, the average per capita income 
reported by married individuals was somewhat higher than that reported by unmarried 
individuals.
Income did not appear to vary considerably in either country according to whether or 
not the individual was employed. In Egypt, the average income of those employed by 
the government, non-government entities, or who were self-employed was somewhat 
lower than average income. At the same time, those who were not employed by these
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en tities  reported an income that was slightly a b o ve  a vera g e . In Lebanon, average 
income was the same across employment status.
By contrast, there were some differences in income by specific occu p a tio n a l sta tu s  in 
each country. In terms of occupational groups, in Lebanon the most prevalent 
occupation in the sample was homemaker, comprising nearly one-third of the sample. 
Approximately a fourth of the sample was self-employed. 14% were non-governmental 
employees, with half as many respondents employed by the government. In Lebanon, 
the occupational group that reported the highest income was the un em ployed  g ro u p  th a t 
w as o th erw ise  a b le  to w ork , followed by stu den ts  and govern m en ta l em p lo yees. The 
poorest respondents were the unemployed who were unable to  w ork. As the survey was 
conducted amongst individuals aged over 18 years, individuals identifying themselves 
as students are largely enrolled in higher education and typically come from higher 
socioeconomic backgrounds.
Table 4.6 Per capita income by demographic characteristics
All respondents
E e v p t ($)
(n = 3703) 
mean
1579
L eb an o n  ($)
(n = 1960) 
mean
2998
Age group
(1 )1 8 -2 6  years 1609 2996
(2) 27-35 years 1468 2421
(3) 36-42 years 1605 2809
(4) 43-54 years 1798 3112
(5) 55-95 years 1421 3693
G ender
Female 1717 3566
M ale 1469 2488
M arital status
Single 1522 2746
M arried 1599 3121
Educational status
No schooling to prim ary level 1240 1905
Secondary level or above 2084 3978
Em ploym ent status
U nem ployed (excl gov/nongov/self) 1415 2984
E m ployed (incl gov, nongov, self) 1786 2983
Occupational type
G overnm ental 1913 3824
N ongovernm en tal 1641 2777
Self-em ployed 1704 2823
Non-paid work 1546 2205
Student 2782 4284
H om em aker 1283 2220
Retired 1645 2586
U nem ployed -  able to work 1473 6587
U nem ployed -  unable to work 861 2176
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Note: Per capita income based on actual income values. $ = purchasing power parity exchange 
rate.
The occupational picture in Egypt differs from that in Lebanon. Again, the most 
common occupation in the sample was homemaker. One-fifth of respondents were self- 
employed and one-fifth of the reported working for the government. Hence nearly three 
times as many Egyptian respondents as Lebanese were governmental employees (18% 
versus 6.5%, respectively). By contrast, only 5% of Egyptians were self-employed, 
whilst five times as many respondents in Lebanon were self-employed (24%). In 
Egypt, respondents who reported the highest per capita income were students, followed 
by retired individuals and governmental employees. Respondents who reported the 
lowest income were the unemployed who were unable to work.
4.5. Distribution of health indicators across income level
Health status across socioeconomic status is assessed in several ways. First, the types 
of chronic health conditions reported by different socioeconomic groups are described. 
The rates of foregone care and, amongst respondents who used care, the reason for and 
type of service(s) received at their last visit. Further analysis of equity is presented in 
Chapter Five by adjusting for demographic characteristics such as age and gender. 
Patterns of ill health, as indicated by the specific types of chronic health conditions 
across income, were found to vary between the countries as illustrated by Table 4.7.
In Egypt, the conditions that varied the most across income included asthma, migraine 
headaches, stroke, sleep disorders, and arthritis, with the lower three income categories 
reporting higher rates of chronic conditions. In Lebanon, poorer groups also reported 
higher rates of chronic health conditions, particularly high blood pressure, heart disease, 
asthma, stroke, depression, sleep disorders, hearing and vision problems, ulcers, and 
arthritis. Overall, the income-associated differences in the types of chronic health 
conditions between countries were due mainly to the higher rates of illness amongst the 
lowest income quintile in Lebanon as compared to Egypt.
Table 4.8 shows reasons for foregoing health care utilisation across income. In Egypt, 
the poorest quintiles were five times more likely to forego care, whether because they 
were refused care due to a lack of affordability or whether they did not seek care due to 
the same reason, with nearly equal rates amongst the poorest group regarding being 
refused and avoiding care. In Lebanon, nearly seven times as many respondents in the
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poorest quintile as compared to the richest reported being refused care, and three times 
as many of the poorest did not seek care altogether.
Table 4.7 Incidence of chronic health conditions across income level
Income quintile Poorest
2"d
Poorest Middle Richest Richest Total Ratio*
A rthritis/arthrosis
Egypt (n = 4342) 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.26 1.8
L ebanon(n  = 2899) 0.20 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.12 2.2
A sthm a
Egypt 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 1.5
Lebanon 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 1.3
D epression/anxiety
Egypt 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 1.4
Lebanon 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.17 1.6
High blood 
pressure/hypertension
Egypt 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 1.2
Lebanon 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.14 1.7
Chronic bronchitis
Egypt 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 1.18
Lebanon 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 2.0
Back pain/disc problem s
Egypt 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.19 1.25
Lebanon 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.22 1.5
M igraine
Egypt 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.14 1.6
Lebanon 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.13 1.15
Stroke
Egypt 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.3
Lebanon 0.04 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.01 0.01 4.0
Sleep problem s
Egypt 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 1.2
Lebanon 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.12 1.5
Hearing problems
Egypt 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 2.0
Lebanon 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 1.4
Vision problem s
Egypt 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 1.3
Lebanon 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.18 1.3
Gastritis/ulcer
Egypt 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.16 1.2
Lebanon 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.15 1.6
Tum our/cancer
Egypt 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.01 0.005 0.5
Lebanon 0.0 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0
Total: At least one 
chronic condition
Egypt 0.63 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.44 0.58 1.4
Lebanon 0.69 0.64 0.62 0.50 0.54 0.57 1.3
*Ratio o f poorest to richest.
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Table 4.8 Foregone health care by income level
Income quintile Poorest 2"** Middle 2"** Richest Total Ratio*
Poorest Richest
Did not seek because 
could not afford
Egypt 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.12 4.75
Lebanon 0.34 0.36 0.23 0.15 0.12 0.20 2.8
R efused care because of 
affordability
Egypt 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.12 5.25
Lebanon 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 3.3
*Ratio o f poorest to richest.
Amongst those respondents who used services, Table 4.9 describes the main reason or 
reasons for seeking health care for the most recent visit across income levels. In Egypt, 
the most common reason cited for visiting health care providers was for a chronic health 
condition-related check-up, comprising 68% of respondents, followed by chronic health 
condition-related treatment (21%) and acute care (17%). Treatment follow-up and 
preventative care whilst not sick were each cited by approximately 4% of respondents.
The distribution of reasons across income levels was fairly even, with slightly more 
respondents in the richest group reporting chronic health condition-related check-ups.
In Lebanon, the most common reasons reported by respondents for seeking health care 
were for chronic care in general (approximately 40% each for treatment and check-up), 
followed by acute care (36%) and treatment follow-up (27%). Preventative care whilst 
not sick was reported by approximately 12% of respondents.
Reasons that were cited somewhat more commonly amongst the poorest groups 
included chronic health-related care, treatment follow up, and preventative care. 
Amongst the richest group, ‘other’ causes were more common than amongst the poorest 
group, which largely included surgical or other technology-intensive procedures. In 
general, ‘other’ causes for which treatment was sought in both countries included 
surgical operations, echocardiography, x-rays, and medical scans.
In terms of what types of medical services were provided at the last visit, results are 
presented by income in Table 4.10. Being examined was received by nearly 100% of 
all respondents in either country, after which the patterns change somewhat between 
countries. In Egypt, the next most common medical service provided was obtaining a 
medication or prescription, at nearly 92% of respondents, which was generally equally
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cited by all income groups. Next, receiving treatment and discussing specific health 
problems were cited by approximately 72% each by respondents. More respondents in 
the richest quintile as the poorest cited receiving treatment by 15%, whilst the richest 
cited discussing health problems 32% more than the poorest.
By contrast, Lebanese respondents cited receiving treatment as the second-most 
common medical service received, at 82% of respondents. This medical service was 
fairly equally cited across all income groups. Next, discussing health problems was 
cited by nearly 80% of respondents at any income level, followed by 75% who received 
medications or prescriptions. Regarding diagnostic or laboratory tests, slightly more 
respondents in the poorest quintile as the richest reported receiving these medical 
services.
‘Other’ treatments received in both Egypt and Lebanon included allergy treatment, 
birth, surgery, and treatment for renal disease, goiter, hypertension, infections, 
respiratory ailments, and other specific types of conditions. Overall, the type of medical 
services received by respondents who utilised health services did not appear to vary 
considerably by income level. The provision of medical treatment at the visit varied 
somewhat more so in Egypt than in Lebanon.
4.6. Health insurance by occupation
In both Egypt and Lebanon, approximately 96% of governmental employees report 
having any type of health insurance (Table 4.11 and Table 4.12). As such, this group 
has the highest coverage rate as compared to the rest of the sample. However, the gap 
in coverage rates between governmental and non-governmental workers is much larger 
in Egypt than it is in Lebanon.
For example, in Lebanon, 96% of governmental employees have health insurance, as 
compared to 66% amongst non-governmental employees and 34% amongst the self- 
employed. In Egypt, 96% of governmental employees had health insurance coverage, 
as compared to 28% and 12% for the other two groups, respectively. Therefore, whilst 
1.5 times as many governmental employees as non-governmental employees (excluding 
the self-employed) had health insurance coverage in Lebanon, this ratio was 3.5 times 
as many in Egypt. These results indicate that health insurance is associated to a larger 
extent with governmental employment in Egypt than it is in Lebanon.
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Table 4.9 Reason for last health care visit across income level____________________
Incom e q u in tile  P o o res t 2" M idd le  2" R ichest T o ta l R atio*
___________ P o o res t____________ R ichest____________________________
C heck-up for chronic 
condition
Egypt 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.9
Lebanon 0.50 0.35 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.42 1.3
M edical care for
chronic condition
Egypt 0.22 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.8
Lebanon 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.40 1.4
M edical care for acute
illness o r injury
Egypt 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.9
Lebanon 0.36 0.46 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.35 1.0
Treatm ent follow-up
Egypt 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 1.3
Lebanon 0.35 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.27 1.4
General m edical
exam /tests
Egypt 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.75
Lebanon 0.22 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 2.0
O ther
Egypt 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.9
Lebanon 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.8
*Ratio o f poorest to richest.
T a b le  4 .1 0  N a tu r e  o f  h e a l th  c a r e  t r e a tm e n t  re c e iv e d  a t  la s t  v is it  a c ro s s  in c o m e
Incom e qu in tile P oo res t 2«à M iddle 2" R ichest T o ta l R atio*
P o o res t R ichest
M edical exam
Egypt 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.93 1.0
Lebanon 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 1.0
Laboratory/diagnostic
test
Egypt 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.60 0.46 0.7
Lebanon 0.68 0.59 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.59 1.1
M edical treatm ent
Egypt 0.71 0.67 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.71 0.9
Lebanon 0.85 0.88 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.82 1.0
Discuss specific health
problem
Egypt 0.65 0.68 0.78 0.80 0.86 0.73 0.8
Lebanon 0.82 0.73 0.78 0.76 0.80 0.78 1.0
Discuss health in
general
Egypt 0.52 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.77 0.62 0.7
Lebanon 0.57 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.58 0.9
Received medication
Egypt 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.92 1.0
Lebanon 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.75 1.0
Other
Egypt 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.5
Lebanon 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.18 1.0
*Ratio o f poorest to richest.
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Homemakers in Lebanon tend to report relatively higher rates of coverage for insurance 
than in Egypt. For example, 44% of homemakers in Lebanon reported having any 
insurance as compared to just 8% in Egypt. These results may be due to differences in 
coverage policies for social health insurance beneficiaries and their dependents. In 
Lebanon, dependents are generally included with certain caveats, but they are generally 
excluded from most schemes in Egypt.
Retired individuals reported similar health insurance coverage rates in Egypt and 
Lebanon for most of the insurance categories. However, for exclusively outpatient 
insurance, the coverage rate amongst retired individuals was 9% in Egypt but only 2% 
in Lebanon. This difference may reflect differences in social health insurance policies 
associated with certain occupations. Nonetheless, this result suggests that social health 
insurance in Egypt appears to be more generous in terms of outpatient coverage on 
aggregate than it is in Lebanon.
Regarding the unemployed but able to work, the results suggest that they had higher 
rates of coverage in Lebanon than in Egypt. For example, for any insurance coverage, 
30% of this group reported having any insurance in Lebanon, as compared to only 10% 
in Egypt. As shown, this group also tends to have a relatively high income and average 
educational level that is similar to the self-employed and non-governmental employees. 
These findings suggest that those who are unemployed but able to work may be able to 
afford purchasing private health insurance and are likely wealthy and voluntarily choose 
not to work. In many parts of the Middle East and notably in Lebanon, wealth 
generated through property, other assets, or remits from abroad is not uncommon.
Similarly, a higher proportion of the unemployed but unable to work reported having 
insurance coverage in Lebanon than in Egypt. In contrast to those unemployed but able 
to work, this group in Lebanon may represent beneficiary dependents or individuals 
with certain disabihties who are covered by social health insurance. By contrast, the 
unemployed but unable to work in Egypt typically rely on public providers or pay out- 
of-pocket for health care. The rate of foregone care for either reason was also highest 
amongst homemakers and unemployed respondents in both countries (Table 4.13).
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Table 4.11 Health insurance by occupational type
Any insurance
% w ith insurance
Outpatient
insurance
Inpatient
insurance
E gypt Lebanon E gypt Lebanon E gypt Lebanon
O ccupational type
G overnm ental 0.96 0.95 0.71 0.76 0.92 0.95
N ongovernm en ta l 0.28 0.65 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.63
Self-em ployed 0.12 0.34 0.10 0.23 0.05 0.33
N on-paid w ork 0.65 0.60 0.54 0.40 0.65 0.60
Student 0.79 0.61 0.64 0.41 0.63 0.60
H om em aker 0.08 0.44 0.07 0.34 0.05 0.43
Retired 0.74 0.70 0.55 0.52 0.65 0.69
U nem ployed -  able to work 0.09 0.30 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.28
U nem ployed -  unable to 0.11 0.33 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.32
w ork
Total 0.33 0.48 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.47
Table 4.12 Health insurance by occupational type (continued)
Only outpatient Only inpatient Both types of
% w ith insurance insurance insurance insurance
E gypt Lebanon E gypt Lebanon Egypt Lebanon
O ccupational type
G overnm ental 0.04 0.0 0.25 0.19 0.67 0.76
N on-governm ental 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.45
Self-em ployed 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.22
N on-paid work 0.0 0.0 0.12 0.20 0.54 0.40
Student 0.15 0.005 0.15 0.20 0.49 0.41
H om em aker 0.03 0.002 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.33
Retired 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.19 0.46 0.50
U nem ployed -  able to 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.19
w ork
U nem ployed -  unable to 0.03 0.009 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.23
w ork
Total 0.05 0.008 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.34
Table 4.13 Foregone health care by occupational type
% did not receive needed care Did not seek Refused care
E gypt Lebanon Egypt Lebanon
O ccupational type
G overnm ental 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.005
N on-governm ental 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.03
Self-em ployed 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.05
N on-paid w ork 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.0
Student 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.005
Hom em aker 0.14 0.26 0.15 0.07
Retired 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.04
U nem ployed -  able to work 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.08
Unem ployed -  unable to 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.08
work
Total 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.05
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4.7. Determinants of health insurance
Determinants of the probability of having three types of insurance are explored; (a) 
coverage for any type of service (‘any insurance’); (b) coverage for outpatient services 
(or ‘outpatient insurance’); and (c) insurance for inpatient services (or ‘inpatient 
insurance’). The primary explanatory variables of interest are income and occupational 
type. The determinants of insurance are discussed based on results from two sets of 
analysis: (a) the pooled model, which primarily evaluates the effect of country on the 
probability of insurance coverage; and (b) the country-specific models, which primarily 
evaluate the effects of income and employment type in each setting.
4.7.1. Any insurance
4.7.1.x. Pooled model
The pooled model consists of five versions. Model 1 shows the effect of country 
without controlling for any other factor. Model 2 shows the same model with the 
addition of other covariates, representing the main effects model. This model contains 
an aggregated indicator for employment status, representing whether or not the 
individual is employed regardless of the type of occupation.
Model 3 is identical to Model 2, with the exception that the employment variable has 
been replaced with a set of disaggregated occupational indicators. Model 4 is similar to 
Model 3, with the addition of the interaction term for country * go v-employee. Model 5 
is also similar to Model 3, with the addition of the interaction term for country*income.
Regarding the effect of country on the probability of having any insurance, in Model 1 
the country effect was highly significant and negative in direction (Table 4.14). This 
result suggests that the likelihood of having any insurance is significantly higher in 
Lebanon than it is in Egypt. After adding the other covariates and interaction terms in 
Models 2 through 5, the country effect remains significant and negative, controlling for 
other factors.
Governmental employment was a significant and positive determinant, indicating that it 
increases the likelihood of having health insurance in both countries. This factor was 
the most important determinant of having any insurance in the pooled model. The 
interaction term for country*govemment was significant and positive. This finding 
suggests that the effect of governmental employment on the likelihood of insurance
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coverage is higher in Egypt than it is in Lebanon, controlling for other factors. The 
effect of income was also significant and positive, as was the interaction term for 
country*income. This finding suggests that income is a positive determinant of 
insurance coverage, and that its effect is stronger in Egypt than it is in Lebanon.
Most of the health need variables were not significant determinants of having insurance 
in the pooled model. In Model 2, diabetes and depression were significant at the 90% 
confidence level, but they were no longer significant after disaggregating the 
employment variable. Diabetes exerted a positive effect, indicating that those 
diagnosed with diabetes were somewhat more likely to have health insurance than those 
without diabetes. Depression exerted a negative effect, suggesting that those diagnosed 
with depression were somewhat less likely to have health insurance than those without 
depression.
Since the effects of depression and diabetes disappear after disaggregating the health 
insurance variable, it is possible that there is a degree of coUinearity between these 
variables and certain types of occupational categories. This observation supports the 
method used in evaluating the effects of separate occupations.
4.7.1.2. Country-specific models
For the country-specific models, three versions are discussed (Table 4.15). In order to 
compare the effect of income without controlling for other factors. Model 1 consists of 
the income variable exclusively. Model 2 expands upon Model 1 by adding the other 
covariates, representing the main effects model. Model 3 is similar to the main effects 
model except that the aggregated employment variable is replaced with the set of 
disaggregated occupational variables.
Income was a significant and positive determinant in all three models for both countries. 
The magnitude of the effect was relatively larger in Egypt than it was in Lebanon, 
consistent with the significant and positive effect of country*income from the pooled 
model. Being employed was significant and positive in both countries, and was also 
relatively stronger in Egypt.
Governmental employment was the strongest predictor of having any insurance 
coverage in both countries. The effect was relatively larger in magnitude in Egypt. 
Other occupational types also exerted significant and positive effects. Being a non-
i l l
governmental employee positively determined insurance, and tended to exert a stronger 
effect in Lebanon than in Egypt.
Being a student was a positive determinant of insurance, exerting a stronger effect in 
Egypt than in Lebanon. This may be due to the fact that students are eligible for certain 
social health insurance schemes in Egypt, but otherwise do not receive health insurance. 
By contrast, students in Lebanon are generally covered as beneficiaries’ dependents. In 
addition, being retired was a positive determinant of insurance, and also exerted a 
stronger effect in Egypt than in Lebanon. Whilst retirees are covered by social health 
insurance schemes in Egypt, they are generally excluded from coverage in Lebanon, 
unless they qualify for coverage as beneficiaries’ dependents under certain conditions.
In terms of health need and age, these effects were generally small in both countries. 
Most of the health variables were not significant. In Egypt, high blood pressure was 
significant and positive in Model 3, exerting a relatively small effect. In Lebanon, self­
assessed health was significant and negative, exerting a relatively small effect. These 
results suggest that having high blood pressure in Egypt and a poor perception of one’s 
health in Lebanon tend to increase the likelihood of having health insurance.
Age was significant and positive in both countries, but the magnitude of the probit 
index was approximately zero. Education exerted a significant and positive effect in 
both countries. The magnitude of its effect was relatively larger in comparison to other 
variables. It was also a relatively stronger determinant in Egypt than in Lebanon.
Table 4.14 Probability of Any Insurance, pooled
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 5
Coeff. (SE)
Country (l=Egypt, -0.391*** -0.175*** -0.595*** -0.625*** -1.667***
0=Lebanon)
(0.030) (0.037) (0.045) (0.044) (0.381)
Age 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.067 0.177** 0.170** 0.177**
(0.042) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Married 0.094* 0.202*** 0.192*** 0.200***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Secondary education 0.844*** 0.400*** 0.394*** 0.392***
(0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Employed 0.421***
(0.043)
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Model 1 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4 
Coeff. (SE)
Model 5 
Coeff. (SE)
Income (log) 0.224*** 0.238*** 0.240*** 0.183***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)
Self-assessed health -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Self-reported pain 0.019 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chronic -0.018 -0.032 -0.028 -0.026
(0.041) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
High blood pressure 0.012 0.085 0.085 0.082
(0.055) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Diabetes 0.140+ 0.134 0.132 0.130
(0.076) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083)
Heart disease 0.131 0.125 0.123 0.122
(0.082) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Depression -0.103+ -0.082 -0.083 -0.088
(0.060) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Gov employee 2.803*** 2.099*** 2.811***
(0.125) (0.187) (0.127)
Nongov employee 0.846*** 0.850*** 0.845***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.102)
Self-employed 0.139 0.147 0.134
(0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
Unpaid work 1.516*** 1.526*** 1.501***
(0.241) (0.242) (0.242)
Student 1.410*** 1.410*** 1.403***
(0.123) (0.123) (0.122)
Homemaker 0.072 0.090 0.070
(0.099) (0.099) (0.098)
Retired 1.507*** 1.531*** 1.508***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
Unemp - unable -0.075 -0.069 -0.073
(0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
Country*Gov-empl 0.855***
(0.190)
Country*lncome 0.144**
(0.051)
Constant -0.063** -3.066*** -3.181*** -3.164*** -2.741***
(0.022) (0.201) (0.238) (0.238) (0.287)
N 7575 6885 6885 6885 6885
U -4973.154 -3914.283 -2984.608 -2975.966 -2979.996
chi2 174.437 1173.996 1828.669 1968.401 1765.045
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05 **p<0.01 *** p <  .001. Coeff = coefficient. SE = standard error.
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Table 4.15 Probability of Any Insurance, by country
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coejf. Coejf. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SB) (SB) (SB) (SB) (SB)
Income (log) 0.435*** 0.240*** 0.297*** 0.280*** 0.220*** 0.211***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Age 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.314*** 0.081 0.229*** 0.266***
(0.058) (0.100) (0.061) (0.080)
Married -0.003 0.024 0.183*** 0.313***
(0.053) (0.070) (0.053) (0.062)
Secondary
education 1.174*** 0.486*** 0.424*** 0.271***
(0.052) (0.066) (0.056) (0.059)
Employed 0.556***
(0.060)
0.240***
(0.062)
Self-assessed
health 0.035 0.032 -0.135*** -0.116**
(0.035) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
Self-reported
pain -0.006 -0.027 0.013 0.014
(0.035) (0.043) (0.033) (0.034)
Chronic 0.007 0.026 0.020 -0.019
(0.055) (0.069) (0.064) (0.067)
High blood
pressure 0.051 0.181* 0.027 0.035
(0.075) (0.089) (0.084) (0.086)
Diabetes 0.128 0.150 0.126 0.130
(0.096) (0.117) (0.121) (0.122)
Heart disease 0.167 0.111 0.186+ 0.188+
(0.119) (0.156) (0.112) (0.114)
Depression -0.100 -0.165 -0.078 -0.070
(0.098) (0.126) (0.074) (0.077)
Gov
employee 3.024***
(0.210)
2.122***
(0.195)
Nongov
employee 0.785***
(0.210)
0.920***
(0.118)
Self-
employed 0.256
(0.201)
0.110
(0.117)
Unpaid work 1.879***
(0.330)
1.000**
(0.372)
Student 2.102***
(0.224)
0.898***
(0.142)
Homemaker 0.027
(0.201)
0.224+
(0.115)
(continued)
114
Table 4.15 Probability of Any Insurance, by country (continued)
Model 1
Coejf.
(SE)
EGYPT 
Model 2
Coejf.
(SE)
Model 3
(SE)
Model 1
Coejf.
(SE)
LEBANON 
Model 2
Coejf.
(SE)
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Retired 1.843*** 0.907***
(0.229) (0.186)
Unemp -
unable 0.393 -0.068
(0.367) (0.150)
Constant -3.567*** -3.790*** -4.235*** -2.227*** -2.389*** -2.790***
(0.243) (0.264) (0.370) (0.274) (0.285) (0.302)
N 4218 4133 4133 2878 2752 2752
11 -2560.022 -1989.475 -1245.288 -1935.618 -1790.419 -1634.580
chi2 169.358 951.161 1456.540 64.069 207.492 413.530
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < .(X)l. Coeff = coelficient. SE = standard error.
4.7.2. Outpatient insurance 
4.7 2.1. Pooled model
For outpatient insurance, the country effect was significant and negative on the 
likelihood of outpatient insurance, even after controlling for other factors (Table 4.16). 
The effect of governmental employment was significant and positive. This suggests 
that being a governmental employee increases the probability of having outpatient 
insurance across countries. The interaction term for country*govemment was 
significant and positive. This finding suggests that the effect of governmental 
employment on the likelihood of outpatient insurance coverage is higher in Egypt than 
it is in Lebanon, holding other factors constant.
Income exerted a significant and positive effect on the probability of having outpatient 
insurance. Similarly, the interaction term for country*income was significant and 
positive. This finding suggests that a higher income increases the hkelihood of being 
insured, and that this effect is stronger in Egypt than it is in Lebanon.
Most of the health status effects were not significant in the pooled model. Diabetes 
exerted a significant positive effect in Model 2, but was significant at the 90% 
confidence level in Models 3 ,4 , and 5. These findings suggest that those diagnosed 
with diabetes were somewhat more likely to have outpatient insurance coverage than did 
those without diabetes. Depression was significant at the 90% confidence level in 
Model 2 only, where it was negative. This indicates that those diagnosed with 
depression were somewhat less likely to have health insurance than those without 
depression, but this effect disappears after disaggregating the employment variable.
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These results are similar to those found for the effect of health status on the probability 
of any insurance coverage.
4.T.2.2. Country-specific models
The effect of income was significant in both countries and remained so after adding the 
other covariates (Table 4.17). The magnitude of the effect was relatively larger in 
Egypt than it was in Lebanon. Being employed was a significant and positive 
determinant in both countries. However, its effect was relatively greater in Egypt than 
in Lebanon. Governmental employment was the strongest predictor of having 
outpatient insurance coverage in both countries. The effect was positive in both 
countries, but was relatively stronger in Egypt.
Similar to any insurance, some of the other occupational categories were significant and 
positive determinants of outpatient insurance. Being a non-govemmental employee 
positively determined insurance, and tended to exert a stronger effect in Lebanon than 
in Egypt. Unpaid work was positively associated with outpatient insurance to a greater 
degree in Egypt than in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the effect of unpaid work was significant 
only at the 90% confidence level. Being a student was a positive determinant of 
outpatient insurance, exerting a stronger effect in Egypt than in Lebanon. Being retired 
was positively associated with insurance, having a stronger effect in Egypt than in 
Lebanon.
Health and age tended to be relatively weakly associated with outpatient insurance in 
both countries. Most of the health variables were not significant. In Lebanon, the effect 
of depression was significant and negative, exerting a relatively small effect. These 
results suggest that having depression in Lebanon tend to decrease the likelihood of 
having health insurance. Age was significant and positive only in Egypt, but the 
magnitude of the probit index was approximately zero. Education exerted a significant 
and positive effect in both countries, and had a relatively greater effect in Egypt than in 
Lebanon.
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Table 4.16 Probability of Outpatient Insurance, pooled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) Coeff. (SE) (SE) (SE)
Country (l=Egypt, -
0=Lebanon) 0.276*** -0.110** -0.420*** -0.453*** -2.269***
(0.031) (0.038) (0.043) (0.045) (0.358)
Age 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.028 0.152** 0.141* 0.146**
(0.043) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Married 0.098** 0.189*** 0.180*** 0.186***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Secondary education 0.699*** 0.328*** 0.322*** 0.312***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Employed 0.339***
(0.044)
Income (log) 0.183*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.073*
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
Self-assessed health 0.015 0.026 0.024 0.023
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Self-reported pain 0.023 0.009 0.010 0.008
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chronic -0.020 -0.029 -0.028 -0.017
(0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
High blood pressure -0.024 0.021 0.020 0.014
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
Diabetes 0.164* 0.158+ 0.156+ 0.155+
(0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Heart disease 0.064 0.047 0.047 0.041
(0.083) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Depression -0.104+ -0.079 -0.079 -0.090
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Gov employee 1.711*** 1.470*** 1.715***
(0.106) (0.141) (0.106)
Nongov employee 0.697*** 0.699*** 0.698***
(0.105) (0.106) (0.105)
Self-employed 0.124 0.130 0.115
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Unpaid work 1.243*** 1.251*** 1.216***
(0.229) (0.230) (0.230)
Student 1.136*** 1.135*** 1.129***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.120)
Homemaker 0.061 0.081 0.062
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101)
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117
Table 4.16 Probability of Outpatient Insurance, pooled (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) Coeff. (SE) (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Retired 1.144*** 1.166*** 1.145***
(0.130) (0.131) (0.130)
Unemp - unable -0.047 -0.044 -0.046
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Country*Gov-empl 0.318*
(0.124)
Country*Income 0.246***
(0.047)
Constant ■0.395*** -2.910*** 2.874*** -2.867*** -2.046***
(0.023) (0.204) (0.229) (0.230) (0.269)
N 7575 6885 6885 6885 6885
11 -4530.829 -3750.105 3263.148 -3259.909 -3248.218
chi2 80.952 795.242 1600.636 1643.927 1565.600
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p<0.01 *** p < .001. Coeff = coefficient. SE = standard error.
Table 4.17 Probability of Outpatient Insurance, by country
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Income (log) 0.438*** 0.256*** 0.267*** 0.170*** 0.133*** 0.114***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Age 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.004+
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.232*** 0.060 0.228*** 0.256***
(0.060) (0.080) (0.062) (0.076)
Married -0.035 0.024 0.202*** 0.292***
(0.054) (0.066) (0.054) (0.062)
Secondary
education 0.993*** 0.441*** 0.302*** 0.161**
(0.053) (0.063) (0.057) (0.060)
Employed 0.421*** 0.250***
(0.062) (0.063)
Self-assessed
health 0.022 0.014 -0.035 -0.013
(0.036) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)
Self-reported
pain -0.002 -0.010 0.021 0.015
(0.037) (0.040) (0.033) (0.034)
Chronic -0.032 -0.038 0.076 0.053
(0.056) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067)
High blood
pressure 0.003 0.062 -0.024 -0.012
(0.079) (0.089) (0.085) (0.086)
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Table 4.17 Probability of Outpatient Insurance, by country (continued)
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Diabetes 0.151 0.168 0.130 0.131
(0.101) (0.113) (0.121) (0.122)
Heart disease 0.060 0.008 0.110 0.101
(0.122) (0.139) (0.113) (0.116)
Depression -0.022 -0.006 -0.176* -0.176*
(0.097) (0.107) (0.075) (0.077)
Gov
employee 1.822***
(0.199)
1.543***
(0.149)
Nongov
employee 0.671**
(0.215)
0.766***
(0.121)
Self-
employed 0.236
(0.204)
0.117
(0.121)
Unpaid work 1.630***
(0.317)
0.721+
(0.375)
Student 1.741***
(0.221)
0.697***
(0.145)
Homemaker 0.024
(0.204)
0.194
(0.119)
Retired 1.386***
(0.228)
0.782***
(0.180)
Unemp -
unable -0.017
(0.399)
-0.017
(0.155)
Constant -3.820*** -3.821*** -3.981*** -1.702*** -2.051*** -2.251***
(0.256) (0.272) (0.346) (0.252) (0.276) (0.292)
N 4218 4133 4133 2878 2752 2752
U -2287.720 -1910.053 -1541.981 -1847.431 -1733.812 -1627.613
chi2 156.898 715.077 1313.703 28.113 107.419 293.967
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < .001. Coeff = coef ïcient. SE = standard error.
4.7.3. Inpatient insurance
4.7.3.I. Pooled model
For inpatient insurance, country was a significant and negative determinant of the 
probability of inpatient insurance (Table 4,18). Consistent with the other insurance 
models, the probability of having inpatient insurance is greater in Lebanon than in 
Egypt. This effect was remained even after controlling for other factors. Governmental 
employment was a significant and positive determinant of having inpatient coverage. 
The interaction term for country*govemment was significant at the 90% confidence 
level and positive. This finding suggests that the effect of governmental employment
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on the likelihood of inpatient insurance coverage is somewhat higher in Egypt than it is 
in Lebanon, holding other factors constant.
Income exerted a significant and positive effect on the probability of having inpatient 
insurance. Yet the interaction term for country*income was significant and negative. 
These results suggest that a higher income increases the likelihood of having inpatient 
insurance. However, this effect is stronger in Lebanon than it is in Egypt, controlling 
for other factors. This finding suggests that a private health insurance schemes may 
account for a large proportion of inpatient coverage in Lebanon. These results contrast 
with those found for outpatient insurance, where the effect of income on outpatient 
insurance was greater in Egypt that it was in Lebanon.
Most of the health status effects were not significant. Heart disease was significant at 
the 90% confidence level and positive. Depression was significant in Model 1 only, 
exerting a negative effect. These findings suggest that those diagnosed with heart 
disease were somewhat more likely to have inpatient insurance coverage than did those 
without heart disease. In addition, individuals diagnosed with depression were 
somewhat less likely to have health insurance than those without depression, but this 
effect disappears after disaggregating the employment variable.
4.T.3.2. Country-specific models
The effect of income on the likelihood of inpatient insurance was significant and 
positive in Egypt only for Models 1 and 2, consisting of the aggregated employment 
variable (Table 4.19). The effect of income was not significant in Egypt after 
disaggregating the employment variable in Model 3. In Lebanon, the effect of income 
was significant and positive in all versions. In addition, the magnitude of the effect of 
income was relatively larger in Lebanon than it was in Egypt.
Being employed significantly increased the probability of having inpatient insurance 
coverage in both countries. The magnitude of its effect was relatively larger in Egypt 
than in Lebanon. Governmental employment was the most important determinant of 
inpatient insurance coverage in both countries. The effect was positive in both 
countries, although it was relatively greater in Egypt. Other occupational categories 
were predictors of having inpatient insurance. Being a non-govemmental employee 
increased the likelihood of having insurance, and tended to exert a stronger effect in 
Lebanon than in Egypt. Unpaid work positively predicted having insurance to a greater
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degree in Egypt than in Lebanon. Being a student tended to increase the likelihood of 
being covered for inpatient care, exerting a stronger effect in Egypt than in Lebanon. 
Being retired was positively associated with inpatient insurance, and also had a stronger 
effect in Egypt than in Lebanon.
Health and age had relatively small effects on the probability of having inpatient 
insurance across countries. In Lebanon, the effect of self-assessed health was 
significant and negative, exerting a relatively small effect. These results suggest that 
having poor self-reported health in Lebanon tends to increase the likelihood of having 
inpatient insurance. In Egypt, heart disease was significant and positive in Model 2, but 
was not significant in Model 3 after disaggregating the employment variable. At the 
same time, high blood pressure became significant at the 90% confidence level in Egypt 
after disaggregating the employment variable in Model 3. These results indicate that 
both ‘heart disease’ and ‘high blood pressure’ signify heart conditions in general. Age 
was significant and positive in both countries, with a relatively small effect. Education 
tended to increase the likelihood of having inpatient insurance. Similar to the other 
models, its effect was relatively stronger in Egypt than it was in Lebanon.
Table 4.18 Probability of Inpatient Insurance, pooled
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coejf. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Country (l=Egypt,
0=Lebanon) -0.517*** -0.379*** -0.919*** -0.951*** -0.294
(0.030) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046) (0.370)
Age 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.010 0.206** 0.197** 0.208***
(0.043) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Married 0.113** 0.222*** 0.212*** 0.223***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Secondary education 0.804*** 0.318*** 0.312*** 0.323***
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Employed 0.456***
(0.043)
Income (log) 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.193***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035)
Self-assessed health -0.033 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
(continued)
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Table 4.18 Probability of Inpatient Insurance, pooled (continued)
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE)
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE)
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE)
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE)
Model 5 
Coeff. 
(SE)
Self-reported
pain 0.020 0.008 0.008 0.009
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Chronic 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.015
(0.041) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
High blood
pressure 0.007 0.085 0.085 0.087
(0.056) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
Diabetes 0.105 0.089 0.087 0.090
(0.077) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Heart disease 0.162* 0.160+ 0.159+ 0.162+
(0.082) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091)
Depression -0.111+ -0.087 -0.088 -0.084
(0.060) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Gov employee 2.756*** 2.127*** 2.758***
(0.119) (0.186) (0.119)
Nongov
employee 0.841*** 0.846*** 0.842***
(0.104) (0.105) (0.105)
Self-empl 0.062 0.069 0.065
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Unpaid work 1.707*** 1.718*** 1.717***
(0.250) (0.252) (0.250)
Student 1.404*** 1.405*** 1.410***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.127)
Homemaker 0.070 0.089 0.070
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102)
Retired 1.491*** 1.517*** 1.493***
(0.136) (0.136) (0.136)
Unemp - unable -0.106 -0.100 -0.107
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Country*Gov-
empl 0.734***
(0.180)
Country*Income -0.084+
(0.049)
Constant -0.084*** -2.580*** -2.552*** -2.535*** -2.796***
(0.022) (0.192) (0.227) (0.227) (0.292)
N 7575 6885 6885 6885 6885
11 -4781.881 -3821.089 -2836.019 -2829.064 -2834.516
chi2 297.140 1146.999 2054.466 2258.049 2088.910
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < .001. Coeff = coefficient. SE = standard error.
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Table 4.19 Probability of Inpatient Insurance, by country
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model I Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. CogQF Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Income (log) 0.297*** 0.068* 0.060 0.279*** 0.223*** 0.214***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Age 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.241*** 0.135 0.247*** 0.280***
(0.060) (0.094) (0.061) (0.080)
Married 0.023 0.061 0.177*** 0.306***
(0.055) (0.077) (0.053) (0.062)
Secondary
education 1.143*** 0.358*** 0.409*** 0.253***
(0.054) (0.072) (0.056) (0.059)
Employed 0.629***
(0.062)
0.241***
(0.062)
Self-assessed
health 0.015 0.003 -0.128*** -0.110**
(0.035) (0.044) (0.039) (0.041)
Self-reported
pain -0.006 -0.030 0.018 0.019
(0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.034)
Chronic 0.058 0.113 0.026 -0.012
(0.057) (0.072) (0.064) (0.067)
High blood
pressure 0.033 0.177+ 0.044 0.053
(0.077) (0.094) (0.084) (0.086)
Diabetes 0.064 0.087 0.111 0.113
(0.100) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122)
Heart disease 0.253* 0.225 0.177 0.179
(0.117) (0.155) (0.111) (0.114)
Depression -0.116 -0.156 -0.071 -0.062
(0.102) (0.138) (0.074) (0.077)
Gov
employee 2.806***
(0.217)
2.163***
(0.195)
Nongov
employee 0.678**
(0.228)
0.921***
(0.118)
Self-
employed -0.028
(0.222)
0.119
(0.118)
Unpaid work 2.056***
(0.332)
1.043**
(0.373)
Student 1.920***
(0.235)
0.922***
(0.143)
Homemaker -0.164
(0.222)
0.240*
(0.115)
Retired 1.683***
(0.242)
0.878***
(0.184)
(continued)
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Table 4.19 Probability of Inpatient Insurance, by country (continued)
Model 1
Coejf.
(SE)
EGYPT 
Model 2
Coejf.
(SE)
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
LEBANON 
Model 2
Coejf.
(SE)
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Unemp - 
unable
Constant -2.724*** -2.818***
0.236
(0.395)
-2.632*** -2.237*** -2.434***
-0.065
(0.151)
-2.854***
(0.230) (0.255) (0.359) (0.274) (0.286) (0.304)
N 4218 4133 4133 2878 2752 2752
11 -2440.082 -1899.698 -1108.646 -1934.080 -1793.531 -1634.842
chi2 87.782 829.445 1827.233 63.349 197.658 406.941
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < .001. Coeff = coe Ticient. SE = standard error.
4.8. Discussion: Society, health, and health insurance
4.8.1. Comparative demographics
Overall, Egyptian respondents were relatively less wealthy and less educated than their 
Lebanese counterparts. However, whilst both groups reported similar aggregate levels 
of chronic health conditions, the Egyptians reported better self-assessed health levels 
than did the Lebanese, A higher proportion of Egyptian respondents reported having 
visited health care providers, particularly outpatient facilities, than did the Lebanese 
respondents. The differences between countries in health care-seeking behaviour may 
be due to differences found regarding the nature of chronic health conditions, the 
perceived severity of disease, and the nature of public supply of outpatient services.
4.8.2. Framing economic status
Understanding how social stratification varies by country provides more accurate 
information with which to assess social inequalities. Overall, income did not appear to 
vary by age substantially in either country. In both countries, a higher income was 
generally associated with being married and female. Educational status and 
employment information revealed the most telling information about income. Although 
completing secondary education or above was more common amongst the higher 
income groups in both countries, the gap between the richest and the poorest groups 
was greater in Egypt than it was in Lebanon. In addition, the completion rates were 
nearly identical across income in both countries, except for the poorest quintile, where 
the completion rate in Egypt was much lower than in Lebanon. These results suggest 
that socioeconomic inequality in Egypt may be due to the vulnerability of the poorest
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groups in society to missed educational attainment, although the same holds true for 
Lebanon to a somewhat lesser extent.
Employment appears to be similar between countries when considering aggregate 
gainful employment rates, but the detailed exploration found important differences 
pertaining to socioeconomic status. Gainfully employed was defined as being a 
governmental employee, non-governmental employee, or self-employed. Overall, 
approximately 44% in each country were gainfully employed, with nearly 50% more 
respondents in the richest as poorest quintiles employed. However, considerably more 
people in Egypt were government employees than in Lebanon. Conversely, 
considerably more people in Lebanon were self-employed.
These results suggest that indicators of social stratification may differ across countries. 
Educational level and occupational status appear to be important indicators of 
socioeconomic status in Egypt. By contrast, reported income and education seem to 
represent socioeconomic status in Lebanon. Although similar in many social and 
cultural respects, the structure of socioeconomic classes does not necessarily translate 
across borders. These findings could also mean that, on the one hand, socio-cultural 
and epidemiological patterns might be attributed to environment and history. On the 
other hand, class structure might be explained by the macro-economic environment, 
which directly or indirectly affects state versus private labour structure, social benefits, 
income generation, and, ultimately, social inequalities. With this development also 
come different patterns and consequences of social exclusion.
4.8.3. Health-care seeking behaviour
Other important indicators of socioeconomic status included the specific types of 
chronic health conditions afflicting different income groups and their health care- 
seeking behaviours. Contrary to previous research in developed countries showing that 
some chronic conditions are more frequently reported amongst the relatively rich, this 
research found that chronic conditions of most types are more common amongst the 
relatively poor in both countries. However, the types of conditions that were reported 
differed to an extent between settings. More respondents in Egypt reported arthritis and 
somewhat more reported ulcers than in Lebanon. Heart disease, depression, and vision 
problems were amongst the conditions that were more prevalent in Lebanon. The 
greatest income-associated inequality was found in Egypt in arthritis, asthma, migraine
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headaches, and hearing problems, whilst in Lebanon, inequality was greatest in heart 
disease, stroke, arthritis, high blood pressure, and ulcers.
These results suggest that respondents in the poorest quintiles report different 
conditions in each country due to several possible factors. First, etymological 
differences in disease due to environmental or other risk factor differences amongst 
poorer groups could differ between settings. Second, reporting relatively more 
treatment-intense conditions in Lebanon than in Egypt could be related to reporting 
bias, due to demand-side incentives to obtain coverage or supply-side incentives to 
generate demand. Finally, utilisation and treatment patterns amongst the poor could be 
less clinically effective for certain conditions in Lebanon than in Egypt, and vice versa.
Reasons for seeking care and the type of care received varied somewhat across income 
group. First, of those who did receive care, the reasons were fairly evenly distributed 
across income in Egypt. Yet in Lebanon, poorer groups tended to report less acute 
reasons than did richer groups, whilst the latter reported treatment-intense reasons more 
often. At the visit, receiving treatment, tests, and discussing specific health problems 
was more common in Lebanon than in Egypt. The results also show that poorer groups 
tended to avoid seeking care due to financial constraints between 3-5 times more often 
than richer groups in both countries. However, more of the poorest respondents in 
Lebanon than in Egypt were actually refused care due to financial constraints. These 
results suggest that the nature of care sought appears to be more acute and/or more 
technology-intense in Lebanon than in Egypt.
4.8.4. Economic determinants of health insurance
Overall, the government employment was the most important predictor of health 
insurance. Other important predictors were other types of employment, country, 
education, and income, whilst age played a minor role. Being male and being married 
were significant only in Lebanon, where they played a moderate role. Thus, income per 
se was not necessarily the most important determinant of health insurance, as 
employment or being a dependent appears to be the main route to securing health 
insurance in both countries.
However, income plays a greater role in Lebanon than in Egypt. In the pooled models, 
the probability of having insurance was higher in Lebanon than in Egypt; however, this
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effect disappears in the case of inpatient insurance after accounting for the interaction 
between country*income. This suggests that the country effect for inpatient care is 
mainly explained by the greater effect of income in Lebanon, rather than another quality 
about the Lebanese system. This enhanced effect of income in Lebanon is likely tied to 
the fact that voluntary private health insurance is purchased by approximately 20% of 
the Lebanese population. By contrast, the influence of being a government employee 
on having insurance was significantly higher in Egypt than it was in Lebanon. Since 
voluntary private insurance in Egypt is nearly non-existent, those who do have health 
insurance are typically civil servants.
Finally, the effects varied by the type of health insurance. Governmental employment 
generally played a stronger role in determining inpatient insurance than it did for 
outpatient insurance. Income was a larger determinant of outpatient insurance in Egypt 
than it was in Lebanon. In Egypt, a few other differences were observed between 
outpatient and inpatient insurance. Income was no longer a predictor of inpatient 
insurance after accounting for employment type, reinforcing that the effect of income in 
Egypt may be largely due to its effect through employment type. Being employed was a 
larger determinant of inpatient care than it was for outpatient care. These effects 
support the idea that social structure and acquiring coverage for health care differs 
somewhat between countries.
4.9. Chapter summary
The Egyptians and Lebanese are similar in some respects, yet social disparities in health 
and health insurance depend on the way social groups are defined in each country. A 
higher income per capita and a higher secondary education completion rate was found 
in the Lebanese sample, likely due to the relatively more advanced stage of economic 
development in Lebanon as compared to Egypt. By contrast, governmental 
employment is relatively higher in Egypt. This result may be explained by both the 
structure of the employment sector in Egypt and the incentives to work for the state 
there, given higher-quality and more comprehensive social benefits available, beyond 
services provided universally.
Regarding health, poorer groups appear to be afflicted by certain conditions more often 
than richer groups in both settings. In Lebanon, the poor also tend to report higher rates 
of illness for a greater number of conditions than they do in Egypt. These results
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indicate that income disparities in self-reported illness exist in both countries, but to a 
greater extent in Lebanon than in Egypt. Regarding health care-seeking behaviour, 
income-disparities in the use of high-technology services appear to be greater in 
Lebanon than in Egypt.
The economic determinants of health insurance in Egypt and Lebanon are similar to 
those reported for other contexts, although the ranking of predictors varies somewhat. 
Being a civil servant matters the most in Egypt and Lebanon. Despite the option to 
purchase private health insurance in Lebanon, governmental employment is still far 
more important than income in having insurance. At the same time, income is an 
important predictor of having insurance coverage in both countries. Therefore, in 
considering the effects of insurance and income on utilisation, it is important to note 
that these variables are highly correlated. The nature of economic inequality may 
therefore differ between countries, which can be further explored by quantifying the 
degree of inequity.
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Chapter 5. Distribution of health and health care
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents results regarding the distribution of health status and health care 
in Egypt and Lebanon. Findings are presented on the patterns of health care utilisation 
by income, measures of equity, and how health care payments can affect income level.
The first section of the chapter shows how levels of health indicators are distributed 
across income quintiles. The associated concentration indices and concentration curves 
are described for each health indicator, including health status, health care utilisation, 
health insurance coverage, and out-of-pocket payments. The index provides a summary 
measure of how equitable the distribution is, whilst the concentration curve visually 
depicts how equity changes along the income spectrum. The second section further 
illustrates the effect of inequity by showing the impact of out-of-pocket payments on 
income levels and poverty rates.
In presenting the distribution of health indicators and their associated equity measures, 
actual and need-standardised values are reported. For health status, values were 
adjusted by accounting for demographics, represented by age and gender. For 
utilisation and insurance, values were adjusted by accounting for health need, 
represented by these demographics and the three main health indicators, represented by 
self-assessed health, self-reported pain, and chronic health conditions. Out-of-pocket 
payments were not standardised for need, due to two reasons: (a) out-of-pocket 
payments were collected at the household level and (b) limited information was 
available in order to adjust for aggregate household health need. However, out-of- 
pocket payments were adjusted for household composition.
5.2. Health status
5.2.1. Self-assessed health
The actual proportion of respondents who rated themselves as having a ‘moderate or 
below’ health status was relatively higher amongst the poorest quintile as compared to
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the richest (Table 5,1). The gap was wider in Lebanon (twice as high amongst the 
poorest) than in Egypt (40% higher amongst the poorest). As shown in the table and 
Figure 5.1, the concentration indices are negative and statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. These results suggest that self-assessed ill health is concentrated 
amongst lower-income groups, known as a ‘pro-poor’ distribution.
The distribution is more pro-poor in Lebanon, since the magnitude of the index is larger 
in Lebanon than it is in Egypt. After standardising for age and gender, ill health is still 
more prevalent amongst the poorest quintile relative to the richest, but the gap is not as 
wide. The standardised indices show significantly pro-poor distributions in both 
countries, but the magnitude is smaller than the actual indices as shown in Table 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2. Overall, the degree of pro-poor inequity in self-assessed ill health in 
Lebanon is greater than it is in Egypt.
As shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, the actual and standardised curves he above the 
entire line of equality, respectively. Therefore, self-assessed ill health is pro-poor 
across all levels of income. However, in Egypt the curves lie further above the line for 
the upper 40% of the income distribution; this shows that iU health is more skewed 
towards lower incomes amongst people whose earnings are above average.
Since the standardised curves lie above but closer to the hne of equality relative to the 
actual curves, the standardised distribution is slightly less pro-poor. Because the 
income gaps narrow somewhat after standardisation but still remain pro-poor, factors 
such as age and gender partially explain why lower-income groups are more likely to 
report feeling ill.
5.2.2. Self-reported pain
Approximately 1.5 times as many of the poorest group as the richest suffered from pain 
in Egypt and in Lebanon (Table 5.1). Overall, the indices show significantly pro-poor 
distributions, but more in Egypt (Figure 5.1). After standardisation, the indices 
continue to be pro-poor but relatively less so (Figure 5.2). All of the curves show a pro­
poor distribution of pain, but somewhat less so after standardisation (Figure 5.5 and 
Figure 5.6). However, in Egypt pain appears more pro-poor amongst the upper income 
levels.
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Table 5.1 Concentration indices for ill health
Proportion reporting ill health (%)
(Actual)
SAH
Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N C.I.
Egypt 0.309 0.264 0.296 0.231 0.224 0.274 1.4 4484 -0.052*
Lebanon
Pain
0.505 0.432 0.382 0.295 0.254 0.330 2.0 3243 -0.215*
Egypt 0.472 0.413 0.439 0.365 0.310 0.418 1.5 4482 -0.112*
Lebanon
CHC
0.548 0.506 0.467 0.391 0.362 0.421 1.5 3233 -0.055*
Egypt 0.630 0.590 0.597 0.540 0.443 0.582 1.4 4416 -0.038*
Lebanon
(Standardised)
SAH
0.694 0.639 0.620 0.620 0.503 0.539 1.4 3174 -0.074*
Egypt 0.308 0.290 0.311 0.251 0.251 0.290 1.2 4471 -0.033*
Lebanon 
Pain - any
0.423 0.408 0.357 0.301 0.250 0.315 1.7 3216 -0.151*
Egypt 0.468 0.434 0.451 0.383 0.333 0.430 1.4 4469 -0.073*
Lebanon
CHC
0.479 0.483 0.445 0.400 0.400 0.361 1.2 3206 -0.041*
Egypt 0.631 0.609 0.609 0.555 0.458 0.594 1.4 4405 -0.031*
Lebanon 0.628 0.619 0.599 0.512 0.537 0.560 1.2 3148 -0.047*
^Statistically significant at 95%  confidence level. C.I. = C ON CEN TRA TION  INDEX: <0 = pro-poor; 0 = incom e-neutral; >0 = pro-rich. ‘R atio ’ refers to 
percentage am ongst the poorest 20% relative to richest 20%. Standardised sample size is lower since observations with predicted negative values for standardisation 
w ere dropped. SAH = Self-assessed health, where dummy variable: 1 = moderate or below; 0 = very good or above. Pain refers to dum m y variable: 1 = any level 
o f pain; 0 = no pain reported. CHC = Chronic health conditions, where dumm y variable: 1 = diagnosis o f at least one chronic health condition, and 0 = no diagnosis.
131
5.2.3. Chronic health conditions
In both countries, the rate of chronic health conditions was 40% higher amongst the 
poorest quintile than amongst the richest (Table 5.1). Overall, the indices show 
significant pro-poor distributions, but more so in Lebanon (Figure 5.1). After 
standardisation, chronic health conditions are pro-poor, suggesting that the distribution 
of chronic health conditions is not entirely explained by age and sex differences 
(Figure 5.2). The indices in both countries show pro-poor distributions, but more so in 
Lebanon. Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 show that all four curves indicate pro-poor rates.
Figure 5.1 Equality in health with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.2 Equity in health with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.3 Concentration curve for self- Figure 5.4 Concentration curve for self­
assessed health (actual) assessed health (standardised)
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Figure 5.5 Concentration curve for pain Figure 5.6 Concentration curve for pain 
(actual) (standardised)
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Figure 5.7 Concentration curve for chronic health cond itions (actual)
Concertradon Curves; Diagnosis of Chronic Condition (Unstandardisedl, Egypt and Lebanon
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Figure 5.8 Concentration curve for chronic health condition (standardised)
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5.3. Any outpatient care
Any outpatient care was defined as the proportion of respondents who reported having 
visited any type of outpatient providers, or outpatient contact. In both countries, the 
poorest groups were 20-30% more likely to visit ‘any’ outpatient care than the richest 
(Table 5.2). The actual indices point to a significant pro-poor distribution in Lebanon 
and an income-neutral distribution in Egypt (Figure 5.9).
The standardised rate of outpatient use is income-neutral in both countries, indicating 
that health need largely explains the actual, pro-poor distribution in Lebanon 
(Figure 5.10). The actual and standardised curves generally show pro-poor ‘any’ 
outpatient use in both countries (Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12). However, after 
standardisation outpatient use in Egypt is slightly pro-rich amongst the lowest third of 
the income distribution.
5.4. General practitioner care
5.4.1. Contact
General practitioner visits were 30-50% more common amongst the poorest quintiles 
than the richest in both countries (Table 5.2). The indices show that the Egyptian 
pattern was income-neutral and the Lebanese pattern was significantly pro-poor 
(Figure 5.9). The standardised indices show general practitioner contact is significantly 
pro-poor in both countries, but more in Lebanon (Figure 5.2). In both countries, the 
actual and standardised curves show pro-poor distribution for the lower-income groups, 
and pro-rich distribution for upper-income groups (Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14).
5.4.2. Intensity
Amongst those who visited general practitioners, the poorest quintiles in both countries 
reported 20% more frequent visits as the richest (Table 5.3). Overall, the actual and 
standardised indices show income-neutral distributions (Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16). 
Based on Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18, general practitioner visits appear pro-rich for the 
lower-income groups and pro-poor for upper-income groups.
5.5. Medical specialist care
5.5.1. Contact
Actual rates of specialist contact appear income-neutral in both countries, although the 
indices suggest a slightly pro-rich distribution (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.9). The
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standardised indices are significantly pro-poor in Lebanon and income-neutral in Egypt 
(Figure 5,10). The actual and standardised curves for specialist care in Egypt and 
Lebanon indicate pro-rich distributions for lower-income levels and pro-poor for upper- 
income levels (Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20).
5.5.2. Intensity
The actual and standardised average number of visits was approximately 1.7 per month 
in both countries (Table 5.3). All of the indices show income-neutral distributions 
(Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16). All of the curves show a slightly pro-rich pattern 
amongst lower-income levels and slightly pro-poor amongst higher-income levels 
(Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22).
5.6. Pharmacists
5.6.1. Contact
The proportion of respondents who visited pharmacists was similar across quintiles in 
both countries (Table 5.2). The indices for both countries were not significant; the 
index is slightly pro-poor in Egypt and pro-rich in Lebanon (Figure 5.9). After 
standardisation, neither index is significant, though slightly pro-poor in Egypt and 
income-neutral in Lebanon (Figure 5.10). The actual curves for both countries show 
that contact is somewhat pro-rich for lower-income groups and pro-poor for upper- 
income groups (Figure 5.23). The standardised curves lie on opposite sides of the line 
of equality relative to the actual curves, indicating a pro-poor distribution for lower- 
income groups and pro-rich for upper-income groups (Figure 5.24).
5.6.2. Intensity
In Egypt and Lebanon, the average number of conditional visits was nearly 2.5 per 
person per month, and the richest-to-poorest ratio appears somewhat pro-poor 
(Table 5.3). The standardised and actual indices are similar, suggesting that the 
intensity of pharmacy visits is income-neutral (Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16). All of the 
curves show that pharmacy visits are pro-rich amongst lower-income groups and 
slightly pro-poor amongst the upper-income groups (Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26).
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Table 5.2 Concentration indices for various types of outpatient contact
Proportion of users (%)
(Actual) Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N C.I.
Any outpatient care
Egypt 0.612 0.604 0.604 0.587 0.503 0.595 1.2 4490 -0.007
Lebanon 0.439 0.421 0.443 0.376 0.339 0.385 1.3 3246 -0.052*
General practitioners
Egypt 0.490 0.559 0.390 0.417 0.333 0.463 1.5 672 -0.137
Lebanon 0.378 0.382 0.252 0.283 0.299 0.303 1.3 1136 -0.223*
Specialists
Egypt 0.784 0.830 0.851 0.832 0.827 0.823 0.9 1267 0.019
Lebanon 0.397 0.407 0.414 0.406 0.404 0.406 1.0 1139 0.034
Pharmacy
Egypt 0.507 0.584 0.697 0.561 0.449 0.574 1.1 745 -0.010
Lebanon 0.290 0.386 0.285 0.287 0.285 0.295 1.0 1120 0.020
(Standardised)
Any outpatient care
Egypt 0.581 0.607 0.592 0.622 0.586 0.598 1.0 4401 0.023*
Lebanon 0.351 0.369 0.404 0.410 0.373 0.384 0.9 3134 0.010
General practitioners
Egypt 0.383 0.489 0.151 0.165 0.300 0.333 1.3 304 -0.087
Lebanon 0.415 0.497 0.311 0.279 0.255 0.306 1.6 326 -0.097*
Specialists
Egypt 0.523 0.492 0.363 0.750 0.601 0.522 0.9 1043 -0.012
Lebanon 0.507 0.312 0.340 0.230 0.435 0.365 1.2 446 -0.070*
Pharmacy
Egypt 0.360 0.239 0.234 0.250 0.241 0.274 1.5 421 -0.055
Lebanon 0.476 0.605 0.370 0.326 0.391 0.397 1.2 314 -0.001
*Statistically significant at 95% confidence level. C.I. = CONCENTRATION INDEX; <0 = pro-poor; 0 = income-neutral; >0 = pro-rich. 
Standardised sample reduced since observations with predicted negative values for standardisation were dropped. Ratio: poorest 20% to richest 20%.
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Figure 5.9 Equality in outpatient contact with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.10 Equity in outpatient contact with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.11 Concentration curves for Figure 5.12 Concentration curves for
any outpatient contact (actual) any outpatient contact (standardised)
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Figure 5.13 Concentration curves for 
general practitioner contact (actual)
Figure 5.14 Concentration curves for 
general practitioner contact 
(standardised)
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Table 5.3 Concentration indices for outpatient intensity
Average no. of visits per person per two weeks
(Unconditional, actual) Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N C.I.
General practitioners
Egypt 0.782 1.073 0.801 1.031 0.433 0.867 1.8 672 n/a
Lebanon 0.732 0.831 0.388 0.480 0.490 0.527 1.5 1136 n/a
Specialists
E gypt 1.246 1.460 1.503 1.347 1.364 1.389 0.9 1267 n/a
Lebanon 0.740 0.758 0.670 0.626 0.632 0.664 1.2 1139 n/a
Pharmacy
E gypt 1.128 1.426 2.011 1.271 0.783 1.401 1.4 745 n/a
Lebanon 0.637 0.898 0.715 0.789 0.712 0.737 0.9 1120 n/a
(Conditional, actual) 
General practitioners
Egypt 1.596 1.919 2.057 2.475 1.300 1.871 1.2 311 0.021
Lebanon 1.938 2.176 1.537 1.698 1.639 1.739 1.2 349 -0.020
Specialists
E gypt 1.589 1.758 1.767 1.620 1.648 1.688 1.0 1043 0.045
Lebanon 1.865 1.865 1.618 1.539 1.565 1.635 1.2 470 -0.092
Pharmacy
Egypt 2.223 2.441 2.885 2.267 1.742 2.440 1.3 427 0.011
Lebanon 2.194 2.324 2.508 2.750 2.500 2.498 0.9 331 0.005
(Conditional, standardardised) 
General practitioners
E gypt 1.607 2.002 2.092 2.542 1.389 1.922 1.2 304 0.015
Lebanon 1.957 1.992 1.463 1.646 1.600 1.683 1.2 326 -0.022
Specialists
E gypt 1.607 1.761 1.765 1.644 1.675 1.699 1.0 1043 0.048
Lebanon 1.889 1.835 1.595 1.507 1.538 1.614 1.2 446 -0.091
Pharmacy
Egypt 2.235 2.421 2.761 2.376 1.713 2.418 1.3 421 0.013
Lebanon 2.231 2.402 2.532 2.694 2.518 2.510 0.9 314 0.003
^Statistically significant at 95% confidence level. C.I. = CONCENTRATION INDEX: <0 = Pro-Poor; 0 = Income-Neutral; >0 = Pro-Rich. Ratio: poorest 20% to richest 20%
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igure 5.15 Equality in outpatient intensity with confidence intervals____
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Figure 5.17 Concentration curves for
general practitioner intensity
(actual)
Figure 5.18 Concentration curves for
general practitioner intensity
(standardised)
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Figure 5.19 Concentration curves for Figure 5.20 Concentration curves for
specialist contact (actual) specialist contact (standardised)
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Figure 5.21 Concentration curves for
specialist intensity (actual)
Figure 5.22 Concentration curves for
specialist intensity (standardised)
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Figure 5.23 Concentration curves for 
pharmacist contact (actual)
Figure 5.24 Concentration curves for 
pharmacist contact (standardised)
Cumulative population proportion Cumulative population proportion
cone curve rx-Egypt  cone curve rx- Lebanon
 line of perfec t equality
cone curve st-rx- Egypt 
 line of perfect equality
cone curve st-rx- Lebanon
C oncentration curves A BO V E line o f perfect equality = Pro-Poor distributions. 
BELO W  the line = Pro-Rich 
A LONG the line = Incom e-N eutral
143
Figure 5.25 Concentration curves for
pharmacy intensity (actual)
Figure 5.26 Concentration curves for
pharmacy intensity (standardised)
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5.7. Hospital outpatient care
5.7.1. Contact
In Egypt, 20% more respondents in the poorest income group had visited hospital 
outpatient units as compared to the richest income, but rates were similar between these 
quintiles in Lebanon (Table 5,4). The actual and standardised indices show that 
hospital outpatient contact is income-neutral in both countries, but somewhat pro-rich in 
Egypt (Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.28). All of the curves suggest that contact is mostly 
pro-poor, but pro-rich amongst both extremes of the income spectrum (Figure 5.29 and 
Figure 5.30).
5.7.2. Intensity
Amongst Egyptian and Lebanese respondents, the indices suggest that the conditional 
number of visits was income-neutral, although somewhat pro-rich (Table 5.5 and 
Figure 5.31). After standardisation, the intensity of hospital outpatient visits was 
income-neutral in Egypt and Lebanon, but somewhat pro-rich in Egypt and pro-poor in
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Lebanon (Figure 5.32). The actual and standardised curves for both countries show a 
mostly pro-rich distribution but pro-poor for the upper-most income groups (Figure 5.33 
and Figure 5.34). However, in Lebanon the number of visits was relatively more pro­
poor than that in Egypt.
5.8. Hospital inpatient care
5.8.1. Contact over twelve months
In Egypt, over twice as many respondents in the poorest quintile were admitted as the 
richest, but only 30% more of the poorest had in Lebanon (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.27). 
The actual index for Egypt was negative but not significant, but was significantly pro­
poor in Lebanon. After standardisation, the indices are income-neutral (Figure 5.28). 
All of the curves are a somewhat pro-rich (Figure 5.35 and Figure 5.36). The actual 
curves show that admissions are pro-poor for the lowest income levels.
5.8.2. Contact over one month
In Egypt, four times as many of the poorest quintile as the richest had been admitted 
over one month, but in Lebanon half as many of the poorest had admissions as the 
richest (Table 5.4). The actual indices show an income-neutral distribution overall, 
although somewhat pro-poor (Figure 5.27). After standardisation, the indices show that 
admissions are income-neutral in both countries (Figure 5.28). Actual and standardised 
curves show income-neutral distributions in both countries, but somewhat pro-rich in 
Lebanon for upper incomes (Figure 5.37 and Figure 5.38).
5.8.3. Intensity over one month
Over one month, the average number of conditional visits was slightly higher in 
Lebanon than in Egypt (Table 5.3). The actual and standardised indices were income- 
neutral, though slightly pro-rich in Egypt and slightly pro-poor in Lebanon (Figure 5.31 
and Figure 5.32). All of the curves show that admission frequency is mostly pro-rich, 
but pro-poor amongst the lowest income deciles (Figure 5.39 and Figure 5.40).
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Figure 5.27 Equality in hospital contact with confidence intervals
Equality in health service use (probability): Egypt and Lebanon, actual
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Table 5.4 Concentration indices for contact with hospital providers
Proportion of users (%)
(actual) Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N Cl
Hospital outpatient units
Egypt 0.604 0.551 0.550 0.588 0.500 0.569 1.2 701 0.164
Lebanon 0.075 0.060 0.082 0.079 0.083 0.079 0.9 1090 0.031
Hospital inpatient-12 mo
Egypt 0.060 0.056 0.060 0.054 0.028 0.055 2.2 4490 -0.015
Lebanon 0.146 0.127 0.162 0.117 0.115 0.129 1.3 3246 -0.114*
Hospital inpatient-1 mo
Egypt 0.302 0.313 0.266 0.214 0.080 0.264 3.8 517 -0.134
Lebanon 0.025 0.095 0.044 0.037 0.060 0.050 0.4 1085 -0.039
(standardised)
Hospital outpatient units
Egypt 0.197 0.397 0.463 0.250 0.374 0.332 0.5 386 0.105
Lebanon 0.210 0.238 0.106 0.095 0.202 0.162 1.0 85 0.002
Hospital inpatient-12 mo
Egypt 0.058 0.062 0.061 0.064 0.045 0.060 1.3 4401 0.015
Lebanon 0.111 0.099 0.149 0.123 0.122 0.124 0.9 3134 0.026
Hospital inpatient-1 mo
Egypt 0.071 0.061 0.106 0.045 0.156 0.083 0.5 129 -0.098
Lebanon 0.103 0.173 0.068 0.044 0.100 0.087 1.0 62 -0.035
*Statistically significant at 95% confidence level. C.I. = CONCENTRATION INDEX: < 0 = Pro-Poor. 0 = 
Standardised sample size reduced since observations with predicted negative values for standardisation were 
20%
Income-Neutral. > 0 = Pro-Rich, 
dropped. Ratio: poorest 20% to richest
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Table 5.5 Concentration indices for intensity of hospital services
(Unconditional, actual) N
Average no. of visits per person per two weeks 
Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio C.I.
Hospital outpatient units
Egypt 701 0.922 1.186 1.309 1.202 0.875 1.104 1.1 n/a
Lebanon 1090 0.167 0.120 0.164 0.139 0.143 0.148 1.2 n/a
Hospital inpatient-1 mo
Egypt 517 0.453 0.484 0.404 0.443 0.080 0.413 5.7 n/a
Lebanon 1085 0.058 0.143 0.078 0.042 0.144 0.097 0.4 n/a
(Conditional visits, actual) 
Hospital outpatient units
Egypt 399 1.527 2.151 2.378 2.045 1.750 1.942 0.9 0.019
Lebanon 92 2.222 2.000 2.000 1.765 1.724 1.870 1.3 0.011
Hospital inpatient-1 mo
Egypt 136 1.500 1.550 1.517 2.067 1.000 1.566 1.5 0.029
Lebanon 62 2.333 1.500 1.778 1.125 2.381 1.918 1.0 -0.020
(Conditional, 
standardardised) 
Hospital outpatient units
Egypt 386 1.551 2.151 2.412 2.086 1.856 1.971 0.8 0.021
Lebanon 85 2.368 1.519 1.993 1.600 1.459 1.719 1.6 -0.047
Hospital inpatient-1 mo
Egypt 129 1.484 0.148 1.503 2.217 0.968 1.551 1.5 0.040
Lebanon 62 2.499 1.672 1.757 0.991 2.295 1.894 LI -0.041
^Statistically significant at 95% confidence level, n/a = not applicable. C.I. = CONCENTRATION INDEX: < 0 
0 = Pro-Rich. UNCONDITIONAL refers to average number of visits for entire sample, including non-users and 
is calculated for probability of visits separately from the number of visits CONDITIONAL upon being a user (i.e 
poorest 20% to richest 20%.
= Pro-Poor. 0 = Income-Neutral. > 
users of health services. Instead, C.I. 
., having at least one visit). Ratio:
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Figure 5.29 Equality in hospital intensity with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.30 Equity in hospital intensity with confidence intervals
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Figure 5.31 Concentration curves for
hospital outpatient contact (actual)
Figure 5.32 Concentration curves for 
hospital outpatient contact 
(standardised)
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Figure 5.33 Concentration curves for 
hospital outpatient intensity (actual)
Figure 5.34 Concentration curves for 
hospital outpatient intensity 
(standardised)
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Figure 5.35 Concentration curves for
inpatient contact (12-mo., actual)
Figure 5.36 Concentration curves for
inpatient contact (12 mo., standardised)
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Figure 5.37 Concentration curves for Figure 5.38 Concentration curves for
inpatient contact (1-mo., actual) inpatient contact (1 mo., standardised)
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Figure 5.39 Concentration curves for
inpatient intensity (actual)_____
Figure 5.40 Concentration curves for
inpatient intensity (standardised)
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5.9. Health insurance
5.9.1. Any health insurance
In both countries, nearly 60-70% fewer respondents in the poorest quintile had 
insurance coverage of any type as compared to the richest (Table 5.6). The actual and 
standardised indices show significant pro-rich distributions, but more in Lebanon 
(Figure 5.41 and Figure 5.42). All curves indicate that ‘any’ insurance is pro-rich, but 
income inequality is relatively greater amongst middle-income groups (Figure 5.43 and 
Figure 5.44).
5.9.2. Outpatient insurance
Outpatient insurance rates were 60-70% lower amongst the poorest quintile than 
amongst the richest (Table 5.6). The actual and standardised indices show significantly 
pro-rich coverage in both countries (Figure 5.42 and Figure 5.42). All curves show that 
outpatient insurance is pro-rich, but is relatively less after standardisation (Figure 5.45 
and Figure 5.46). It is mostly pro-rich, but pro-poor amongst the top 10% of the income 
distribution. Income inequity is higher amongst middle-income groups.
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5.9.3. Inpatient insurance
The inpatient insurance rate was twice as high in Lebanon as in Egypt, and generally 
60% higher amongst the richest quintiles relative to the poorest. Overall, the actual and 
standardised indices illustrate that coverage is significantly pro-rich, but more so in 
Lebanon (Figure 5.41 and Figure 5.42). Figure 5.47 and Figure 5.48 show that it is 
consistently pro-rich, particularly amongst middle-income levels.
5.10. Household out-of-pocket payments for health care
Over one year, virtually all households in both countries paid out-of-pocket fees for 
health care, whether for physician visits or medications (Table 5.7). The proportion of 
households that paid fees to physicians was slightly lower in Lebanon than in Egypt, but 
for medications the proportions were nearly equal. Within each country, the 
proportions of households reporting payments for doctor visits and medications were 
nearly equal between the poorest and richest quintiles.
Whilst the average share of income spent on health care was relatively high by 
international standards, the share found in Lebanon was twice that found in Egypt (17% 
versus 8%, respectively). In Egypt the total share spent by the poorest quintile was five 
times greater than that spent by the richest in Egypt, but in Lebanon it was twelve times 
greater.
As a percent of income, a larger share was spent on medications than on physician visits 
in both countries. In Egypt, the dollar amount spent on medications was nearly 3.5 
times as much as that spent on physician fees. The lowest-income quintile spent 3.6 
times as much on medications as on physicians, whilst the poorest-income quintile 
spent nearly 3 times as much on medication as on physicians.
In Lebanon, approximately 2.2 times as much was spent on medications as on 
physicians overall. Similar to Egypt, the poorest quintile spent approximately 2.6 times 
as much on medications than on physician fees. The ratio was nearly 2 times amongst 
the richest quintile.
These results suggest that (i) the lower-income groups utilise physicians less than the 
richest; or (ii) that lower-income groups tend to visit providers that are associated with 
relatively lower fees, such as public or charitable providers. The indices show that all
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out-of-pocket payments were significantly pro-poor (i.e., higher amongst the relative 
poor), but relatively more in Lebanon (Table 5.8). In both countries, income-related 
inequity in out-of-pocket payments was relatively greater for medications than it was 
for physician visits.
Figure 5.41 Equality in health insurance with confidence intervals______
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Figure 5.42 Equity in health insurance with confidence intervals
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Table 5.6 Concentration indices by type of health insurance
Proportion with health insurance (%)
(Actual Proportions) Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N C.I.
Any insurance
Egypt 0.204 0.281 0.345 0.422 0.599 0.325 0.3 4352 0.204*
Lebanon 0.245 0.323 0.398 0.529 0.589 0.478 0.4 3223 0.246*
OP Insurance
Egypt 0.161 0.202 0.242 0.345 0.528 0.251 0.3 4352 0.186*
Lebanon 0.172 0.237 0.326 0.415 0.406 0.352 0.4 3223 0.190*
IP Insurance
Egypt 0.179 0.238 0.312 0.364 0.404 0.274 0.4 4352 0.134*
Lebanon 0.236 0.319 0.396 0.523 0.578 0.471 0.4 3223 0.203*
(Standardised Proportions) 
Any insurance
Egypt 0.317 0.406 0.477 0.568 0.726 0.454 0.4 2855 0.138*
Lebanon 0.377 0.466 0.586 0.713 0.757 0.652 0.5 2051 0.162*
OP Insurance
Egypt 0.298 0.341 0.401 0.482 0.628 0.393 0.5 2855 0.130*
Lebanon 0.343 0.402 0.520 0.607 0.600 0.543 0.6 2051 0.140*
IP Insurance
Egypt 0.276 0.327 0.386 0.442 0.527 0.362 0.5 2855 0.102*
Lebanon 0.379 0.439 0.553 0.651 0.688 0.600 0.6 2051 0.147*
♦Statistically significant at 95%  confidence level. C.I. = CO N CEN TRA TIO N  INDEX: <0 = pro-poor; 0  = incom e-neutral; >0 = pro-rich. S tandardised sam ple size 
reduced since observations w ith predicted negative values for standardisation were dropped. Ratio: poorest 20%  to richest 20%
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Figure 5.43 Concentration curves for any health insurance (actual)
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Figure 5.44 Concentration curves for any health insurance (standardised)
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Figure 5.45 Concentration curves in Figure 5.46 Concentration curves for
outpatient insurance (actual)
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Figure 5.47 Concentration curves for Figure 5.48 Concentration curves for 
inpatient insurance (actual)______  inpatient insurance (standardised)
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Table 5.7 Amount and incidence of out-of-pocket expenditures for health care, by type and income
Poorest 20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N
Out-of-pocket payments, total 
(PPP$ per capita)
Egypt 86 106 136 162 151 120 0.6 3680
Lebanon 309 322 367 380 409 376 0.8 2445
Out-of-pocket payments, total (incidence)
Egypt 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.0 3011
Lebanon 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.0 1547
Physician visit fees (PPP$ per capita)
Egypt 18 21 30 35 36 26 0.5 3708
Lebanon 85 96 100 124 124 113 0.7 2478
Physician visit fees (incidence)
Egypt 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.97 1.1 3032
Lebanon 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.89 1.0 1565
Medications (PPP$ per capita)
Egypt 66 81 100 121 105 90 0.6 4086
Lebanon 218 229 261 246 270 253 0.8 2811
Medications (incidence)
Egypt 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.0 3375
Lebanon 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.0 1761
PPP = purchasing power parity exchange rate. ‘Incidence’ = percent of households that reported paying out-of-pocket payments.
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Table 5.8 Concentration indices for out-of-pocket payments
Average share of income spent out-of-pocket on health (%)
Out-of-pocket payments, total (share)
Egypt
Lebanon
Physician visit fees (share)
Egypt
Lebanon
Medications (share)
Egypt
Lebanon
20% 2nd poorest Middle 2nd richest Richest 20% Total Ratio N C.I.
0.131 0.081 0 .0 7 0 0 .055 0 .0 2 8 0 .0 8 4 4 .7 3011 -0 .1 9 6 *
0.695 0 .195 0 .147 0 .1 0 0 0 .0 6 0 0 .1 6 9 11.6 1547 -0 .4 4 0 *
0 .028 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 1 6 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 8 4.1 30 3 2  -0 .1 8 3 *
0 .193 0 .058 0.041 0.031 0 .0 1 9 0 .0 4 9 10.4 1565 -0 .4 0 7 *
0.101 0 .063 0 .052 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 1 7 0 .0 6 4 5 .9 337 5  -0 .2 0 8 *
0 .4 4 0 0.141 0 .103 0 .0 6 6 0 .0 4 0 0 .1 1 7 11.1 1761 -0 .4 3 1 *
^Statistically significant at 95% confidence level. C.I. = CONCENTRATION INDEX: < 0 = Pro-Poor; 0 = Income-Neutral; > 0 = Pro-Rich.
Figure 5.49 Equality in out-of-pocket payments with confidence intervals
Equality in out-of-pocket payments: Egypt and Lebanon, actual
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Figure 5.50 Concentration curves for Figure 5.51 Concentration curves for
total out-of-pocket payments out-of-pocket payments to doctors
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Figure 5.52 Concentration curves for out-of-
pocket payments for medications
Cumulative population proportion
cone  curve m e d  oop - Egypt 
line o f p e rfec t equality
cone  curve m ed  oop- Lebano
Concentration curves ABOVE line of perfect equality = Pro-Poor distributions. 
BELOW the line = Pro-Rich 
ALONG the line = Income-Neutral
160
5.10.1. Catastrophic expenditures
Catastrophic payments were defined as total out-of-pocket payments that were equal to 
10% or more of annual, total household income. Total out-of-pocket payments included 
physician fees, medications, and ‘other’ health services. The proportion that had 
catastrophic payments in Lebanon was double that in Egypt (38% versus 21%, 
respectively), as shown in Table 5.7. Catastrophic payment rates were several times 
higher amongst the poorest quintiles than the richest, but were more pro-poor in 
Lebanon than in Egypt.
Income Quintile Egypt (%) Lebanon (%)
Richest 20% 9.7 12.6
2"*^ richest 17.2 23.7
Middle 16.6 40.5
2"‘* poorest 22.8 48.8
Poorest 20% 34 64.7
Total 20.9 38.3
Concentration index -0.0242 -0.0529
*Percent of households with 10% or more of income spent on health care.
5.10.2. Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments
The poverty rates were estimated before and after accounting for household health care 
payments using relative and absolute poverty lines (Table 5.10 and Table 5.11). Due to 
their income levels, the international poverty lines used to discuss results are $l-a-day 
for Egypt and $2-a-day for Lebanon. In both countries, health care payments account 
for a considerable proportion of poverty, but to a larger extent in Lebanon. These 
results were found regardless of which poverty line was used. After accounting for 
payments, twice as many households fall below the poverty line in Egypt using the 
international poverty line of $1 per day. In Lebanon, approximately four times as many 
households fall into poverty at using $2 per day.
In addition, while this effect is largely driven by the poorest income quintile in Egypt, 
some households in higher income groups are also driven into poverty in Lebanon. 
Using the relative poverty line for Lebanon, 2%, 10%, and 41% more households in the 
middle, second poorest, and poorest income quintiles, respectively, fall below the 
poverty line after payments are accounted for.
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___________Table 5.10 Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments, Egypt___________
Poverty headcount Richest 2^ Middle 2 Poorest Total
______________________ 20%______ richest____________ poorest______20%___________
Poverty line of $1.08 per day
P rep ay m en t 0 0 0 0 32.8 7.5
headcount
Post-paym ent 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.3 63.1 14.9
headcount
Percentage change +0.2 -hO.2 4-0.4 + 1 3 +92.4 +100.0
Poverty line of $2.15 per day
Pre-paym ent 0 0 7.9 1 1 45.9
headcount
Post-paym ent 0.2 3.5 68.5 1 1 56.1
headcount
Percentage change +0.2 -h3.5 4-767.0 0 0 +22.2
Relative poverty line
P rep ay m en t 0 0 0 0 283 6.5
headcount
Post-paym ent 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.5 40.8 9.7
headcount
Percentage change +0.2 4-0.2 +0.4 + 1.5 +44.2 +49.2
Table 5.11 Poverty impact of out-of-pocket payments, Lebanon
Poverty headcount Richest 2"'* Middle 2"d Poorest Total
20% richest poorest 20%
Poverty line of $1.08 per day
P rep ay m en t 0 0 0 0 1.6 0.4
headcount
Post-paym ent 0 0 0.9 1.0 8.1 2.0
headcount
Percentage change 0 0 4-0.9 +1.0 +400.0 +400.0
Poverty line of $2.15 per day
P rep ay m en t 0 0 0 0 3.0 0.7
headcount
Post-paym ent 0 0 0.9 1.0 11.0 2.6
headcount
Percentage change 0 0 +&9 +1.0 +267.0 +271.0
Relative poverty line
P rep ay m en t 0 0 0 0 60.7 13.3
headcount
Post-paym ent 0.3 0.3 2.1 9.6 85.7 19.6
headcount
Percentage change -1-0.3 4-0.3 4-2.1 +9.6 +41.2 +47.4
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5.11. Discussion: Representations of health care inequity
5.11.1. Health status
The distribution of health variables presented in this chapter suggests a paradox of 
progress. Lebanese respondents reported worse levels of ill health than did Egyptian 
respondents -  but were less likely to access health care services. There was also 
relatively greater inequity in health insurance coverage and out-of-pocket payments in 
Lebanon than in Egypt, as summarised in Table 5.12. This was found despite the 
observation that the Lebanese had higher incomes and higher levels of education.
Herein lies the paradox; that a relatively wealthier society reflects relatively greater 
inequity than a relatively poorer one.
Overall, the distribution of self-assessed health and chronic conditions by 
socioeconomic status appears more pro-poor amongst Lebanese respondents than their 
Egyptian counterparts. The degree of inequity regarding self-reported pain is somewhat 
more pronounced in Egypt than in it is in Lebanon. After standardising for health need, 
the risk of having at least one chronic health condition increases by 40% in Egypt when 
moving from the richest to the poorest quintile; in Lebanon, the risk increases by 20%. 
These findings suggest that lower income groups tend to report worse health levels, 
particularly in Lebanon. In addition, the greatest degree of inequality was found in self- 
reported pain in both countries, followed by the prevalence of chronic health conditions 
and self-assessed health.
5.11.2. Health care utilisation
Since health need is concentrated amongst the relatively poor, the use of health services 
is expected to be concentrated amongst the poor before standardising for health need. 
After standardising for health need, assuming income largely captures enabling factors, 
it is expected that utilisation would become income-neutral, since a horizontally 
‘equitable’ distribution is reflected in ‘equal access for equal [medical] need’. 
Significant differences in the rates of at least one visit were found in some cases, but in 
neither country did the intensity of using services vary significantly across income.
Analysis of the proportion of users showed that before standardising for health need, 
poorer groups used some services significantly more than richer groups in Lebanon, 
including overall outpatient services, general practitioners, and inpatient care.
However, although not statistically significant, the rich in Lebanon tended to use
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specialist, pharmacy, and hospital outpatient care more than the poor. After 
standardising for health need, general practitioner use in Lebanon continues to be 
significantly concentrated amongst the poor, as does the rate of specialist care.
This finding may mean that, given unequal need amongst the poor relative to the rich, 
the poor use general practitioners and inpatient care more often than the rich, but no 
significant differences in other types of services are found by income level. Assuming 
equal need between the poor and rich, however, the rates of general practitioner and 
specialist care are higher amongst the poor, with no significant differences found in 
other types of services.
In Egypt, there were some non-significant trends favouring pro-poor use before 
standardisation for any outpatient, general practitioner, pharmacy and inpatient care. 
Non-significant pro-rich use was found for specialist and hospital outpatient care. After 
standardisation, the rates of general practitioner visits continued to be significantly more 
concentrated amongst the poor, whilst any outpatient care was significantly more 
concentrated amongst the rich, possibly due to the non-significant pro-rich use of 
hospital-based outpatient and inpatient care.
The use of other services was not significantly different across income. Therefore, 
other factors besides health need and income likely explain the preponderance of 
physician use amongst the poor in Lebanon and Egypt, assuming medical need is equal 
across income. These factors may include other enabling factors including other 
measures of socioeconomic status such as education and employment, social capital 
factors such as marital status, or additional unobservable factors such as the nature, 
quantity, and quality of care of health services.
Likewise in Egypt, after assuming equal medical need, the pro-rich use of hospital 
outpatient services may be explained by factors such as: (a) a preference for high 
technology offered at hospitals, (b) better quality of free care at public facilities located 
in relatively wealthier areas, and (c) social health insurance coverage for hospital 
outpatient care at contracted facilities. These factors may stimulate demand for 
inpatient care earlier than would normally be expected based on the severity of illness, 
or for inpatient care for less-severe cases that could be treated at outpatient facihties. 
Regarding the intensity of use, the findings from this analysis indicate that once contact
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with the health service is made, the intensity of visits is less explained by individual- 
level socioeconomic factors, but likely by medical need and provider decisions.
5.11.3. Health insurance
Given the possibility that the distribution of services across income could be due to 
insurance coverage, equity in insurance coverage was assessed. Results 
overwhelmingly pointed to the concentration of all types of insurance amongst the 
relatively rich. In addition, the concentration was most skewed towards the rich in 
Lebanon, and especially for inpatient insurance coverage. Interestingly, the opposite is 
true in Egypt, where the inequity in insurance is more exacerbated for outpatient 
coverage than inpatient coverage. Aside from other socioeconomic factors, these 
findings partially explain the standardised pro-rich use of hospital outpatient care in 
Egypt, and hospital outpatient and inpatient care in Lebanon.
5.11.4. Out-of-pocket payments
The burden of out-of-pocket payments was found to be relatively higher amongst poorer 
groups in both countries, but more so in Lebanon. Since the poor are also less likely to 
be covered by health insurance for any type of care in Lebanon, they are therefore more 
likely to face higher out-of-pocket payments as a share of income. In Egypt, inequity in 
out-of-pocket payments is relatively lower than in Lebanon; although they are more 
likely to use outpatient services than their Lebanese counterparts, these services are 
usually free or nearly free at the point of use due to public provision. Nonetheless, poor 
quality of free care means that the poor may have to pay higher informal fees or seek 
care from relatively lower-priced private providers often.
5.11.5. Economic impact of out-of-pocket payments
Before accounting for out-of-pocket payments, the poverty rate in Egypt and Lebanon 
was found to be just less than 10% for Egypt and less than 1% for Lebanon, which are 
relatively similar rates as those published for the year 2001. Figures for Egypt from the 
World Bank (2007) suggest the poverty headcount was 2.58% in 1995 and 3.08% in 
2000, whilst Jolliffe et al (2004) estimate the headcount was 7.6% in 1997.
The percentage changes in poverty levels for Egypt and Lebanon appear relatively large 
as compared to findings from other countries, suggesting that the impact of out-of- 
pocket payments on living standards is particularly high. For example, the percentage 
change in headcount appears to be lower in Vietnam (pre-payment headcount of 3.6%
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versus post-payment headcount of 4.7%, respectively; change of 30%), Indonesia (7.9% 
versus 8.6%, respectively; change of 8.7%), and Sri Lanka (3.8% versus 4.1%, 
respectively; change of 8.3%) as reported by Van Doorslaer et al (2006).
These findings are likely due to differences in health financing policy and utilisation 
practices, among other considerations. Although validating poverty rates in Egypt and 
Lebanon may be difficult due to relatively little data, this analysis suggests that the 
relative impact of out-of-pocket payments on living standards can be substantial. In 
addition, this effect is largely relegated to the poorest groups but can be felt to some 
extent across the socioeconomic spectrum.
Table 5.12 Summary of equity results (standardised)
Egypt Lebanon
Pro- Income Pro­ Pro­ Income Pro-
poor NeutraD rich poor Neutral rich
Health Status
Self-assessed health X * 0
Pain g* X*
Chronic health conditions X 0
Probability of care
Any use o f outpatient services X* X
General practitioners X 0
Specialists X X*
Pharm acists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient (12-m onth recall) X X
Hospital inpatient ( 1 -m onth recall) S X
Intensity of yisits
General practitioners X X
Specialists X X
Pharm acists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient (1-m onth recall) X X
Health insurance
Any
O utpatient
Insurance
Out-of-pocket payments
Total
Physician fees 
M edications
= Incom e neutral defined as (-0.01, 0.01). * = Statistically significant at 95* confidence 
level. Survey data did not contain inform ation on intensity for ‘any use o f outpatient’ or
hospital inpatient care over 12-month recall.
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5.12. Chapter summary
Evaluating the income-distribution in health care is one aspect of equity. Why are 
Lebanese respondents less likely to use health services than Egyptian respondents, 
despite having higher levels of ill health? So far the analysis suggests that horizontal 
equity in affordability is relatively greater in Egypt than in Lebanon. Yet the 
determinants of health care use warrant closer examination.
Understanding the role of socioeconomic factors in decision-making can help to inform 
and target health-financing policies. For example, what are the factors that inhibit 
illness-stricken people with fewer socioeconomic resources from seeking certain types 
of care? According to the findings from this chapter, insurance coverage and the nature 
of care are but two of the possible explanatory factors. Controlling for a broad range of 
individual-level factors may help to further elucidate the nature of inequity in health 
care.
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Chapter 6. Effect of economic status on outpatient care
6.1. Introduction
Results are presented on how economic status affects the use of outpatient services. 
Findings are based on multivariate regression models. This relationship may depend on 
the nature of the service and how other factors play a role. Outpatient care is generally 
thought to be relatively less acute and perceived by citizens as somewhat discretionary. 
In this analysis, outpatient services are defined as services that are not located at 
hospitals, such as general practitioner services, medical specialist services, and 
pharmacies.
Chapter six is divided into two main sections. The first section presents estimation 
results and the second discusses overall findings. Results from the pooled and country- 
specific analyses are described, including: (i) whether health insurance is endogenous to 
models of outpatient care, (ii) the effect of country of residence, (iii) the effect of 
income, (iv) the effect of insurance, and (v) the interaction effects. The effects of the 
control variables are discussed briefly. Because the relationships between dependent 
and independent variables may vary by country, emphasis is given to the country- 
specific models.
6.2. Any use of outpatient services
6.2.1. Probability: pooled model
The effects of income and insurance on the probability and frequency of outpatient 
visits were evaluated through multivariate regression. To ensure validity of the results, 
the endogeneity of the insurance variable was assessed using the recursive bivariate 
probit model.
The recursive model simultaneously adjusts for endogeneity and provides an estimate of 
the difference in fit between the standard probit and recursive models. If the models are 
not statistically significant from one another, then health insurance is assumed to be 
exogenous to the model. In this case, the standard probit model is used to discuss the 
variable effects.
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For ‘any use of outpatient care’, results from testing the various models show that the 
probit model is valid for drawing conclusions. This is due to the fact that health 
insurance was not endogenous to the model for any outpatient use, as shown in results 
from the pooled recursive model (Table 6.1, Models 2 through 4). Here, the Wald test 
of rho gives a chi-squared statistic that is not statistically significant. Therefore, health 
insurance and outpatient visits are not co-determined. This result validates using the 
standard probit model, instead of having to correct for co-determination by using the 
recursive model.
The probability of any use of outpatient services is significantly higher for respondents 
living in Egypt than for those in Lebanon, all other factors held equal. All of the probit 
models show a statistically significant, positive probit index, or coefficient. The 
country effect remains after successively adding covariates, including: (i) other factors 
that lead to the ‘main effects’ model (Model 2); (ii) the three interaction terms 
representing the inter-relationships between income, insurance, and country (Model 3), 
and (iii) the triple-interaction term representing the simultaneous inter-relationship 
between income, insurance, and country (Model 4).
Since the triple-interaction term is not significant, inferences regarding the effects of 
covariates will be drawn from Model 3, which did include a significant interaction term. 
Other significant determinants of outpatient use in the pooled model were: being male, 
being married, having a lower self-assessed health status, pain, and being diagnosed 
with having one or more chronic health conditions. Neither age nor being employed 
was significant.
The effect of insurance on the probability of outpatient use is stronger in Egypt than in 
Lebanon. The only interaction term that was significant was country*insurance, as 
shown in probit-Model 3. This indicates that the effect of insurance depends on the 
country; since the sign of the coefficient is positive, the effect is stronger in Egypt. 
However, the pooled effects should be interpreted with some caution due to country- 
specific differences in endogeneity.
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6.2.2. Probability: country models
For the probability of any outpatient use, results are based on the probit estimates for 
Egypt and the recursive estimates for Lebanon, These models are valid because 
insurance was not endogenous in Egypt for any outpatient use, but was endogenous in 
Lebanon (Table 6.2). This shows that the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables can differ across countries.
Having insurance coverage is associated with a higher likelihood of visiting outpatient 
providers in both countries, although the effect is relatively larger in Lebanon than in 
Egypt. This is due to the fact that the coefficient in Lebanon is relatively greater than in 
Egypt.
Insurance was also the most important factor determining whether a respondent visited 
outpatient providers in Lebanon. The effect of insurance in Lebanon may have been 
underestimated in the probit model, which does not adjust for the ‘selection bias’ that 
arises from endogeneity. For the probability of any outpatient care, these findings show 
greater insurance-related inequity in Lebanon than in Egypt.
Income does not significantly affect outpatient use in either country. However, the 
coefficient was positive in Egypt and negative in Lebanon. These results suggest that 
income somewhat increases the likelihood of outpatient use in Egypt, but somewhat 
decreases the likelihood in Lebanon. The interaction term for income*insurance is not 
significant in either country. However, the negative value suggests that as income 
increases, insurance tends to become slightly less important in explaining outpatient 
use.
Other factors increase the probabihty of outpatient use in Egypt are: poor self-assessed 
health, pain suffering, having chronic health conditions, being married, being relatively 
more highly educated, and being older in age. Employment status did not have a 
significant effect. These results suggest that being older, having a worse health status, 
and being married each increase the likelihood of outpatient use, all other factors held 
equal. Amongst the three variables representing health need, chronic health conditions 
exerted the strongest effect.
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In Lebanon, other positive determinants include: a poor self-assessed health, pain 
suffering, having chronic health conditions, being married, being unemployed, being 
relatively less highly educated, and age. These factors had the same general effect as 
they did in Egypt.
The employment effect suggests those who are employed by the government, non­
governmental firms, or self-employed have lower chances of visiting outpatient 
providers than do those not employed. In contrast, employed respondents in Egypt have 
somewhat higher chances of using outpatient care than unemployed respondents.
The validity of the results was tested by checking for inconsistencies due to income- 
insurance collinearity and the use of aggregated variables for employment and chronic 
health conditions (Table 5.3 and Table 6.4). Aggregating variables may lead to loss of 
information, biasing some of the results. After including and excluding the relevant 
variables, results show that the effects of income and insurance in both countries remain 
largely the same. This suggests that collinearity and the use of aggregated variables do 
not affect the results for outpatient services. Similar results were found for most other 
health services tested in this thesis (Appendix F).
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Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Outpatient
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.531*** 0.711*** 1.030** 0.787+ 0.531*** 0.741*** 1.019** 0.766+
(0.029) (0.052) (0.333) (0.421) (0.029) (0.041) (0.336) (0.421)
Insured (outpatient) -0.456 -0.070 -0.353 0.056 0.314 -0.090
(0.354) (0.798) (0.866) (0.040) (0.366) (0.522)
Age 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.241*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.245*** 0.255*** 0.254***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Married 0.175*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.178***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Secondary education 0.189* 0.127 0.111 0.076+ 0.061 0.062
(0.086) (0.126) (0.133) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Employed 0.034 0.005 -0.006 -0.025 -0.029 -0.032
(0.060) (0.076) (0.079) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Income (log) 0.033 0.055 0.035 0.003 0.041 0.024
(0.031) (0.046) (0.052) (0.023) (0.038) (0.042)
Self-assessed health 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.221***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Self-reported pain 0.264*** 0.269*** 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.271***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Chronic 1.024*** 1.044*** 1.047*** 1.050*** 1.052*** 1.052***
(0.056) (0.052) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Income*OPInsurance -0.036 0.010 -0.048 0.003
(0.051) (0.068) (0.046) (0.066)
Country* OPInsurance 0.206* 0.988 0.208* 1.026
(0.083) (0.703) (0.083) (0.700)
Country* Income -0.049 -0.016 -0.046 -0.012
(continued) (0.044) (0.057) (0.045) (0.056)
172
Table 6.1 Probability of any outpatient use, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SB)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4 Model 1
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Country*Income* OPInsur. -0.103 -0.108
(0.092) (0.091)
Constant -0.292*** -2.375*** -2.534*** -2.387*** -0.292*** -2.202*** -2.438*** -2.307***
(0.022) (0.213) (0.338) (0.387) (0.022) (0.198) (0.310) (0.341)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male -0.026 -0.027 -0.027
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Secondary education 0.692*** 0.692*** 0.692***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Employed 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.342*** n/a
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Income (log) 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Country (l=Egy,0=Leb) -0.094* -0.092* -0.092*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant -2.860*** -2.860*** -2.860***
(0.197) (0.197) (0.197)
athrho
Constant 0.314 0.177 0.129
(0.229) (0.328) (0.343)
P 0.304 0.175 0.129
N 7736 6885 6885 6885 7736 6885 6885 6885
Log-likelihood -5195.131 -7227.256 -7222.822 -7222.223 -5195.131 -3469.374 -3464.432 -3463.768
329.330*** 2850.003*** 2734.684*** 2706.856*** 329.330*** 1866.907*** 1872.430*** 1872.641***
RESET test: chi2(l) = 2.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.1550 chi(2) = 1.05; Prob > chi2 = 0.3048
n/a = not applicable. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. p = rho, signifying endogeneity if  *, denoting use of the RECURSIVE model is needed; otherwise PROB IT. = chi-
squared, signifying high degree of goodness-of-fit for overall model if *.
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Table 6.2 Probability of any outpatient use, country models
BIVARIATE PROBIT
EGYPT
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
LEBANON 
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
EGYPT
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
LEBANON 
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE)
Outpatient
Insured
(outpatient) -0.193 0.965 1.030*** 1.129* 0.120* 0.918+ -0.039 -0.180
(0.548) (1.090) (0.234) (0.547) (0.059) (0.503) (0.056) (0.492)
Age 0.006+ 0.004 -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.004* 0.005* -0.006** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.299*** 0.321*** 0.057 0.056 0.317*** 0.320*** 0.163* 0.162*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067)
Married 0.170** 0.160** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.166** 0.161** 0.205*** 0.205***
(0.053) (0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)
Secondary
education 0.275+ 0.178 -0.147* -0.148* 0.186*** 0.187*** -0.042 -0.042
(0.163) (0.203) (0.061) (0.061) (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.061)
Employed 0.094 0.050 -0.221*** -0.221*** 0.057 0.054 -0.140* -0.141*
(0.086) (0.101) (0.064) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067) (0.068)
Income (log) -0.003 0.008 -0.018 -0.016 -0.024 0.009 0.039 0.033
(0.052) (0.054) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.032) (0.040)
Self-assessed
health 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.285*** 0.284***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042)
Self-reported
pain 0.182*** 0.184*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.346*** 0.346***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035)
Chronic 1.390*** 1.400*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 1.402*** 1.400*** 0.463*** 0.462***
(continued) (0.063) (0.051) (0.065) (0.065) (0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.065)
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Table 6.2 Probability of any outpatient use, country models (continued)
BIVARIATE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Income*OPInsur -0.111 -0.011 -0.109 0.018
(0.079) (0.055) (0.068) (0.062)
Constant -1.831*** -1.879*** -1.454*** -1.472*** -1.657*** -1.893*** -1.978*** -1.932***
(0.388) (0.450) (0.319) (0.338) (0.254) (0.314) (0.277) (0.335)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.232*** -0.231*** 0.209*** 0.209***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Secondary education 0.997*** 0.995*** 0.299*** 0.299***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056)
Employed 0.408*** 0.410*** 0.247*** 0.247*** n/a
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Income (log) 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.141*** 0.141***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -3.841*** -3.845*** -2.069*** -2.074***
(0.266) (0.268) (0.265) (0.269)
athrho
Constant 0.185 -0.019 -0.781** -0.796**
(0.328) (0.392) (0.247) (0.257)
P 0.183 -0.019 -0.653** -0.662**
N 4133 4133 2752 2752 4133 4133 2752 2752
Log-likelihood -3834.591 -3833.612 -3200.986 -3200.967 -1922.890 -1921.691 -1456.438 -1456.399
2159.836*** 2121.757*** 1036.045*** 1048.155*** 1377.364*** 1377.327*** 614.887*** 614.971***
RESET test: chi(2) = 0.09; Frob>chi2 = 0.7703 chi(2) = 1.71; Prob > chi2 = 0.1914
n/a = not applicable. *p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Model 1:
VFJL
Model 2: Model 3:
" t s J  r -
Model 4: Model 5: Model 6; Model 7: Model 8:
Inc alone Inc, no Ins Ins, no Inc Main effects Main+Intx Main-Empl No empl-CC Main-All
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Income (log) -0.092*** -0.010 -0.024 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.010
(0.027) (0.032) (0.033) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
Age 0.004* 0.004+ 0.004* 0.005* .004+ 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.298*** 0.311*** 0.317*** 0.320*** 0.357*** 0.275*** 0.351***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.080) (0.048) (0.080)
Married 0.170** 0.162** 0.166** 0.161** 0.159** 0.177*** 0.173**
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057)
Secondary education 0.224*** 0.159** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.169** 0.187*** 0.161**
(0.052) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) (0.055) (0.060)
Employed 0.085
(0.060)
0.057
(0.061)
0.057
(0.061)
0.054
(0.061)
Self-assessed health 0.221*** 0.210*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.222*** 0.212*** 0.214***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Self-reported pain 0.190*** 0.196*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.190***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Chronic 1.386*** 1.408*** 1.402*** 1.400*** 1.402*** 1.363*** 1.364***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054)
Insured (outpatient) 0.113+ 0.120* 0.918+ 0.890+ 0.978+ 0.936+
(0.058) (0.059) (0.503) (0.513) (0.503) (0.515)
Income*OPInsur. -0.109
(0.068)
0.101
(0.041)
-0.117+
(0.068)
-0.109
(0.069)
Gov employee -0.241
(0.170)
-0.235
(0.168)
Nongov employee -0.158
(0.181)
-0.154
(0.179)
Self-employed -0.217
(0.166)
-0.212
(0.164)
(continued)
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Table 6.3 Collinearity in probability of any outpatient use: probit model, Egypt (continued)
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6: M odel?: Model 8:
Inc alone Inc, no Ins Ins, no Inc Main effects Main+Intx Main-Empl No empl-CC Main-All
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Unpaid work -0.287
(0.294)
-0.293
(0.293)
Student -0.467*
(0.202)
-0.460*
(0.199)
Homemaker -0.313+
(0.169)
-0.319+
(0.167)
Retired -0.135
(0.209)
-0.139
(0.210)
Unemp - unable -0.614+
(0.327)
-0.577+
(0.341)
High blood pressure 0.304***
(0.091)
0.305***
(0.091)
Diabetes 0.359*
(0.143)
0.361*
(0.142)
Heart disease 0.327+
(0.175)
0.317+
(0.175)
Depression -0.250*
(0.101)
-0.231*
(0.102)
Constant 0.890*** -1.756*** -1.771*** -1.657*** -1.893*** -1.608*** -1.780*** -1.518***
(0.193) (0.249) (0.112) (0.254) (0.314) (0.338) (0.311) (0.338)
N 4342 4253 4257 4133 4133 4133 4141 4133
11 -2928.738 -1998.470 -1978.694 -1922.890 -1921.691 -1916.821 -1910.642 -1900.991
chi2 11.694*** 1402.573*** 1418.105*** 1377.364*** 1377.327*** 1378.010*** 1349.733*** 1351.000***
P 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.4 Collinearity in probability of any outpatient use: recursive model, Lebanon
Model 1: Model 2; Model 3: Model 4: Model 5; Model 6: Model 7: Model 8:
Inc alone Inc, no Ins Ins, no Inc Main effects Main+Intx Main-Empl No empl-CC Main-All
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Outpatient care
Income (log) -0.090*** 0.035 -0.018 -0.016 -0.012 0.089** -0.011
(0.027) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038)
Age -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.157* 0.161* 0.057 0.056 -0.008 0.201*** -0.007
(0.066) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.076) (0.048) (0.076)
Married 0.203*** 0.237*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.133* 0.151*** 0.139*
(0.058) (0.056) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.041) (0.056)
Secondary education -0.046 -0.042 -0.147* -0.148* -0.134* 0.147** -0.139*
(0.060) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.053) (0.062)
Employed -0.146*
(0.067)
-0.134*
(0.065)
-0.221***
(0.064)
-0.221***
(0.064)
Self-assessed health 0.278*** 0.292*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.244*** 0.194*** 0.232***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042)
Self-reported pain 0.348*** 0.349*** 0.298*** 0.296*** 0.297*** 0.240*** 0.292***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.031) (0.040)
Chronic 0.467*** 0.459*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.290*** 0.367***
(0.065) (0.062) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.050) (0.068)
Insured (outpatient) -0.035 1.030*** 1.129* 1.107* -1.828*** 1.143*
(0.054) (0.234) (0.547) (0.551) (0.324) (0.551)
Income* OPInsurance -0.011
(0.055)
-0.007
(0.055)
0.049
(0.041)
-0.007
(0.055)
Gov employee -0.225+
(0.133)
-0.213
(0.131)
Nongov employee -0.159
(0.112)
-0.160
(0.110)
Self-employed -0.180 -0.177
(continued) (0.111) (0.110)
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Table 6.4 Collinearity in probability of any outpatient use: recursive model, Lebanon (continued)
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: Model 5: Model 6: M odel?: Model 8:
Inc alone Inc, no Ins Ins, no Inc Main effects Main+Intx Main-Empl No empl-CC Main-All
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Student -0.084
(0.135)
-0.095
(0.133)
Homemaker 0.139
(0.105)
0.138
(0.104)
Retired 0.090
(0.166)
0.088
(0.163)
Unemp -  unable 0.060
(0.139)
0.036
(0.138)
High blood pressure 0.102
(0.062)
0.150*
(0.075)
Diabetes -0.078
(0.092)
-0.117
(0.111)
Heart disease 0.204*
(0.085)
0.258*
(0.103)
Depression 0.025
(0.055)
0.006
(0.065)
Constant 0.403+ -1.952*** -1.695*** -1.454*** -1.472*** -1.474*** -1.613*** -1.401***
(0.208) (0.277) (0.123) (0.319) (0.338) (0.351) (0.260) (0.352)
Insurance (inpatient)
Age 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.208*** 0.210***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.060)
Secondary education 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.283*** 0.299***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)
Employed 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.248*** 0.233*** 0.248***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.061)
Income (log) 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.142***
(continued) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
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Table 6.4 Collinearity in probability of any outpatient use: recursive model, Lebanon (continued)
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4; Model 5: Model 6: M odel?: Model 8:
Inc alone Inc, no Ins Ins, no Inc Main effects Main+Intx Main-Empl No empl-CC Main-All
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Constant -2.069*** -2.074*** -2.073*** -2.083*** -2.077***
athrho
(0.265) (0.269) (0.269) (0.253) (0.269)
Constant -0.781** -0.796** -0.797** 1.546*** -0.845**
N 2899 2773 3050
(0.247)
2752
(0.257)
2752
(0.263)
2752
(0.291)
2752
(0.281)
2752
11 -1926.587 -1466.523 -1601.387 -3200.986 -3200.967 -3198.641 -3190.246 -3192.226
chi2 11.257*** 618.898*** 700.267*** 1036.045*** 1048.155*** 1050.840*** 1703.654*** 1102.981***
P 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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6.3. General practitioners
6.3.1. Probability: pooled model
The country effect was not significant, indicating that the probability of general 
practitioner care is similar across countries, holding other factors equal (Table 6.5, 
probit models). The effects of income and insurance did not appear to depend on the 
country. Health insurance is not endogenous to the pooled model (recursive models 2 
through 4).
6.3.2. Probability: country models
In both countries, neither insurance nor income was a significant determinant of general 
practitioner use (Table 6.6). In Egypt, the probability of visiting general practitioners 
was higher amongst females as well as respondents with relatively lower levels of 
education, holding other factors constant. In Lebanon, pain was the only significant 
determinant. Insurance was not endogenous to either country model (recursive models). 
Age was not significant, although its effect was negative in both countries. Education 
was not found to be a significant predictor in either country, but the negative value 
suggests that the use is somewhat concentrated amongst respondents who are less 
highly educated. Whilst education was not significant in Lebanon, the magnitude of its 
effect was found to be larger for general practitioners than it was for outpatient services. 
This result suggests that the significant, negative value found for outpatient care is 
likely driven by its effect on general practitioner care.
6.3.3. Intensity: pooled model
A greater intensity of visits is predicted for Lebanese respondents as compared to their 
Egyptian counterparts, amongst respondents who used services (Table 6.7). The 
income*insurance interaction term is significant and negative, suggesting that as 
income increases, the effect of insurance in explaining the intensity of general 
practitioner care decreases. The country*insurance interaction term is significant and 
negative, suggesting that the role of insurance is greater in Lebanon in explaining the 
intensity of use. In addition, the country*income interaction term is significant yet 
positive, indicating that the effect of income in explaining intensity of general 
practitioner use was greater in Egypt.
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6.3.4. Intensity: country models
For general practitioner care, insurance in Egypt was significant and positive at the 90 
percent level (Table 6.8). This result shows that those with insurance tend to have a 
more visits to general practitioners than those without insurance. Having a higher 
income in Egypt was also significantly associated with more visits. Neither income nor 
insurance were significant determinants of the intensity of general practitioner visits in 
Lebanon. The results of the zero-inflated model were similar to the negative binomial 
model. In Egypt, the interaction effect representing income*insurance was significant, 
although it was negative. The interaction effect in Lebanon was not significant, yet was 
negative with a relatively large value. These results suggest that as income increases, 
the effect of insurance on the intensity of using general practitioner care decreases.
Although age was not significant in the probability models, age was a significant factor 
predicting the frequency of general practitioner visits in Egypt, but not in Lebanon. In 
Egypt, its value was negative, indicating that older individuals were predicted to visit 
general practitioners less frequently over one month than younger counterparts, all other 
factors held equal. In Egypt, the coefficient of education in the general practitioner 
model was negative and significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Therefore, just 
as respondents with a higher education are less likely to visit general practitioners, the 
frequency of visits is also predicted to decrease as the level of education increases. The 
value of the coefficient of education was also largest in the general practitioner care for 
Egypt as compared to the other service-specific intensity models in Egypt. Whilst it 
was not significant in Lebanon in any of the models, its value was also negative and 
largest in magnitude in the intensity models for general practitioners.
Pain was a significant, positive predictor in both Egypt and Lebanon, although the 
effect was slightly greater in Egypt than in Lebanon. Neither self-assessed health nor 
chronic conditions exerted a significant effect in either country, similar to results in both 
countries regarding the probability of seeking care. Being married tended to increase 
the intensity of general practitioner care in Egypt but was not significant in Lebanon.
Goodness-of-fit tests indicated the negative binomial regression model to be preferred 
over the zero-inflated model; however, the results for the effects of health need 
variables on the intensity of general practitioner care were consistent between both 
models.
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Table 6.5 Probability of general practitioner visit, pooled model
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE)
Model 4
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 4
Coeff.
(SE)
General practitioners
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.768 0.221 0.405*** 0.653 0.184
(0.062) (0.075) (0.581) (0.846) (0.072) (0.635) (0.744)
Insured (outpatient) 0.181 -1.691* -1.250 -0.058 -0.333 -0.911
(1.775) (0.820) (2.941) (0.075) (0.711) (0.926)
Age -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.198 -0.068 -0.162 -0.182* -0.183* -0.183*
(0.139) (0.124) (0.220) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Married 0.082 0.074 0.081 0.082 0.083 0.081
(0.074) (0.063) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
Secondary education -0.183 0.093 -0.088 -0.145+ -0.141+ -0.137+
(0.284) (0.183) (0.446) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079)
Employed 0.025 0.252+ 0.111 0.064 0.067 0.065
(0.301) (0.135) (0.407) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089)
Income (log) -0.080 0.046 -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.083
(0.134) (0.105) (0.214) (0.041) (0.055) (0.058)
Self-assessed health -0.014 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.009
(0.046) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Self-reported pain 0.114** 0.095* 0.113** 0.114** 0.114** 0.114**
(0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Chronic 0.142 0.112 0.130 0.144 0.138 0.130
(0.102) (0.090) (0.102) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
Income *OPInsurance 0.065 0.119 0.038 0.112
(continued) (0.077) (0.124) (0.091) (0.118)
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Table 6.5 Probability of general practitioner visit, pooled model (continued)
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE)
Model 4
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 4
Coeff.
(SE)
Country*OPInsurance -0.046 1.565 -0.040 1.638
(0.133) (1.721) (0.161) (1.489)
Country* Income -0.063 0.026 -0.032 0.033
(0.086) (0.128) (0.087) (0.103)
Country* Income* OPInsur. -0.214 -0.224
(0.227) (0.197)
Constant -0.504*** -0.070 -0.924 -0.210 -0.199 -0.216 -0.056
(0.039) (1.036) (0.743) (1.499) (0.359) (0.464) (0.483)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Male 0.189* 0.184* 0.189*
(0.089) (0.088) (0.088)
Secondary education 0.466*** 0.469*** 0.468***
(0.080) (0.077) (0.079)
Employed 0.460*** 0.437*** 0.455***
(0.093) (0.098) (0.099)
Income (log) 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.233*** n/a
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) -0.117 -0.111 -0.115
(0.077) (0.075) (0.078)
Constant -3.109*** -3.098*** -3.111***
(0.370) (0.369) (0.370)
(continued)
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Table 6.5 Probability of general practitioner visit, pooled model (continued)
Model 1
Coeff.
(SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(SE) (SE) (SE)
Model 2
Coeff.
(SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff.
(SE)
Model 4
Coeff.
(SE)
athrho
Constant -0.144 0.928 0.176
(1.078) (0.916) (1.566)
P -.1429994 .7297149 .1745335
N 1808 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572
11 -1164.682 -1891.451 -1890.920 -1890.427 -988.850 -988.567 -987.825
chi2 43.578*** 238.288*** 473.491*** 258.275*** 83.626*** 84.095*** 86.100***
RESET test: shown for probit model (recursive model shows insurance not endogenous; probit therefore used.) RESET test: chi2(l) = 0.28; Prob > chi2 = 0.5965
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 6.6 Probability of general practitioner visit, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
General practitioners
Insured (ou^atient) -0.318 1.045 0.796 -1.669+ -0.070 0.505 -0.039 -0.939
(1.938) (4.573) (2.242) (0.973) (0.136) (1.176) (0.093) (0.931)
Age -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.011) (0.015) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.289+ -0.300* -0.192 -0.054 -0.297* -0.295* -0.125 -0.129
(0.150) (0.133) (0.193) (0.147) (0.131) (0.131) (0.110) (0.110)
Married 0.129 0.111 0.003 0.001 0.124 0.120 -0.000 0.001
(0.128) (0.147) (0.091) (0.091) (0.122) (0.122) (0.096) (0.096)
Secondary education -0.146 -0.303 -0.137 -0.001 -0.217+ -0.210 -0.070 -0.072
(continued) (0.575) (0.783) (0.188) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.098) (0.099)
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Table 6.6 Probability of general practitioner visit, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Employed 0.047 -0.092 0.028 0.174 -0.011 -0.011 0.116 0.111
(0.470) (0.705) (0.292) (0.132) (0.138) (0.138) (0.117) (0.117)
Income (log) -0.050 -0.080 -0.085 -0.027 -0.076 -0.053 -0.039 -0.072
(0.216) (0.246) (0.120) (0.086) (0.075) (0.088) (0.051) (0.059)
Self-assessed health -0.084 -0.083 0.075 0.077 -0.085 -0.082 0.080 0.081
(0.070) (0.070) (0.063) (0.059) (0.070) (0.070) (0.063) (0.063)
Self-reported pain 0.051 0.052 0.147+ 0.150** 0.052 0.051 0.159*** 0.160***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.083) (0.052) (0.065) (0.065) (0.048) (0.048)
Chronic 0.183 0.185 0.021 0.022 0.190 0.181 0.027 0.023
(0.185) (0.177) (0.122) (0.119) (0.177) (0.178) (0.127) (0.127)
Income*OPInsurance -0.105 0.118 -0.079 0.115
(0.255) (0.115) (0.159) (0.118)
Constant 0.524 0.842 -0.424 -0.677 0.749 0.594 -0.736 -0.483
(1.887) (2.237) (1.090) (0.566) (0.596) (0.676) (0.455) (0.511)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.005+ 0.005+
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.000 -0.009 0.248* 0.255*
(0.156) (0.158) (0.119) (0.109)
Secondary education 0.883*** 0.889*** 0.239* 0.245**
(0.147) (0.140) (0.098) (0.093)
Employed 0.800*** 0.809*** 0.250* 0.256* n/a
(continued) (0.164) (0.162) (0.124) (0.114)
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Table 6.6 Probability of general practitioner visit, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE)
Income (log) 0.445*** 0.430*** 0.174** 0.168***
(0.112) (0.121) (0.060) (0.051)
Constant -5.443*** -5.343*** -2.300*** -2.264***
(0.808) (0.924) (0.454) (0.420)
athrho
Constant 0.146 -0.205 -0.557 0.474
(1.158) (1.793) (1.825) (0.596)
P 0.145 -0.202 -0.506 0.442
chi2_c 0.016 0.013 0.093 0.633
N 616 616 956 956 616 616 956 956
11 -683.982 -683.847 -1169.729 -1169.121 -415.976 -415.842 -565.583 -564.993
chi2 162.941 159.760 73.794 89.627 18.823 18.973 32.735 34.485
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.062 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.7 Intensity of general practitioner visits, pooled model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
General practitioners
Country (l=Egy 0=Leb) 0.206 0.069 -3.980* -4.625**
(0.197) (0.179) (1.577) (1.766)
Insured (outpatient) -0.279 3.8724- 3.027
(0.207) (2.314) (2.799)
Age -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.204 -0.126 -0.123
(0.191) (0.185) (0.185)
Married 0.3714- 0.277 0.269
(0.196) (0.194) (0.196)
Secondary education -0.3804- -0.455* -0.454*
(0.201) (0.199) (0.199)
Employed -0.288 -0.174 -0.182
(0.199) (0.194) (0.194)
Income (log) -0.069 -0.064 -0.083
(0.100) (0.153) (0.159)
Self-assessed health -0.040 -0.026 -0.023
(0.101) (0.098) (0.098)
Self-reported pain 0.407*** 0.372*** 0.370***
(0.099) (0.093) (0.094)
Chronic 0.160 0.254 0.249
(0.283) (0.275) (0.275)
Income*OPInsurance -0.5024-
(0.297)
-0.392
(0.361)
Country*OPInsurance -1.034*
(0.427)
1.647
(3.581)
Country*Income 0.596**
(0.220)
0.687**
(0.247)
Country*Income*OPInsurance -0.363
(0.479)
Constant -18.895 -1.277 -1.177 -1.022
(1.197) (1.431) (1.487)
Inalpha
Constant 19.451 1.519 1.204 1.198
(0.967) (0.774) (0.781)
N 660 576 576 576
U -792.747 -657.947 -651.431 -651.208
chi2 1.091 36.581*** 52.943*** 55.897***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.8 Intensity of general practitioner visits, country models
EGYPT LEBANON 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
General practitioners
Insured (outpatient) -0.678* 3.809+ -0.003 3.636
(0.267) (2.023) (0.286) (2.814)
Age -0.022*** -0.022*** 0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Male -0.363+ -0.331 0.238 0.292
(0.210) (0.209) (0.307) (0.319)
Married 0.409* 0.375+ 0.333 0.333
(0.197) (0.197) (0.307) (0.297)
Secondary education -0.443+ -0.425+ -0.450 -0.449
(0.253) (0.250) (0.292) (0.297)
Employed -0.316 -0.298 -0.111 0.008
(0.218) (0.215) (0.324) (0.336)
Income (log) 0.307* 0.458** -0.172 -0.071
(0.135) (0.160) (0.131) (0.163)
Self-assessed health -0.017 0.007 -0.071 -0.069
(0.103) (0.102) (0.170) (0.168)
Self-reported pain 0.407*** 0.386*** 0.345* 0.320*
(0.104) (0.102) (0.140) (0.138)
Chronic 0.189 0.157 0.192 0.222
(0.323) (0.310) (0.452) (0.440)
Income*OPInsurance -0.617* -0.473
(0.282) (0.362)
Constant -2.198+ -3.228* -16.156*** -17.309***
(1.136) (1.303) (1.878) (1.802)
Inalpha
Constant -0.421 -0.494 16.721*** 17.017***
(0.602) (0.614) (1.092) (0.848)
N 291 291 285 285
U -331.889 -330.438 -313.667 -312.656
chi2 59.145 63.545 23.199 22.306
P 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.022
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
6.4. Medical specialists
6.4.1. Probability: pooled models
Results show that Egyptian respondents are more likely to visit specialists than 
Lebanese counterparts to an extent; but having insurance in Lebanon closes this gap. 
The country effect was significant only in the bivariate model (Table 6.9, Model 1) and 
the main effects model (recursive Model 2). However, after accounting for the
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significant interactions between country, income, and insurance in Models 3 and 4, the 
country effect is no longer significant.
These results suggest that before accounting for the interaction between country, 
income and insurance, respondents in Egypt appear to be more likely to visit specialists 
than in Lebanon, holding other factors constant. After accounting for these interactions, 
the net effect of country on specialist care is negligible. This suggests that the effect of 
country is largely explained by income and insurance differences between the countries.
The models incorporating interaction terms (Models 3 and 4) both show that there are 
significant interactions between country, insurance, and income. Model 3 reflects that 
the income*insurance term is significant and negative, suggesting that the effect of 
insurance tends to decrease as income increases. In addition, the effect of 
country*insurance is also significant and negative, suggesting that the effect of 
insurance is greater in Lebanon than it is in Egypt. Model 4 shows that the coefficient 
for country*income*insurance is significant.
Health insurance was endogenous to the main effects model (Model 2), but was not 
endogenous after adding the interaction terms between income, insurance, and country 
(Models 3 and 4). Given differences in endogeneity between the two countries in the 
specialist models, however, the country-specific effects of income, insurance, and 
income*insurance were explored using country-specific analyses.
6.4.2. Probability: country models
Insurance is a significant and positive determinant of specialist contact in both 
countries, although the effect is larger in Egypt than in Lebanon (Table 6.10, probit 
models). These results imply having insurance coverage is predicted to increase the 
likelihood of seeing specialists, and that the effect is relatively more pronounced in 
Egypt. Health insurance is not endogenous to either country models, which indicates 
that the probit models should be used to assess effects. Income was also a significant 
determinant of specialist care in Egypt. In Egypt having a higher income increases the 
chances of visiting specialists. These results suggest that income-associated inequity 
exists in Egypt in relation to the probability of specialist care. In Lebanon, income plays 
a very small role as the coefficient is nearly zero and is not significant.
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The interaction effect of income*insurance was significant in Egypt, but was not 
significant in Lebanon. These results indicate that the effect of insurance on the use of 
specialists in Egypt was moderated by income: the effect of insurance on determining 
the likelihood of visiting specialists diminishes as income increases. In Lebanon, the 
interaction term was not significant, although directionally it was similar.
Age was a significant factor and positive in Egypt, meaning that older respondents were 
more likely to visit specialists than their younger counterparts, controlling for other 
factors. Whilst age was not significant in Lebanon for specialist care, its effect was 
similar in direction and its magnitude slightly smaller than in Egypt. Education was 
found to be marginally significant in Egypt, as indicated by the significance of the 
indices at a 90 percent confidential level.
Interestingly, the direction of the education variable is the opposite of that observed for 
general practitioner care and in both countries. That is to say, whilst a higher education 
reduces the likelihood of using general practitioner services, it increases the likelihood 
of seeking specialist care. However, this effect was more pronounced in Egypt than in 
Lebanon for both types of physician care, as evident by the relatively larger coefficients 
of education in Egypt as compared to Lebanon.
6.4.3. Intensity: pooled model
The effect of country on specialist intensity was not significant, although the effect had 
a positive direction (Table 6.11, Model 2). These results indicate that the frequency of 
specialist visits did not differ significantly between Egypt and Lebanon, holding other 
factors constant. Respondents in Egypt reported marginally more frequent visits. The 
interaction effects in the pooled model were not significant. Hence, the magnitude of 
the effects of income and insurance on specialist intensity does not depend on country.
6.4.4. Intensity: country models
In Egypt, insurance coverage is marginally significant and tends to decrease the 
frequency of specialist visits (Table 6.12). Insurance coverage does not play a 
statistically significant role in Lebanon, but the size of the coefficient is relatively large 
and exerts a negative effect. These results suggest that either (i) the uninsured have 
more intense visits to specialists, while the insured seek care elsewhere; or (ii) the 
nature of visits to specialists is different for the insured and the uninsured, which is not
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always obvious by looking at the quantity of visits. As income increases, the intensity 
of visiting medical specialists increases significantly in Egypt. In addition, the 
interaction term for income*insurance was significant and positive in Egypt. So as 
income increases, insurance becomes gradually more important in explaining the 
frequency of use. Neither income nor the interaction term is significant determinants in 
Lebanon, with the income coefficient almost equal to zero.
In Lebanon, being employed significantly decreases the frequency of specialist visits. 
Employment status was not significant in Egypt. The magnitude of the coefficient in 
Lebanon is relatively large, relative to other coefficients in the Lebanese specialist 
intensity model and to the employment coefficient in other Lebanese intensity models. 
These results suggest two points. First, amongst respondents in Lebanon who visited 
specialists at least once over a month, the unemployed are predicted to have more 
frequent visits than the employed, all other factors being equal. Second, employment 
status tends to play a relatively important role in the intensity of specialist care in 
particular.
Regarding health need and age, the only need variable in Egypt that is significant was 
pain. In Egypt, the effect of health need on the probability and intensity of use differ. 
Health need was not found to significantly predict probability, although a worse health 
perception and having chronic health conditions exerted a slightly negative effect. Pain 
significantly increases the intensity of use amongst those who seek care. Although age 
was significant in the Egyptian probability model for specialist care, age significantly 
decreases frequency of visits only in Egypt. This finding means that although the 
probability of seeing specialists increases with age, the frequency of visits is predicted 
to decrease with age.
In Lebanon, pain and self-assessed health were significant, but self-assessed health 
played a negative role. The worse the perception of health status, the fewer are the 
visits that a respondent is predicted to have. The magnitude of the coefficients 
associated with these health need variables in Lebanon was also relatively large. Being 
male in Lebanon was associated with less frequent specialist visits. Age was not a 
significant factor in Lebanon regarding the frequency of visits.
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Table 6.9 Probability of specialist visits, pooled model
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Specialists
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 1.148*** 1.161*** 0.539 -0.513 1.266*** 0.505 -0.569
(0.056) (0.105) (0.451) (0.671) (0.068) (0.590) (0.683)
Insured (outpatient) -0.752* 3.117*** 1.630 0.135* 2.213** 0.467
(0.370) (0.703) (1.111) (0.068) (0.697) (0.875)
Age 0.007** -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.004+ 0.004*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.092 0.091 0.093 0.099 0.100 0.094
(0.074) (0.068) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Married 0.155* 0.130** 0.140* 0.163* 0.158* 0.154*
(0.064) (0.049) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Secondary education 0.207* -0.249+ -0.114 0.046 0.072 0.081
(0.091) (0.132) (0.176) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Employed 0.072 -0.291** -0.216 -0.071 -0.050 -0.066
(0.096) (0.099) (0.136) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Income (log) 0.095* -0.062 -0.063 0.033 0.054 0.002
(0.046) (0.063) (0.071) (0.040) (0.052) (0.055)
Self-assessed health -0.035 -0.024 -0.034 -0.038 -0.044 -0.041
(0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Self-reported pain 0.129*** 0.099* 0.129** 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.142***
(0.035) (0.049) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Chronic -0.053 -0.068 -0.069 -0.063 -0.059 -0.068
(continued) (0.079) (0.066) (0.077) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085)
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Table 6.9 Probability of specialist visits, pooled model (continued)
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Income*OPInsurance -0.198+ -0.062 -0.255** -0.032
(0.113) (0.100) (0.088) (0.111)
Country*OPInsurance -0.287+ 3.345* -0.344* 3.825**
(0.163) (1.492) (0.145) (1.325)
Country* Income 0.071 0.247* 0.118 0.268**
(0.077) (0.105) (0.081) (0.094)
Country* Income*OPInsur -0.489* -0.551**
(0.198) (0.174)
Constant -0.221*** -1.448*** -0.137 -0.314 -1.048** -1.267** -0.874+
(0.037) (0.353) (0.689) (0.659) (0.337) (0.432) (0.447)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.031 -0.038 -0.038
(0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
Secondary education 0.559*** 0.552*** 0.562***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.068)
Employed 0.463*** 0.458*** 0.461***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Income (log) 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.232*** n/a
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) -0.072 -0.074 -0.079
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Constant -3.176*** -3.129*** -3.132***
(continued) (0.332) (0.330) (0.328)
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Table 6.9 Probability of specialist visits, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
athrho
Constant 0.575* -1.463 -0.656
(0.289) (1.305) (0.662)
P .5193037 -.8982118 -.5758165
N 2406 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130 2130
11 -1363.076 -2344.829 -2338.786 -2334.507 -1166.859 -1160.832 -1155.942
chi2 423.845*** 847.177*** 1308.870*** 844.764*** 414.875*** 433.330*** 432.087***
RESET test: shown for probit model (recursive model shows insurance not endogenous; probit therefore used.) RESET test: chi2(l) = 0.03; Prob > chi2 = 0.8681
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 6.10 Probability of specialist visits, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Specialists
Insured (ou^atient) -0.884 5.067*** -0.691 -0.680 -0.007 4.402*** 0.225* 0.414
(0.665) (0.999) (1.521) (2.232) (0.109) (0.991) (0.088) (0.887)
Age 0.010* -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.006+ 0.008* 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male 0.048 0.222+ 0.144 0.143 0.108 0.113 0.067 0.069
(0.118) (0.120) (0.154) (0.163) (0.112) (0.112) (0.104) (0.104)
Married 0.242* 0.171* 0.062 0.062 0.225* 0.218* 0.067 0.068
(0.096) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.100) (0.101) (0.093) (0.093)
Secondary education 0.352+ -0.226 0.084 0.084 0.125 0.194+ 0.012 0.013
(0.189) (0.257) (0.161) (0.170) (0.108) (0.112) (0.095) (0.095)
Employed 0.005 -0.396** 0.115 0.115 -0.151 -0.162 0.014 0.016
(continued) (0.156) (0.142) (0.204) (0.217) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)
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Table 6.10 Probability of specialist visits, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Income (log) 0.135+ 0.109 0.084 0.083 0.075 0.249** 0.019 0.025
(0.073) (0.141) (0.122) (0.126) (0.069) (0.078) (0.049) (0.056)
Self-assessed health -0.091 -0.081 0.043 0.043 -0.098 -0.100 0.046 0.045
(0.059) (0.058) (0.054) (0.053) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Self-reported pain 0.049 0.053 0.181* 0.182+ 0.051 0.056 0.201*** 0.201***
(0.057) (0.052) (0.089) (0.097) (0.061) (0.061) (0.046) (0.046)
Chronic -0.122 -0.132 -0.079 -0.079 -0.136 -0.155 -0.086 -0.085
(0.132) (0.116) (0.108) (0.108) (0.137) (0.136) (0.120) (0.120)
Income*OPInsur -0.527** -0.001 -0.602*** -0.024
(0.184) (0.112) (0.134) (0.113)
Constant -0.397 -0.020 -1.481** -1.481** 0.174 -1.107+ -1.197** -1.242**
(0.620) (1.027) (0.557) (0.558) (0.522) (0.591) (0.429) (0.477)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.005+ 0.005+
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.324** -0.324** 0.248* 0.248*
(0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108)
Secondary education 0.900*** 0.933*** 0.210* 0.210*
(0.110) (0.102) (0.094) (0.094)
Employed 0.631*** 0.630*** 0.295** 0.295** n/a
(0.108) (0.107) (0.111) (0.112)
Income (log) 0.323*** 0.300*** 0.198*** 0.198***
(continued) (0.071) (0.061) (0.053) (0.053)
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Table 6.10 Probability of specialist visits, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Constant -4.260*** -4.158*** -2.517*** -2.517***
(0.521) (0.483) (0.417) (0.417)
athrho
Constant 0.550 -0.967 0.627 0.622
(0.481) (0.759) (1.354) (1.502)
P 0.500 -0.748 0.556 0.552
chi2_c 1.305 1.624 0.214 0.171
N 1166 1166 964 964 1166 1166 964 964
11 -1054.062 -1044.080 -1233.511 -1233.511 -525.753 -516.122 -629.441 -629.418
chi2 293.589 406.492 94.880 95.687 17.183 40.111 41.552 41.539
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000
•“p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
197
Table 6.11 Intensity of specialist visits» pooled model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Specialists
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.068 0.150 -1.166 -0.206
(0.110) (0.133) (1.114) (1.216)
Insured (outpatient) -0.080 -1.107 1.312
(0.116) (1.337) (2.594)
Age -0.008* -0.008* -0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.217+ -0.204+ -0.195
(0.125) (0.124) (0.122)
Married -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.118) (0.120) (0.120)
Secondary education 0.018 -0.018 -0.020
(0.121) (0.122) (0.123)
Employed -0.219+ -0.238* -0.224+
(0.125) (0.121) (0.119)
Income (log) -0.038 -0.161 -0.091
(0.071) (0.120) (0.128)
Self-assessed health -0.089 -0.093 -0.092
(0.072) (0.073) (0.072)
Self-reported pain 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.220***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Chronic -0.137 -0.135 -0.131
(0.162) (0.159) (0.157)
Income*OPInsurance 0.104
(0.163)
-0.208
(0.328)
Country*OPInsurance 0.373
(0.296)
-3.257
(2.849)
Country*Income 0.159
(0.150)
0.028
(0.163)
Country*Income*OPInsur 0.478
(0.366)
Constant -0.963** -0.164 0.921 0.405
(0.310) (0.613) (0.959) (1.053)
Inalpha
Constant 0.969* 0.735+ 0.701 0.666
(0.469) (0.442) (0.434) (0.419)
N 1513 1358 1358 1358
11 -1702.353 -1533.561 -1531.166 -1529.967
chi2 0.385 28.989** 32.476** 32.354**
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.12 Intensity of specialist visits, country models
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Specialists
Insured (outpatient) 0.027 -1.987+ -0.350 0.767
(0.130) (1.201) (0.228) (2.450)
Age -0.010* -0.011** -0.003 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.075 -0.075 -0.595* -0.571*
(0.134) (0.134) (0.293) (0.290)
Married -0.042 -0.041 -0.002 0.009
(0.140) (0.140) (0.244) (0.248)
Secondary education 0.038 0.029 -0.198 -0.198
(0.136) (0.138) (0.252) (0.255)
Employed -0.140 -0.133 -0.656* -0.629*
(0.131) (0.130) (0.309) (0.304)
Income (log) 0.020 -0.080 -0.099 -0.066
(0.080) (0.092) (0.127) (0.143)
Self-assessed health -0.015 -0.012 -0.407* -0.408*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.175) (0.172)
Self-reported pain 0.176** 0.176** 0.328** 0.323**
(0.062) (0.061) (0.104) (0.102)
Chronic -0.116 -0.120 -0.099 -0.087
(0.177) (0.174) (0.359) (0.359)
Income*OPInsurance 0.276+
(0.166)
-0.144
(0.315)
Constant -0.236 0.504 -14.665*** -14.034***
(0.586) (0.646) (2.009) (1.830)
Inalpha
Constant 0.134 0.115 17.065*** 16.133***
(0.433) (0.428) (1.691) (1.362)
N 966 966 392 392
11 -1108.307 -1106.940 -414.660 -414.545
chi2 17.706 19.543 19.551 19.782
P 0.060 0.052 0.034 0.048
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
6.5. Pharmacists
6.5.1. Probability: pooled model
The insurance effect is relatively more important than country in explaining pharmacy 
contact, as evident in the way the model changes after accounting for interactions 
(Table 13, probit models). The country effect is initially significant and positive, shown 
in the first two of the four models (Models 1 and 2, respectively). After taking into 
account the significant and negative country*insurance interaction, the effect of country 
setting is no longer significant (Model 3). Insurance plays a stronger role in Lebanon
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than in Egypt in determining pharmacy care, an effect that ultimately reduces the 
country effect. Health insurance is not endogenous to the pooled model for the 
probability of pharmacy care.
6.5.2. Probability: country models
Insurance is a not a significant determinant of pharmacy care in Egypt, but it is 
marginally significant and positive in Lebanon (Table 6.14, probit models). These 
results suggest that having insurance coverage tends to increase the probability of 
visiting pharmacists in Lebanon. Insurance is not endogenous to either model.
Income is not a significant determinant of the use of pharmacists in either country 
(probit Model 1). However the coefficient signs indicate that a higher income is 
associated with a higher probability in Egypt of visiting pharmacists, but with a lower 
probability in Lebanon. The indices have a moderate to small magnitude in both 
settings. The interaction term for income*insurance is significant and negative in Egypt 
at the 90 percent confidence level, but is not significant in Lebanon. These results 
suggest that as income increases in Egypt, the effect of insurance on the probability of 
visiting pharmacies decreases.
Education is found to be marginally significant and negative in Egypt, but it is not 
significant in Lebanon. Therefore, the more highly educated were respondents in 
Egypt, the less likely they were to visit pharmacists, all other factors held constant. In 
Egypt, pain is significant and positive at the 95 percent confidence level. Likewise, 
self-assessed health and chronic conditions are positive, yet significant at the 90 percent 
confidence level. Chronic conditions exert the largest effect in terms of magnitude 
amongst all three health need variables, controlling for other factors.
In Egypt, being married tends to increase the probability of seeking pharmacist care. 
None of the health need variables are significant in Lebanon, although they are all 
positive in direction, similar to the results found in Egypt. Age is a significant, negative 
determinant of the probability of visiting pharmacists in both countries.
This finding suggests that older individuals were less likely to visit pharmacists than 
their younger counterparts. In addition, the magnitude of the age variable is larger in 
both countries than its effect on other outpatient services, indicating that the role played
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by age is most prominent in the probability of visiting pharmacists than for any other 
type of outpatient care.
6.5.3. Intensity: pooled model
Country does not exert a significant effect on the intensity of pharmacist care, all other 
variables held equal (Table 6.15). The interaction term for country*insurance is 
significant and negative. This result suggests that the effect of insurance is moderated 
by country setting, with a greater effect of insurance predicted for Lebanon.
6.5.4. Intensity: country models
Insurance is not a significant determinant of the conditional number of pharmacy visits 
in Egypt or Lebanon, though the coefficient is positive in Egypt and negative in 
Lebanon (Table 6.16). This might suggest that insurance may tend to increase the 
frequency of pharmacist visits in Egypt, but decrease the frequency in Lebanon.
Income is not a significant determinant of the intensity of pharmacy visits in either 
Egypt or Lebanon.
However, the zero-inflated model was preferred over the negative binomial according to 
goodness-of-fit tests (Appendix H). The results of the effect of insurance were thus 
compared to those found from the negative binomial. The significance of the effect of 
insurance on the intensity of seeking pharmacy care is the same in Lebanon in both 
models. Whilst the effect of insurance is significant at the 90 percent confidence level 
in the negative binomial in Egypt, the effect is significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level in the zero-inflated model.
This indicates that the strength of the effect is accentuated in Egypt in the zero-inflated 
model relative to its effect in the negative binomial. These findings indicate that the 
zero-inflated model is more sensitive in detecting the significance of the effect of 
insurance on decreasing the intensity of seeking pharmacy care in Egypt. The effects of 
the other variables are largely the same between the zero-inflated and zero-truncated 
models.
Based on the zero-truncated models, the income*insurance interaction term is not 
significant in either Egypt or Lebanon. These results show that the effect of insurance 
on the intensity of pharmacy visits does not depend on income level. For Egypt, the
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results in the zero-inflated model show that the interaction term is significant and 
negative for the frequency of pharmacy visits, whilst it is negative but not significant in 
the zero-truncated. The zero-inflated model appears to detect significance of the 
interaction term to a greater extent than does the zero-truncated model.
Pain is the main health determinant in Egypt. In contrast to the probability model, self­
assessed health and chronic conditions do not influence the frequency of subsequent use 
in Egypt. Although the goodness-of-fit tests favour the zero-inflated model for the 
intensity of pharmacy visits, the results for health need are similar in both models. The 
exception is chronic conditions in Egypt, where it significantly increases the intensity of 
pharmacy visits in the zero-inflated model, but not in the zero-truncated model.
In Lebanon, a worse health perception and the existence of chronic conditions 
significantly increase intensity of pharmacy care. Whilst none of the health need 
variables were found to influence the probability of visiting pharmacists, they tend to 
influence the intensity of use. Age is significant and negative in both countries, as was 
the case for probability. Therefore, both the probability and intensity of pharmacy visits 
decrease with age. For intensity, the effect of age is slightly larger in Lebanon than it is 
in Egypt.
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Table 6.13 Probability of pharmacy visit, pooled model
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Pharmacy
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.722*** 0.739*** 0.202 -0.399 0.739*** 0.114 -0.472
(0.061) (0.072) (0.675) (0.770) (0.071) (0.637) (0.756)
Insured (outpatient) 0.365 2.417* 1.469 0.054 1.126 0.196
(0.510) (0.999) (1.260) (0.075) (0.729) (0.940)
Age -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.077 -0.104 -0.103 -0.065 -0.069 -0.072
(0.086) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Married 0.208** 0.177* 0.179* 0.210** 0.202** 0.199**
(0.074) (0.072) (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Secondary education -0.171 -0.268* -0.249* -0.120 -0.099 -0.097
(0.111) (0.130) (0.119) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078)
Employed -0.037 -0.134 -0.121 0.007 0.024 0.018
(0.116) (0.150) (0.134) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089)
Income (log) -0.051 -0.091 -0.111+ -0.028 -0.031 -0.056
(0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.044) (0.060) (0.063)
Self-assessed health 0.095* 0.083+ 0.089+ 0.096* 0.096* 0.099*
(0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Self-reported pain 0.084* 0.077* 0.079* 0.085* 0.084* 0.085*
(0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Chronic 0.140 0.106 0.105 0.143 0.131 0.124
(0.098) (0.098) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099)
Income*OPInsurance -0.153+ -0.046 -0.123 -0.004
(continued) (0.081) (0.114) (0.093) (0.120)
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Table 6.13 Probability of pharmacy visit, pooled model (continued)
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT  
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Country*OPInsurance -0.361** 1.622 -0.369* 1.848
(0.134) (1.380) (0.156) (1.444)
Country*Income 0.081 0.166 0.101 0.183+
(0.101) (0.111) (0.087) (0.104)
Country*Income*OPInsurance -0.263 -0.294
(0.183) (0.190)
Constant -0.537*** -0.168 0.139 0.272 -0.338 -0.371 -0.181
(0.039) (0.470) (0.510) (0.520) (0.366) (0.491) (0.516)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.097 0.088 0.090
(0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
Secondary education 0.484*** 0.483*** 0.485***
(0.076) (0.075) (0.075)
Employed 0.398*** 0.387*** 0.389***
(0.089) (0.094) (0.092)
Income (log) 0.237*** 0.247*** 0.245*** n/a
(0.043) (0.046) (0.044)
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) -0.083 -0.072 -0.077
(0.072) (0.074) (0.072)
Constant -3.134*** -3.201*** -3.187***
(continued) (0.355) (0.363) (0.357)
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Table 6.13 Probability of pharmacy visit, pooled model (continued)
Model I
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
athrho
Constant -0.188 -0.774 -0.660
(0.315) (0.780) (0.583)
P -.186 -.649 -.578
N 1865 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639
11 -1188.270 -1949.725 -1945.976 -1944.717 -1009.485 -1006.234 -1004.980
chi2 140.940*** 341.889*** 422.438*** 396.300*** 192.779*** 198.601*** 200.028***
RESET test: shown for probit model (recursive model shows insurance not endogenous; probit therefore used.) RESET test: chi2(l) = 8.56; Prob > chi2 = 0.0034
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 "p < 0.001. Results should be treated in an exploratory way since RESET test shows model may be mis-specified. Due to small sample size for
disaggregated outpatient services such as pharmacy services, results from aggregated outpatient analyses will be used to draw main thesis conclusions.
Table 6.14 Probability of pharmacy visit, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Pharmacy
Insured (outpatient) -0.098 2.754* 1.041 1.790 -0.084 1.883+ 0.160+ 0.334
(0.738) (1.320) (0.829) (1.277) (0.130) (1.118) (0.093) (0.933)
Age -0.018** -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.169 -0.139 -0.074 -0.096 -0.169 -0.162 0.002 0.004
(0.132) (0.129) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.110) (0.111)
Married 0.345** 0.309** 0.129 0.121 0.344** 0.335** 0.138 0.138
(0.118) (0.118) (0.090) (0.085) (0.117) (0.117) (0.096) (0.096)
Secondary education -0.241 -0.407+ -0.090 -0.106 -0.245+ -0.223+ -0.026 -0.025
(continued) (0.255) (0.226) (0.109) (0.100) (0.127) (0.128) (0.098) (0.098)
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Table 6.14 Probability of pharmacy visit, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Employed -0.009 -0.124 -0.062 -0.090 -0.012 -0.015 0.034 0.036
(0.186) (0.177) (0.157) (0.153) (0.134) (0.134) (0.118) (0.119)
Income (log) 0.058 0.094 -0.120+ -0.118* 0.057 0.140 -0.070 -0.065
(0.097) (0.102) (0.066) (0.060) (0.072) (0.086) (0.055) (0.062)
Self-assessed health 0.117+ 0.116+ 0.064 0.056 0.117+ 0.121+ 0.070 0.070
(0.069) (0.068) (0.063) (0.062) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.065)
Self-reported pain 0.178** 0.176** 0.031 0.031 0.178** 0.179** 0.031 0.031
(0.063) (0.062) (0.044) (0.042) (0.063) (0.063) (0.048) (0.048)
Chronic 0.304+ 0.274+ 0.072 0.063 0.304+ 0.285+ 0.084 0.084
(0.164) (0.162) (0.117) (0.114) (0.164) (0.164) (0.123) (0.124)
Income*OPInsur -0.303* -0.062 -0.268+ -0.022
(0.148) (0.106) (0.151) (0.119)
Constant -0.388 -0.536 0.328 0.313 -0.377 -0.977 0.019 -0.018
(0.812) (0.844) (0.540) (0.511) (0.570) (0.652) (0.463) (0.525)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.006* 0.005*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.152 -0.160 0.226* 0.221*
(0.148) (0.146) (0.110) (0.112)
Secondary education 0.983*** 0.990*** 0.205* 0.206*
(0.134) (0.131) (0.093) (0.093)
Employed 0.598*** 0.595*** 0.268* 0.259* n/a
(0.148) (0.147) (0.120) (0.127)
Income (log) 0.360*** 0.354*** 0.200*** 0.207***
(continued) (0.085) (0.080) (0.054) (0.056)
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Table 6.14 Probability of pharmacy visit, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Constant -4.734*** -4.695*** -2.512*** -2.554***
(0.668) (0.646) (0.426) (0.440)
athrho
Constant 0.008 -0.379 -0.612 -0.906
(0.423) (0.429) (0.748) (0.973)
P 0.008 -0.362 -0.546 -0.719
chi2_c 0.000 0.781 0.669 0.867
N 687 687 952 952 687 687 952 952
11 -748.091 -746.076 -1161.335 -1161.185 -438.050 -436.336 -561.767 -561.749
chi2 189.045 190.663 63.249 81.903 52.814 55.454 21.990 22.094
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.02
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.15 Intensity of pharmacy visits, pooled model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Pharmacy
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) -0.041 -0.157 0.317 -0.381
(0.098) (0.104) (0.886) (0.939)
Insured (outpatient) -0.194+ 0.510 -1.213
(0.116) (1.306) (1.778)
Age -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.086 -0.102 -0.103
(0.133) (0.137) (0.135)
Married 0.106 0.092 0.097
(0.109) (0.109) (0.108)
Secondary education -0.116 -0.082 -0.087
(0.107) (0.110) (0.110)
Employed 0.017 0.025 0.028
(0.133) (0.134) (0.133)
Income (log) 0.024 0.048 0.014
(0.060) (0.080) (0.080)
Self-assessed health 0.119+ 0.128* 0.131*
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Self-reported pain 0.173** 0.166** 0.167**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Chronic 0.364* 0.347* 0.336*
(0.158) (0.157) (0.156)
Income*OPInsurance -0.063
(0.169)
0.157
(0.230)
Country*OPInsurance -0.480*
(0.237)
3.283
(2.401)
Country*Income -0.045
(0.120)
0.051
(0.128)
Country*Income*OPInsur -0.500
(0.317)
Constant 0.433*** -0.080 -0.356 -0.107
(0.094) (0.493) (0.661) (0.649)
Inalpha
Constant -0.078 -0.315 -0.345 -0.353
(0.221) (0.221) (0.217) (0.216)
N 758 682 682 682
11 -1262.311 -1117.824 -1115.437 -1114.235
chi2 0.177 57.342*** 71.555*** 74.654***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 6.16 Intensity of pharmacy visit, country model
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Pharmacy 
Insured (outpatient) -0.395* 1.979 0.023 -0.703
(0.160) (1.564) (0.167) (1.677)
Age -0.012** -0.012** -0.015* -0.015*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Male -0.257 -0.252 0.044 0.043
(0.174) (0.169) (0.230) (0.230)
Married 0.194 0.187 0.000 0.008
(0.130) (0.130) (0.175) (0.174)
Secondary education -0.105 -0.102 -0.068 -0.075
(0.146) (0.145) (0.162) (0.162)
Employed -0.056 -0.055 0.094 0.100
(0.173) (0.168) (0.214) (0.213)
Income (log) -0.012 0.056 0.029 0.015
(0.090) (0.096) (0.078) (0.084)
Self-assessed health 0.029 0.032 0.223* 0.225*
(0.066) (0.066) (0.112) (0.111)
Self-reported pain 0.339*** 0.339*** -0.052 -0.050
(0.069) (0.069) (0.087) (0.087)
Chronic 0.347 0.330 0.480* 0.473*
(0.239) (0.238) (0.207) (0.205)
Income*OPInsurance
Constant 0.052
-0.326
(0.213)
-0.425 -0.111
0.093
(0.216)
-0.014
(0.669) (0.748) (0.669) (0.709)
Inalpha
Constant -0.803** -0.821** 0.015 0.011
(0.276) (0.274) (0.344) (0.344)
N 406 406 276 276
11 -644.336 -643.253 -460.551 -460.474
chi2 77.537 81.982 13.518 13.514
P 0.000 0.000 0.196 0.261
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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6.6. Discussion: Effects of economic factors on outpatient utilisation
6.6.1. Country effect
Overall, the analysis of outpatient care reveals an interesting switch in health care 
patterns between Egypt and Lebanon, summarised in Table 6.17. Egyptians are 
predicted to more likely to use outpatient care, but once contact has been made, more 
frequent visits are predicted in Lebanon. These results could suggest (a) a overall 
greater opportunity of access regardless of ability to pay and insurance status in Egypt, 
and/or (b) a greater supplier-induced demand or a less efficient use of resources in 
Lebanon that increase the frequency of visits amongst users.
Because they can rely on free and subsidised health care covered by the Ministry of 
Health, Egyptian respondents may be more likely to seek care. Since public financing 
in the Egyptian health system is relatively constrained, health care is likely to be 
rationed explicitly or implicitly, with relatively little incentive amongst providers to 
provide a high quantity or quality of care. This observation has been found in some tax- 
based systems elsewhere. In the fee-for-service, heavily privatised system in Lebanon, 
fewer respondents may have the opportunity to seek care due to lack of insurance 
coverage, but once contact has been made, due to the private nature of care, there is an 
incentive for providers to stimulate demand, offering further access to high-technology 
services.
6.6.2. Effect of income
Overall, controlling for all else, income per se was not a large factor explaining the 
contact decision regarding outpatient care, except in the case of specialist care in Egypt, 
where inequity in the probability of seeking care was observed, favouring the relatively 
well off. The results indicated that there exist income-associated inequities in Egypt for 
the probability of specialist care and the frequency of using general practitioner, but not 
for pharmacy care. In Lebanon, income alone did not appear to contribute to inequities, 
although insurance did appear to play a role in exacerbating inequity. The effect of 
income in Lebanon could also reflect a more even distribution in income. Income- 
inequity in specialist care in Egypt may be explained by the idea that the relatively well- 
off are more likely to purchase the more preferred, higher-quality private outpatient 
care. Although information on the distinction between public and private facilities was 
not available, literature on patterns of care in Egypt support this possibility.
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6.6.3. Effect of insurance
Insurance was a positive factor in Lebanon determining the likelihood of using any 
outpatient care, hospital outpatient units, specialists, pharmacists, and inpatient care. In 
Egypt, insurance played a somewhat larger role in determining the frequency of use 
than it did the probability. It positively influenced the probability of specialist care; 
yet it influenced the intensity of hospital outpatient and specialist care negatively, and 
general practitioner and pharmacist care positively. These findings suggest a greater 
degree of inequity in Lebanon than in Egypt regarding the probability of using ‘any 
outpatient care’ over twelve months, favouring the insured over the uninsured.
Similar to findings from the literature, insurance played a relatively larger role in 
regards to the amount of services as opposed to the contact decision. One explanation 
fort this effect is supplier-induced demand that can arise when third-party payers 
reimburse providers for services. In the case specialist care, it is possible that in Egypt 
insurance may have reduced the intensity of these services due to the following possible 
explanations.
In the case of specialist care, which is split nearly equally in terms of provision between 
the private and public services in Egypt, those with insurance coverage fewer visits than 
those without, but more visits to general practitioners than those without, controlling for 
income and other factors. Indeed, amongst those with insurance, there is a greater 
incentive on the part of the insurer to encourage preventative care, often provided by 
general practitioners and covered by insurance, whilst specialist care in Egypt is often 
provided on a fee-for-service, out-of-pocket basis. Hence, insurance in Egypt may 
encourage beneficiaries to substitute specialist care for general practitioner care, thus 
explaining these results.
211
Egypt Lebanon Country with
Probability of care Income Insurance Income Insurance greater use
Any use of outpatient
services X XX Egypt
General practitioners Egypt
Specialists X XX X ns
Pharmacists X X ns
Intensity of yisits
General practitioners X XX Lebanon
Specialists ( x ) ns
Pharmacists (x) ns
ns = differences are not statistically significant, n/a = not applicable.
XX = relatively larger coefficient compared to other country, (x )  = difference is significant in favour 
of uninsured/lower-income. Intensity data not collected in survey for ‘any use of outpatient services’
6.6.4. Interaction between income and insurance
The interaction between income and insurance was detected mainly in the probability of 
specialist care and the intensity of general practitioner and pharmacy care in Egypt, but 
was not detected in Lebanon, The negative interaction between income and insurance 
regarding physician services is similar to those findings from the literature, in which the 
role of insurance tends to decrease as income increases. Insurance tends to reduce the 
price sensitivity on the part of beneficiaries, especially for lower-income groups. It is 
important to note that such an effect was not detected in Lebanon, possibly due to two 
reasons: (1) the sample sizes may not have been sufficient, since the direction of the 
effect was usually negative, thus supporting the general relationship; (2) the distribution 
of income in Lebanon is relatively more equal. With a relatively more equal income 
distribution such as that found in Lebanon as compared to Egypt, the differential effect 
of insurance may be more difficult to detect. Nonetheless, these results suggest that the 
effect of insurance is itself prominent in Lebanon.
6.6.5. Effects of other factors
6.6 5.1. Health need
The effect of health needs on outpatient care depends on the type of service, 
summarised in Table 6.18. At times pain is the health indicator that has the largest 
effect, at other times it is having a chronic health condition. Pain was the prime health 
determinant for the probability and the intensity of general practitioner and specialist 
visits. Chronic health conditions were more important in predicting the probability and 
intensity of pharmacy care and the probability of ‘any’ outpatient use. Self-assessed
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health generally played a limited role in predicting the use of health care, except in 
‘any’ use of outpatient care and case of pharmacy care in Egypt, elaborated below.
These results show that perceptions of ill health are more important than ‘objective’ 
measures in the probability of seeking care for physician services, but the reverse seems 
to be true for less discretionary care, such as medications and outpatient use in general.
Health status may increase the use of some services, whilst decreasing the use of others. 
Although not significant, the direction of the effect of self-assessed health was negative 
in some cases (specialist care) and positive in others (pharmacy care). Chronic 
conditions appeared to exert a significant negative effect in the case of inpatient care 
over a one-month recall, although the effect was positive in the case of the longer recall 
period. The longer-recall period for inpatient is likely more reliable; nonetheless, these 
overall findings point to an interesting possibility. The negative effect of chronic health 
conditions and self-assessed health may suggest that overnight admissions and specialist 
care may be substituted for other types of care in some cases, such as outpatient care, 
home-based care, or family/social support. Individuals with chronic health conditions 
may have a greater need for non-acute care than acute care, but this may also depend on 
the specific nature of the condition, which was outside the scope of this thesis.
__________ Table 6.18 Summary of multivariate outpatient results; health need__________
Self-assessed Pain Chronic Health
health Conditions
Prohahilitv of care
Any use of outpatient x x x
services
General practitioners — x
Specialists — x (LEB)
Pharmacists x (EGY) x x
Intensity of visits
Any use of outpatient n/a n/a n/a
services
General practitioners — x
Specialists — x
Pharmacists x x X
X = Effect is statistically significant at 95% confidence level. — = not significant, n/a = not
applicable. Intensity data was not collected for ‘any’ outpatient use.
6.6.5 2. Age
Overall, the effect of age on the probability of using outpatient services was relatively 
small or negligible for most types of care. It tended to decrease the use of health care
213
mainly for ‘any’ outpatient probability, physician intensity, and pharmacy intensity, and 
more so in Egypt. These results are consistent with other findings in Egypt and Jordan 
that indicate that the use of health care generally decreases with age, although the 
relationship may not necessarily be linear (Nandakumar et al, 2000; Ekman, 2007). It is 
possible that age represents unobservable factors that influence the demand for health 
care, such as health need, mobility, and co-dependence. Similarly, the literature 
suggests that older individuals in the Middle East rely heavily on family care-giving, 
where social capital plays a big role.
6.6.5 3. Education
Overall, education played a relatively modest role in determining the probability and 
intensity of ‘any’ outpatient care and physicians’ visits, with the effect more 
pronounced in Egypt. A higher education predicts a lower likelihood of using most 
outpatient services, with the exception of specialist care in Egypt. The findings are 
consistent with those elsewhere showing that a higher education tends to increase the 
use of specialist care (Nandakumar et al, 2000), whilst decreasing the use of general 
practitioners (Morris et al, 2005). The role played by education may represent three 
unobservable factors. The first is the level of knowledge and awareness of one’s health 
condition; second, health-related behaviour including lifestyle and habits that improve 
health; third, social status and unobserved preferences for certain health services and 
providers over others. These effects of education seem to affect the use of physician 
services more than the use of other services.
6.6 5.4. Employment status
Being employed tends to lower the probability of seeking outpatient care in Lebanon, 
whilst it lowers the frequency of visits for hospital outpatient care in Egypt and 
specialist visits in Lebanon. Results can be explained using three implications of 
employment status. First, similar to the effect of education, the employed tend to be 
exposed to more information and knowledge regarding health, thereby increasing their 
efficiency at producing good health. Second, the employed in both countries are more 
likely to be covered by social health insurance than the unemployed, especially in 
Egypt. The employed may be more likely to seek care earlier and reduce the risk of 
more serious illness. Finally, the opportunity cost of absenteeism and disability is 
relatively high for the employed, providing an incentive to take preventative measures.
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In general, the negative effect of being employed on the use of outpatient health 
services in Egypt and Lebanon closely corresponds to results found in other countries.
6.6.5 5. Gender and marital status
Gender and marital status influence the type of health service sought, but as control 
variables in this thesis, their effects were relatively modest. Being male and being 
married were associated with a higher likelihood of outpatient use in Egypt, whilst 
married did so in Lebanon. Being male was associated with a significantly lower 
likelihood of general practitioner care in Egypt and a lower intensity of specialist visits 
in Lebanon. Gender and marital likely represent opportunity, preferences, differences 
in the nature of health need, and factors associated with social capital that influence 
patterns of health care, as well as family and social care-giving.
6.7. Chapter summary
Income-inequity favouring the rich was found in Egypt regarding the contact decision 
for specialists and the intensity of general practitioner care. Greater insurance-related 
inequity was found in Lebanon than in Egypt regarding probability of visiting any 
outpatient facility and specialists. In Egypt, insurance- inequity was found regarding 
the intensity of visiting general practitioners. Pain and chronic health conditions were 
the most important determinants of outpatient care in Egypt and amongst the most 
important in Lebanon, particularly for physician and pharmacy care.
The effects of insurance and income were consistent with the theoretical role of ability- 
to-pay. Where tax-based, universal health systems exist, inequity in access to outpatient 
care is relatively less than in systems without universal coverage. Yet poor quality and 
comprehensiveness of care is a common problem of some tax-based systems, where 
people may choose to seek health care in the private sector instead as in the case of 
specialist care. Interestingly, it is for services that appear more affordable in Egypt that 
ability-to-pay played a greater role in Lebanon, such as ‘any’ outpatient care and 
pharmacy visits. In sum, insurance and income-related disparities found in the use of 
pharmacists and physicians have critical implications for individuals equal in health 
need but unequal in ability to pay. Despite having a relatively higher income in 
Lebanon than in Egypt, even amongst the insured, respondents in Lebanon were less 
likely to access pharmacists, possibly attributed to country differences in coverage, 
preferences, supplier-induced demand, and incentives to access certain services.
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Chapter 7. Effect of economic status on hospital-based care
7.1. Introduction
Compared to outpatient services as examined in the previous chapter, hospital-based 
health care is generally considered to be relatively more acute and less discretionary in 
nature. This difference may affect the role played by economic status. This chapter 
examines results regarding the influence of economic status on the use of hospital 
services, based on multivariate regression analysis. The main types of hospital care that 
are assessed include: (a) hospital-based outpatient units; and (b) hospital inpatient 
admissions assessed through (i) 12-month recall and (ii) one-month recall periods. The 
first half of the chapter reviews the estimation results, and the second half of the chapter 
discusses the main findings. Similar to Chapter Six, results from pooled and country- 
specific analyses are presented. Since the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables may vary by country, emphasis is paid to the country-specific 
results. The discussion focuses on: (i) the endogeneity of health insurance, (ii) the 
country effect, (iii) the income effect, (iv) the insurance effect and (v) the interaction 
effects.
7.2. Hospital outpatient services
7.2.1. Probability: pooled model
The effects of income and insurance on the probability and frequency of hospital care, 
as described in the methods chapter. To ensure that the models are valid, endogeneity 
of the insurance variable was also tested using the recursive bivariate probit model. 
Regarding endogeneity of health insurance in the pooled hospital outpatient analysis, 
insurance is not endogenous in the main effects model (Model 2), but is endogenous in 
the interactions models (Models 3 and 4). Respondents in Egypt are more likely to have 
used services as compared to Lebanese respondents, controlling for other factors (Table 
7.1). Insurance is not a significant determinant in the pooled analysis. The negative 
coefficient suggests that having insurance coverage somewhat reduces the likelihood of 
visiting hospital outpatient clinics, although not significantly so. Income does not exert 
a significant influence, with a value that approaches zero. None of the interaction 
effects between income, insurance, and country are significant for hospital outpatient 
care. These findings suggest that ability to pay does not significantly influence the
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likelihood of using hospital outpatient services, and the effect of insurance is not 
moderated by income or country of residence. Likewise, the effect of income does not 
depend on country of residence.
Besides being a residence of Egypt, the other significant factors that influence the 
probability of hospital outpatient visits are self-reported pain, chronic conditions, and 
being female, with gender significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Based on 
results from the recursive model, the most important factors explaining insurance 
coverage for outpatient care are have a secondary education or above, being employed, 
have a higher income, and being relatively older. Gender and country of residence are 
not significant determinants of hospital outpatient insurance coverage.
7.2.2. Probability: country models
In Egypt, neither insurance nor income is a significant determinant of hospital 
outpatient care (Table 7.2). In addition, the income variable is approximately equal to 
zero and has a negative sign, suggesting it has a negligible effect. The interaction term 
for income*insurance is significant and positive, which indicates that the effect of 
insurance tends to increase as income increases. This may suggest that insurance 
coverage stimulates the use of certain types of hospital outpatient care, for example, the 
use of relatively expensive procedures or the use of quasi-private hospitals. Health 
insurance is not endogenous in Egypt in the main effects model (Model 1), but is 
endogenous after adding the interaction term (Model 2). Regarding the control 
variables, being female, pain and chronic health conditions are significant predictors. 
Pain and chronic conditions have relatively large coefficients and collectively explain 
most of the probability of hospital outpatient visits. Age, marital status, education, 
employment status, and self-assessed health are not significant predictors.
Since health insurance is endogenous in Lebanon in the main and interaction effects’ 
models, the recursive model is used to assess the effects of the explanatory variables. 
Insurance is a relatively large and significant positive predictor of hospital outpatient 
care, whilst income exerts a relatively small influence on reducing the likelihood of 
hospital outpatient care. The magnitude of the income variable is also relatively small. 
The interaction term for income*insurance is not significant in Lebanon, indicating that 
the effect of insurance on hospital outpatient care is not moderated by income level. 
With respect to control factors, being female, pain, and chronic health conditions are
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significant, positive factors. Age, marital status, education, employment status, and 
self-assessed health are not significant determinants.
7.2.3. Intensity: pooled model
Based on pooled Models 1 and 2, the country effect is statistically significant and 
negative. This indicates that the number of hospital outpatient visits is higher in 
Lebanon (per person, per month) amongst respondents who had at least one visit (Table 
7.3). Therefore, whilst respondents in Egypt are more likely to utilise these services, 
the number of visits is greater in Lebanon amongst users. The effect of insurance is 
significant at the 90 percent confidence level and negative, suggesting that having 
insurance coverage for outpatient care reduces the frequency of visits to hospital 
outpatient units (Model 2). Income is not a significant determinant.
After adding the three interaction terms in Model 3, the effect of insurance and income 
remain the same. The interaction term for income*insurance is significant at the 90 
percent confidence level and negative, suggesting that the effect of insurance on 
increasing the intensity of hospital outpatient care is lower for higher income levels 
(Model 3). The interaction of country*insurance is also significant and negative, which 
suggests that the effect of insurance on the intensity of hospital outpatient care is higher 
in Lebanon than in Egypt. In addition, the interaction of country*income is significant 
and positive, indicating that the role played by income on intensity of utilisation is 
greater in Egypt than in Lebanon. The triple-interaction term for 
country*income*insurance is not significant, which means that the relationship between 
income and insurance is basically similar in both countries (Model 4).
Regarding the effects of the control variables on intensity of use, significant 
demographic and need factors associated with a higher intensity are self-reported pain, 
relatively younger age, and being female. Age and gender are relatively less important 
than pain, since they are significant only at the 90 percent confidence levels. The 
effects of the other covariates remain unchanged after the addition of the interaction 
terms.
7.2.4. Intensity: country models
In Egypt, the effect of insurance is significant and negative for the frequency of hospital 
outpatient visits, controlling for other factors (Table 7.4). This result indicates that
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respondents with insurance coverage are predicted to have fewer hospital outpatient 
visits than those without insurance. Income in Egypt is a significantly positive factor 
associated with the intensity of visiting hospital outpatient units. The interaction term 
for the intensity of hospital outpatient use is not significant in Egypt, although positive 
in direction. Regarding the effects of the control variables, younger age, being female, 
self-reported pain, and being unemployed are significant predictors of the intensity of 
hospital outpatient visits in Egypt. The zero-inflated model is preferred over the 
negative binomial according to goodness-of-fit tests; however, the effects of the 
covariates are similar across both techniques (Appendix I).
In Lebanon, neither income nor insurance is a statistically significant determinant of the 
intensity of hospital outpatient use overall, but there is evidence to suggest that 
insurance matters more to relatively lower-income groups. The interaction term for 
income*insurance is significant and positive in Lebanon. These results indicate that as 
income increases, the effect of insurance increases. After adding the interaction term, 
the effects of income and insurance remain non-significant but the magnitude of the 
insurance effect increases. This means that effect of insurance appears larger after 
adding the interaction term is more important in enabling utilisation for lower-income 
groups.
Self-reported pain is predicted to significantly increase the number of hospital 
outpatient visits, holding all other factors constant. None of the other demographic or 
health need variables are significant determinants in Lebanon, such as age, gender, 
marital status, educational level, employment status, self-assessed health, and chronic 
health conditions.
Results from the Lebanese hospital outpatient model should be interpreted cautiously 
since the overall model does not reach statistical significance as evident by the chi- 
squared value that is greater than 0.05. Hence, it does not explain most of the variation 
in hospital outpatient care. This may be due to the small sample size for this model 
(n=73). The zero-inflated model is also preferred in the case of Lebanon over the 
negative binomial according to goodness-of-fit tests; however, the effects of the 
covariates are similar across both techniques.
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Table 7.1 Probability of hospital outpatient visits, pooled model
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Hospital outpatient
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 1.550*** 1.433*** 1.735** 1.877* 1.622*** 1.800* 1.689+
(0.072) (0.358) (0.640) (0.780) (0.089) (0.749) (0.895)
Insured (ouQ)atient) -0.740 -1.837* -1.616 0.236** -0.495 -0.705
(0.870) (0.801) (1.101) (0.090) (0.871) (1.310)
Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.247+ -0.234* -0.227* -0.301** -0.311** -0.310**
(0.127) (0.100) (0.101) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Married -0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
(0.083) (0.077) (0.076) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Secondary education 0.162 0.212* 0.224* -0.018 -0.013 -0.013
(0.188) (0.101) (0.101) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097)
Employed 0.046 0.067 0.074 -0.055 -0.059 -0.059
(0.139) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Income (log) 0.028 0.038 0.055 -0.052 -0.072 -0.080
(0.096) (0.083) (0.093) (0.053) (0.082) (0.089)
Self-assessed health -0.029 -0.025 -0.025 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032
(0.051) (0.047) (0.046) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Self-reported pain 0.138* 0.128** 0.125** 0.155** 0.156** 0.156**
(0.058) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Chronic 0.468** 0.430*** 0.422*** 0.522*** 0.518*** 0.515***
(continued) (0.166) (0.125) (0.123) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139)
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Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
RECURSIVE 
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT 
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Income*OPInsur 0.122 0.086 0.102 0.128
(0.094) (0.148) (0.110) (0.166)
Country*OPInsur -0.073 -0.554 -0.070 0.307
(0.161) (1.506) (0.189) (1.699)
Country *Income -0.051 -0.075 -0.021 -0.005
(0.090) (0.114) (0.101) (0.122)
Country*Income*OPInsur 0.064 -0.050
(0.198) (0.221)
Constant -1.376*** -1.895*** -1.880** -1.977** -1.535*** -1.412* -1.352+
(0.054) (0.470) (0.581) (0.636) (0.444) (0.650) (0.698)
Insured (outpatient)
Age 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.042 0.040 0.039
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Secondary education 0.517*** 0.517*** 0.517***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Employed 0.272** 0.269** 0.269** n/a
(0.092) (0.091) (0.091)
Income (log) 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.239***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) -0.047 -0.048 -0.047
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Constant -3.042*** -3.069*** -3.078***
(continued) (0.368) (0.371) (0.372)
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Table 7.1 Probability of hospital outpatient visits, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
athrho
Constant 0.659 0.876** 0.944**
P
(0.753)
.5777509
(0.333)
.7046473
(0.355)
.7369017
N 1791 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550 1550
11 -794.604 -1557.521 -1556.009 -1555.954 -655.940 -655.198 -655.170
chi2 459.791*** 714.926*** 799.511*** 821.715*** 418.932*** 415.369*** 415.046***
RESET test: shown for probit model (recursive model shows insurance not endogenous; probit therefore used.) RESET test: chi2(I) = 0.02; Prob > chi2 = 0.8837
n/a = not applicable. *Statistically significant at 95% confidence level; **99% confidence level; ***99.9% confidence level, p = rho, signifying endogeneity if *, 
denoting use of the RECURSIVE model is needed; otherwise PROBIT. = chi-squared, signifying high degree of goodness-of-fit for overall model if *.
'‘p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 7.2 Probability of hospital outpatient visits, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Hospital outpatient
Insured (outpatient) -0.876 -2.947** 2.111*** -1.250 0.143 -0.378 0.310* -0.746
(0.688) (1.123) (0.170) (1.310) (0.132) (1.093) (0.126) (1.348)
Age 0.007 0.010* -0.006+ -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.351** -0.355** -0.370*** -0.266+ -0.309* -0.315* -0.313* -0.317*
(0.133) (0.132) (0.110) (0.146) (0.133) (0.134) (0.146) (0.146)
Married 0.037 0.077 0.035 -0.027 0.007 0.011 -0.029 -0.027
(0.117) (0.108) (0.082) (0.137) (0.121) (0.121) (0.141) (0.141)
Secondary education 0.396 0.552** -0.177+ -0.050 0.055 0.051 -0.082 -0.090
(0.268) (0.174) (0.102) (0.144) (0.133) (0.133) (0.142) (0.143)
Employed 0.046 0.089 -0.237* -0.033 -0.050 -0.054 -0.076 ■ -0.083
(0.156) (0.140) (0.118) (0.156) (0.136) (0.137) (0.162) (0.162)
Income (log) 0.023 -0.008 -0.138* -0.040 -0.070 -0.092 -0.035 -0.075
(0.098) (0.079) (0.060) (0.096) (0.071) (0.086) (0.080) (0.091)
Self-assessed health -0.011 -0.001 -0.019 -0.045 -0.019 -0.020 -0.047 -0.047
(0.067) (0.062) (0.053) (0.087) (0.070) (0.070) (0.090) (0.090)
Self-reported pain 0.112 0.087 0.106+ 0.173* 0.132+ 0.133+ 0.176* 0.177*
(0.070) (0.065) (0.056) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072) (0.072)
Chronic 0.433* 0.399** 0.312+ 0.557* 0.479** 0.486** 0.581* 0.572*
(0.169) (0.147) (0.163) (0.226) (0.180) (0.181) (0.231) (0.231)
Income*OPInsurance 0.223+ 0.139 0.071 0.135
(0.130) (0.167) (0.149) (0.171)
Constant -0.632 -0.503 -0.543 -1.446+ 0.145 0.309 -1.604* -1.294+
(continued) (0.825) (0.642) (0.547) (0.739) (0.569) (0.673) (0.660) (0.737)
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Table 7.2 Probability of hospital outpatient visits, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SB)
Insured (outpatient) n/a
Age 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.005+ 0.005+
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.297* -0.287* 0.180+ 0.247*
(0.150) (0.146) (0.101) (0.110)
Secondary education 1.077*** 1.056*** 0.223* 0.207*
(0.138) (0.142) (0.091) (0.094)
Employed 0.309* 0.299* 0.234* 0.271*
(0.155) (0.152) (0.109) (0.115)
Income (log) 0.349*** 0.364*** 0.190*** 0.202***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.050) (0.051)
Constant -4.573*** -4.678*** -2.353*** -2.507***
(0.671) (0.669) (0.402) (0.423)
athrho
Constant 0.679 1.274+ -1.959*** 0.301*
(0.601) (0.682) (0.579) (0.149)
P 0.591 0.855 -0.961 0.292
chi2_c 1.275 3.489+ 11.440*** 4.054*
N 628 628 922 922 628 628 922 922
11 -704.055 -702.821 -819.245 -821.394 -414.760 -414.638 -240.217 -239.843
chi2 191.580*** 283.806*** 462.686*** 60.178*** 26.464** 26.644** 23.282** 23.684*
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.014
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Hospital outpatient
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.077 0.092 -3.854* -2.545
(0.240) (0.246) (1.658) (2.191)
Insured (outpatient) -0.409+ 2.969+ 5.997*
(0.213) (1.608) (3.050)
Age -0.011+ -0.010+ -0.011+
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Male -0.445+ -0.438+ -0.472*
(0.228) (0.225) (0.232)
Married 0.077 -0.013 -0.016
(0.200) (0.194) (0.194)
Secondary education -0.068 -0.067 -0.076
(0.196) (0.191) (0.192)
Employed -0.237 -0.246 -0.259
(0.230) (0.226) (0.229)
Income (log) 0.105 -0.190 -0.064
(0.100) (0.205) (0.250)
Self-assessed health -0.128 -0.127 -0.123
(0.099) (0.096) (0.097)
Self-reported pain 0.509*** 0.509*** 0.512***
(0.092) (0.087) (0.087)
Chronic 0.129 0.201 0.236
(0.362) (0.313) (0.312)
Income*OPInsurance -0.340+ -0.734+
(0.205) (0.396)
Country*OPInsurance -1.123* -5.228
(0.477) (3.527)
Country*Income 0.596* 0.418
(0.232) (0.301)
Country*Income*OPInsur 0.540
(0.460)
Constant -1.758 -1.321 0.639 -0.304
(1.844) (0.989) (1.671) (2.016)
Inalpha
Constant 2.411 0.442 0.175 0.199
(2.079) (0.603) (0.526) (0.533)
N 491 432 432 432
11 -648.360 -547.709 -541.285 -540.690
chi2 0.103 53.100*** 61.292*** 64.225***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
225
Table 7.4 Intensity of hospital outpatient visits, country models
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Hospital outpatient
Insured (outpatient) -0.691** 0.459 0.428 4.676
(0.229) (1.681) (0.454) (3.678)
Age -0.012* -0.012+ 0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
Male -0.744** -0.719** 0.601 0.470
(0.243) (0.247) (0.524) (0.543)
Married -0.027 -0.032 0.065 -0.013
(0.204) (0.204) (0.512) (0.509)
Secondary education -0.029 -0.013 -0.250 -0.270
(0.202) (0.204) (0.500) (0.495)
Employed -0.488* -0.472* 0.370 0.363
(0.227) (0.234) (0.530) (0.532)
Income (log) 0.280* 0.334* -0.251 -0.083
(0.114) (0.150) (0.235) (0.267)
Self-assessed health -0.086 -0.087 -0.273 -0.246
(0.103) (0.103) (0.271) (0.271)
Self-reported pain 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.433+ 0.447+
(0.089) (0.089) (0.250) (0.257)
Chronic 0.291 0.284 0.071 0.233
(0.324) (0.320) (0.969) (0.978)
Income*OPInsurance -0.157
(0.230)
-0.552
(0.476)
Constant -1.924* -2.340* 0.187 -1.050
(0.897) (1.147) (2.417) (2.623)
Inalpha
Constant -0.147 -0.155 0.688 0.596
(0.534) (0.531) (1.458) (1.434)
N 359 359 73 73
U -447.391 -447.180 -90.222 -89.490
chi2 62.111 62.181 9.300 10.763
P 0.000 0.000 0.504 0.463
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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7.3. Hospital inpatient care
7.3.1. Probability over twelve months: pooled model
The country effect is significant and positive, based on the pooled probit models 1 and 2 
(Table 7.5). These results indicate that respondents in Egypt are significantly less likely 
to visit inpatient care than Lebanese counterparts. Insurance is a significant, positive 
determinant of the probability of admissions.
Income is positive but not statistically significant. After adding the interaction terms, 
the only interaction term that is found to be significant is income*insurance (Model 3). 
The positive sign of the interaction term indicates that the effect of insurance on the 
probability of admissions tends to increase as income increases. Results suggest that a 
negative but non-significant effect of country setting exists after controlling for other 
factors.
Therefore, respondents in Egypt are marginally less likely to be admitted to inpatient 
care than their Lebanese counterparts. The country effect is no longer significant, 
although it remains negative. Insurance is no longer significant, but the sign is 
negative. The effect of income does not change after the addition of the interaction 
terms.
The most important factors in the recursive model that are associated with the 
likelihood of have insurance coverage for inpatient care are secondary education, being 
employed, being a resident of Lebanon, have a higher income, and being older. Results 
from the recursive model show that the chi-squared statistic for rho is not significant, 
indicating that health insurance is not endogenous to the pooled inpatient, twelve-month 
model. Other significant determinants of inpatient care are being married, have a 
relatively low educational level, low self-assessed health status, pain, and have chronic 
conditions. Neither age nor gender is significant.
7.3.2. Probability over twelve months: country models
Health insurance is not endogenous in the case of Egypt; therefore the probit model is 
used to assess the explanatory factors. Significant determinants of inpatient insurance 
coverage in Egypt are secondary education, being employed, being female, higher 
income, and being older. In Egypt, neither income nor insurance is a significant 
determinant of inpatient use (Table 7.6). Nonetheless, the value of income is negative
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in direction and approached zero. After including the insurance*income interaction 
term as shown in Model 2, results show that the interaction term is not significant in 
Egypt, although positive in direction. These findings indicate that the effect of 
insurance on utilising inpatient services is not moderated by income level. Overall, 
health status is the most important factor positively determining inpatient use in Egypt. 
Other significant determinants are chronic health conditions, pain, and low self-assessed 
health status. Age, gender, marital status, educational level, employment status, and 
income level are not significant factors.
In Lebanon, results from the recursive model are discussed, since health insurance is 
endogenous to the model. Insurance is a significant determinant. It exerts a negative 
effect; but it exerts a positive effect when specific types chronic health conditions are 
included in the model (Table 7.6). This suggests that the effect of insurance is sensitive 
to the choice of control variables that represent health need.
A higher income significantly increases the probability of inpatient care in Lebanon. 
After including the insurance*income interaction term, results show that the interaction 
term is not significant in Lebanon, although positive in direction (Model 2). These 
findings indicate that the effect of insurance on utilising inpatient services is not 
moderated by income level.
Other significant determinants of hospital inpatient care in Lebanon (12-month recall) 
are being married, have lower self-assessed health levels, have worse pain levels, and 
have chronic health conditions. Factors that are not significant included age, gender, 
educational level, and employment status. The ranking of factors that determine 
insurance coverage in the recursive model are secondary education, being employed, 
higher income, being male, and age.
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Table 7.5 Probability of inpatient care over 12 months, pooled model
RECURSIVE
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
PROBIT
Model 4
Coeff. (SE)
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2
Coeff. (SE)
Model 3
Coeff. (SE)
Model 1
Coeff. (SE)
Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient Care
Country (l=Egy,0=Leb) -0.464*** -0.350*** -0.159 -0.208 -0.464*** -0.442*** -0.135 -0.099
(0.041) (0.079) (0.424) (0.528) (0.041) (0.051) (0.453) (0.543)
Insured (inpatient) 0.838+ 0.315 0.291 0.103* -0.780 -0.745
(0.431) (1.311) (1.258) (0.051) (0.517) (0.644)
Age -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.055 -0.053 -0.053 -0.047 -0.049 -0.049
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Married 0.155** 0.156** 0.155** 0.169** 0.174** 0.175**
(0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Secondary education -0.291** -0.323+ -0.326+ -0.107+ -0.112+ -0.112+
(0.108) (0.184) (0.177) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Employed -0.243** -0.262* -0.264* -0.137* -0.143* -0.143*
(0.079) (0.114) (0.111) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Income (log) -0.014 -0.034 -0.037 0.025 -0.001 0.001
(0.036) (0.050) (0.055) (0.031) (0.048) (0.052)
Self-assessed health 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Self-reported pain 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Chronic 0.283*** 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.299***
(0.063) (0.070) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
Income *IPInsur 0.073 0.078 0.111+ 0.106
(0.087) (0.091) (0.066) (0.082)
Country*IPInsur 0.179 0.320 0.123 0.009
(0.143) (0.967) (0.110) (0.995)
Country* Income -0.033 -0.027 -0.048 -0.053
(continued) (0.059) (0.074) (0.062) (0.074)
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Table 7.5 Probability of inpatient care over 12 months, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Country*Income* IPInsur -0.019 0.015
Constant -1.132*** -1.943*** -1.727***
(0.126)
-1.700** -1.132*** -2.304*** -2.098***
(0.133)
-2.113***
Insured (inpatient) 
Age
(0.028) (0.344)
0.016***
(0.522)
0.016***
(0.559)
0.016***
(0.028) (0.257) (0.383) (0.413)
Male
(0.001)
-0.014
(0.001)
-0.014
(0.001)
-0.014
Secondary education
(0.042)
0.799***
(0.042)
0.799***
(0.042)
0.799***
Employed
(0.038)
0.463***
(0.038)
0.463***
(0.038)
0.463***
Income (log)
(0.043)
0.160***
(0.043)
0.158***
(0.043)
0.159*** n/a
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb)
(0.022)
-0.350***
(0.036)
(0.022)
-0.353***
(0.036)
(0.022)
-0.353***
(0.036)
Constant -2.608*** -2.592*** -2.592***
athrho
(0.186) (0.186) (0.186)
Constant -0.460 -0.529 -0.539
P
(0.298)
-0.430
(0.573)
-0.485
(0.558)
-0.492
N 7736 6885 6885 6885 7736 6885 6885 6885
Log-likelihood -2205.898 -5557.957 -5555.972 -5555.960 -2205.898 -1727.194 -1724.825 -1724.818
125.428*** 1713.078*** 1745.040*** 1752.194*** 125.428*** 452.734*** 457.521*** 457.464***
RESET test: chi2(l) = 1.55; Prob > chi2 = 0.2133 RESET test: chi2(l) = 0.48; Prob > chi2 = 0.4870
*P < 0.05 * * p  < 0.01 * * * p  < 0.001.
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Table 7.6 Probability of inpatient care over 12 months, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient Care
Insured (inpatient) 0.847+ 0.138 -0.762* -1.325* 0.094 -0.785 0.080 -0.785
(0.510) (1.164) (0.309) (0.633) (0.081) (0.741) (0.067) (0.662)
Age -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.077 -0.083 0.059 0.036 -0.094 -0.101 -0.005 -0.012
(0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080)
Married 0.017 0.025 0.233*** 0.243*** 0.050 0.055 0.253*** 0.253***
(0.081) (0.083) (0.070) (0.072) (0.078) (0.078) (0.074) (0.074)
Secondary education -0.304+ -0.288 0.016 -0.028 -0.070 -0.077 -0.134+ -0.135+
(0.159) (0.177) (0.093) (0.097) (0.085) (0.087) (0.075) (0.076)
Employed -0.186+ -0.176 -0.109 -0.143 -0.061 -0.062 -0.201* -0.209*
(0.109) (0.119) (0.087) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Income (log) -0.034 -0.058 0.126** 0.062 -0.026 -0.058 0.057 0.007
(0.046) (0.052) (0.045) (0.059) (0.047) (0.053) (0.041) (0.053)
Self-assessed health 0.104* 0.104* 0.158*** 0.165*** 0.110* 0.108* 0.171*** 0.172***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Self-reported pain 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.166*** 0.172*** 0.238*** 0.239*** 0.182*** 0.180***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.038) (0.038)
Chronic 0.281** 0.285** 0.289*** 0.303*** 0.285** 0.288** 0.317*** 0.318***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.082) (0.084) (0.092) (0.091) (0.086) (0.086)
Income*IP Insurance 0.088 0.102 0.122 0.112
(0.109) (0.083) (0.102) (0.084)
Constant -1.933*** -1.784*** -2.821*** -2.470*** -2.210*** -1.973*** -2.643*** -2.261***
(continued) (0.405) (0.420) (0.329) (0.422) (0.361) (0.398) (0.345) (0.432)
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Table 7.6 Probability of inpatient care over 12 months, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Insured (inpatient) 
Age 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.227*** -0.227*** 0.217*** 0.217***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Secondary education 1.133*** 1.133*** 0.429*** 0.429***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Employed 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.258*** 0.257***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Income (log) 0.068* 0.067* 0.232*** 0.231*** n/a
(0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant -2.815*** -2.806*** -2.605*** -2.599***
athrho
(0.248) (0.248) (0.279) (0.277)
Constant -0.452 -0.403 0.570* 0.395+
P
(0.325)
-0.423
(0.365)
-0.383
(0.247)
0.516*
(0.221)
0.376+
N 4133 4133 2752 2752 4133 4133 2752 2752
Log-hkelihood -2697.021 -2696.694 -2734.629 -2733.629 -793.725 -793.117 -927.496 -926.319
999.366*** 1001.147*** 556.701*** 499.114*** 153.205*** 153.151*** 251.039*** 256.091***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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7.3.3. Probability over one month: pooled model
Over a one-month period, the effect of country setting is significant and positive (Table 
7.7, probit models). This result means that respondents in Egypt are more likely to be 
admitted than their counterparts in Lebanon, holding other factors constant. The 
magnitude of the country coefficient is relatively large, indicating a particularly strong 
effect of country setting. Insurance is significant and positive in the main effects model, 
suggesting that insurance increases the likelihood of inpatient admissions. However, 
income is not a significant factor. Based on the pooled analysis, the chi-squared 
statistic for rho is not significant, indicating that health insurance is not endogenous to 
the inpatient model for the one-month recall period. The most important factors 
explaining inpatient insurance coverage including having a secondary education, being 
employed, being a resident of Lebanon, have a higher income, age, and being male.
After adding the interaction terms to the model, a significant negative interaction is 
found between income and insurance, indicating that as income increases, the effect of 
insurance becomes gradually less. A significant negative interaction is also found 
between country and income, suggesting that the effect of income depended on the 
country and exerted a relatively greater effect in Lebanon. This interaction between 
country and insurance is significant at the 90 percent confidence level and negative, 
indicating the insurance effect is higher in Lebanon. Finally, a significant interaction is 
found between country, income, and insurance at the 90 percent confidence level, 
showing that the relationship between income and insurance varies by country setting.
After taking into account the interaction terms in Model 3, the insurance effect remains 
unchanged, but after adding the triple interaction term in Model 4, insurance is 
significant and positive. Similarly, after accounting for the interactions between 
income, country and insurance in Models 3 and 4, income becomes significant in both 
of these models although not significant in the main effects model. The results from 
Models 3 and 4 suggest that after accounting for the different relationships between 
insurance, income, and country, insurance coverage and higher income each tend to 
independently increase the likelihood of inpatient admissions, effects that are masked 
when ignoring the moderating effects of income and country setting.
Other significant demographic and health need determinants of inpatient admissions are 
being female, pain, and not having chronic health conditions. Those factors that are not
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significant are age, marital status, educational level, and employment status. After 
accounting for the significant interactions in Model 4, the effects of the demographic 
and health need variables remain largely unchanged,
7.3.4. Probability over one month: country models
Over a one-month recall period, insurance is not significant in Egypt and is relatively 
small in magnitude. However, income is a significant determinant in a negative sense. 
These results indicate that poorer individuals in Egypt are more likely to be admitted to 
hospital than wealthier individuals, holding all other factors constant. The interaction 
term for income*insurance is not significant in Egypt, with a value that approached 
zero. In Egypt, the chi-squared statistic for rho is not significant, indicating that health 
insurance is not endogenous to the one-month recall probability model for inpatient care 
(Table 7.8). The most important factors determining inpatient insurance coverage based 
on a one-month recall period are secondary education, being employed, and age.
Self-assessed health and pain variables are significant and positive determinants of the 
likelihood of being admitted, with self-assessed health significant at the 90 percent 
level. Chronic health conditions’ variable is significant and negative in direction.
These results suggest that poorer self-assessed health and pain levels increase the 
likelihood of inpatient admissions, but having a chronic health condition decreases the 
likelihood of admission.
The chi-squared statistic for rho is not statistically significant in Lebanon, suggesting 
that health insurance is not endogenous in the inpatient model for the one-month recall 
period. The most important factors that increases the likelihood of inpatient insurance 
coverage in Lebanon are being employed, have a secondary education or above, being 
male, have a higher income, and age.
Insurance is a significant determinant in Lebanon. The probit index is positive and is 
the largest factor in comparison to other explanatory variables. Hence, in Lebanon, 
have insurance coverage is the most important factor determining the probability of 
being admitted to hospital, holding all other factors constant. Over the one-month recall 
period, income is also significant and positive in Lebanon. In Lebanon, richer 
individuals are more likely to be admitted than poorer individuals, holding other factors 
constant, suggesting that income-associated inequity in the probability of admissions
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exists in Lebanon. These results suggest that there exists insurance- and income- 
associated inequity in Lebanon with regards to the probability of inpatient admission.
In Lebanon, the interaction term is significant and negative with a relatively large value. 
Hence, as income increases in Lebanon, the effect of insurance became less important 
in explaining the probability of being admitted to hospital. Whilst insurance is not 
significant in the main effects model, it became significant and positive after taking into 
account the interaction between income and insurance. Income also became significant 
at the 95 percent level and positive after taking into account the interaction term. The 
effects of other covariates remained largely unchanged. Other significant demographic 
and health need factors that are associated with the likelihood of inpatient admission 
over a one-month recall period in Lebanon are being female and have a poor self- 
reported level of pain. Demographic and health need factors that are not significant 
included age, marital status, educational level, employment status, self-assessed health, 
and chronic health conditions.
73.5. Intensity over one month: pooled model
Regarding the frequency of inpatient admissions, the effect of country setting is 
significant and negative, according to the zero-truncated negative binomial model 
(Table 7.9). These results suggest that amongst respondents that had been admitted, 
respondents in Egypt reported fewer visits than Lebanese counterparts, holding other 
factors constant. The magnitude of the probit index is also relatively large, suggesting a 
particularly country effect.
However, the goodness-of-fit tests favoured the zero-inflated negative binomial model, 
which showed that the country effect is not significant and is positive in direction 
(Appendix I). These findings indicate that respondents in Egypt reported somewhat 
more frequent visits. As the effects of most of the other covariates remained the same, 
the zero-truncated model will be used to evaluate most of the effects.
Based on Model 2 in the zero-truncated set of regressions, insurance is a positive 
predictor of the intensity of inpatient admissions conditional upon use, significant at the 
90 percent confidence level. Insurance exerts a relatively large effect as evident by the 
coefficient’s large value. Income is not a significant predictor of the intensity of being 
admitted to hospital over the one-month recall period.
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The interaction terms between, income, insurance, and country setting as shown in 
Models 3 and Model 4 are not significant. These results show that the effect of 
insurance on the likelihood of inpatient admissions is not moderated by income. In 
addition, the individual effects of insurance and income each on the likelihood of 
admissions does not depend on country setting. Other significant demographic and 
health need factors that are associated with a higher intensity of inpatient admissions 
over one month are age, being married and self-reported pain. Demographic and health 
need factors that are not significant determinants are gender, educational level, 
employment status, self-assessed health status, and chronic health conditions.
7.3.6. Intensity over one month: country models
In Egypt, insurance does not significantly impact the frequency of inpatient admissions, 
but is generally a positive influence (Table 7.10). Income is not significant either. The 
interaction term is not significant in Egypt but is negative and relatively large in 
magnitude. This result suggests that as income increases, the effect of insurance tends 
to decrease slightly. Demographic and health need factors that predict a higher number 
of inpatient visits in Egypt are younger age, being married, and pain. Gender, 
educational level, employment status, self-assessed health and chronic conditions are 
not significant determinants.
In Lebanon, insurance significantly increases the number of hospital inpatient visits, 
holding other factors equal. Income is not a statistically significant factor, although 
positive in direction. The interaction term is not significant in Lebanon but is negative 
and relatively large in magnitude. Hence, the effect of insurance tends to decrease 
somewhat as income increases. A higher intensity of inpatient admissions is associated 
with relatively young age, being married, and pain.
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Table 7.7 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, pooled model
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient
Country (l=Egy, 0=Leb) 0.945*** 1.058*** 3.508*** 4.531*** 1.064*** 3.508*** 4.580***
(0.085) (0.111) (0.837) (0.985) (0.104) (0.837) (0.985)
Insured (inpatient) 0.034 0.975 2.121 0.088 1.057 2.738*
(0.323) (1.065) (1.364) (0.111) (0.996) (1.340)
Age 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Male -0.338** -0.297* -0.261* -0.342** -0.302* -0.307*
(0.121) (0.125) (0.129) (0.119) (0.122) (0.122)
Married -0.019 -0.008 0.002 -0.019 -0.008 -0.002
(0.110) (0.111) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) (0.111)
Secondary education -0.153 -0.142 -0.036 -0.164 -0.155 -0.158
(0.133) (0.145) (0.178) (0.122) (0.125) (0.126)
Employed -0.177 -0.179 -0.090 -0.186 -0.190 -0.191
(0.139) (0.146) (0.173) (0.129) (0.131) (0.131)
Income (log) -0.030 0.185* 0.304** -0.034 0.179* 0.257**
(0.062) (0.093) (0.103) (0.056) (0.085) (0.094)
Self-assessed health 0.105 0.122+ 0.109 0.105 0.122+ 0.114
(0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
Self-reported pain 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.216***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Chronic -0.352* -0.369** -0.336* -0.352* -0.369** -0.350*
(0.143) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
Income*IPInsurance -0.138 -0.350* -0.140 -0.355*
(continued) (0.125) (0.164) (0.125) (0.171)
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Table 7.7 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Country*IPInsurance 0.201 -3.349+ 0.203 -3.175+
(0.229) (1.790) (0.228) (1.848)
Country *Income -0.340** -0.492*** -0.339** -0.485***
(0.112) (0.128) (0.112) (0.132)
Country*Income*IPInsurance 0.472* 0.450+
(0.236) (0.244)
Constant -1.579*** -1.696*** -3.351*** -4.165*** -1.669*** -3.317*** -3.922***
(0.061) (0.492) (0.756) (0.781) (0.468) (0.714) (0.785)
Insured (inpatient)
Age 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.159+ 0.158+ 0.159+
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Secondary education 0.530*** 0.530*** 0.530***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Employed 0.446*** 0.446*** 0.443*** n/a
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Income (log) 0.240*** 0.241*** 0.243***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Country (l=Egypt, 0=Lebanon) -0.335*** -0.335*** -0.333***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Constant -2.996*** -2.996*** -3.013***
(0.379) (0.379) (0.382)
athrho
Constant 0.032 0.041 0.369
(continued) (0.185) (0.240) (0.418)
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Table 7.7 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, pooled model (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SB) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
p .0324401 .0411388 .3533874
N 1602 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382
11 -535.561 -1249.262 -1244.529 -1242.874 -420.918 -416.186 -414.649
chi2 122.336*** 323.619*** 329.177*** 369.667*** 140.757*** 152.173*** 151.581***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
Table 7.8 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, country models
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient
Insured (inpatient) 0.064 -0.459 -0.133 2.698* 0.279 -0.159 -0.008 2.817*
(0.630) (1.528) (0.194) (1.332) (0.176) (1.300) (0.147) (1.314)
Age 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male -0.249 -0.256 -0.375* -0.356+ -0.243 -0.250 -0.389* -0.368*
(0.171) (0.171) (0.167) (0.188) (0.171) (0.171) (0.166) (0.171)
Married 0.067 0.072 -0.050 -0.052 0.061 0.065 -0.050 -0.052
(0.165) (0.164) (0.157) (0.158) (0.164) (0.163) (0.158) (0.159)
Secondary education -0.075 -0.064 -0.168 -0.160 -0.155 -0.159 -0.183 -0.174
(0.297) (0.300) (0.168) (0.179) (0.189) (0.190) (0.170) (0.171)
Employed -0.210 -0.204 -0.152 -0.138 -0.257 -0.259 -0.167 -0.151
(continued) (0.213) (0.216) (0.179) (0.202) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.183)
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Table 7.8 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Income (log) -0.205* -0.223* 0.123 0.253* -0.212* -0.229* 0.110 0.242**
(0.091) (0.102) (0.078) (0.111) (0.086) (0.099) (0.078) (0.093)
Self-assessed health 0.171+ 0.168+ 0.057 0.052 0.171+ 0.169+ 0.057 0.052
(0.095) (0.095) (0.108) (0.108) (0.096) (0.095) (0.108) (0.108)
Self-reported pain 0.207* 0.208* 0.185* 0.195* 0.208* 0.209* 0.185* 0.195*
(0.082) (0.082) (0.077) (0.078) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077) (0.078)
Chronic -0.610** -0.602** -0.095 -0.075 -0.611** -0.604** -0.096 -0.075
(0.203) (0.204) (0.215) (0.215) (0.203) (0.205) (0.216) (0.216)
Income*IPInsurance 0.067 -0.361* 0.061 -0.362*
(0.179) (0.167) (0.179) (0.168)
Constant 0.348 0.468 -2.635*** -3.676*** 0.426 0.548 -2.558*** -3.608***
(0.718) (0.786) (0.689) (0.905) (0.658) (0.745) (0.689) (0.808)
Insured (inpatient)
Age 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Male -0.197 -0.197 0.283** 0.283**
(0.173) (0.173) (0.107) (0.107)
Secondary education 1.172*** 1.172*** 0.319*** 0.319***
(0.157) (0.157) (0.094) (0.094)
Employed 0.677*** 0.677*** 0.325** 0.325** n/a
(0.174) (0.174) (0.113) (0.113)
Income (log) 0.099 0.099 0.277*** 0.277***
(continued) (0.089) (0.089) (0.055) (0.055)
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Table 7.8 Probability of inpatient care over 1 month, country models (continued)
RECURSIVE PROBIT
EGYPT LEBANON EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Constant -2.852*** -2.854*** -3.092*** -3.091***
athrho
(0.695) (0.694) (0.451) (0.450)
Constant 0.125 0.148 0.077 0.068
P
(0.350)
0.124
(0.359)
0.147
(0.078)
0.077
(0.302)
0.068
chi2_c 0.127 0.171 0.986 0.051
N 461 461 921 921 461 461 921 921
11 -440.213 -440.150 -779.515 -777.426 -234.105 -234.053 -179.708 -177.611
chi2 141.411 142.434 85.652 89.460 48.099 47.739 17.645 25.063
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.009
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient
Country (l=Egypt, 0=Lebanon) -0.667 -0.395 3.019 2.414
(0.560) (0.502) (3.827) (5.596)
Insured (inpatient) 0.614-t- 6.067 5.324
(0.369) (4.688) (7.103)
Age -0.040** -0.041** -0.041**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Male -0.375 -0.296 -0.289
(0.488) (0.500) (0.503)
Married 1.527** 1.416** 1.408**
(0.507) (0.506) (0.508)
Secondary education -0.596 -0.560 -0.562
(0.538) (0.531) (0.529)
Employed -0.706 -0.519 -0.506
(0.520) (0.543) (0.548)
Income (log) -0.063 0.406 0.342
(0.302) (0.493) (0.592)
Self-assessed health -0.219 -0.208 -0.203
(0.273) (0.271) (0.278)
Self-reported pain 0.771** 0.795** 0.788**
(0.292) (0.268) (0.280)
Chronic -0.397 -0.289 -0.288
(0.524) (0.555) (0.555)
Income*IPInsurance -0.635
(0.574)
-0.540
(0.881)
Country*IPInsurance -1.258
(1.053)
0.028
(8.034)
Country*Income -0.377
(0.495)
-0.298
(0.728)
Country*Income*IPInsurance -0.172
(1.050)
Constant -16.714*** -17.132*** -21.504*** -21.767***
(0.436) (2.679) (3.968) (5.285)
Inalpha
Constant 17.654*** 17.676*** 17.960*** 18.712***
(0.039) (0.673) (0.968) (4.215)
N 198 165 165 165
U -207.018 -139.135 -138.282 -138.271
chi2 25.978** 36.110** 38.755***
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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Table 7.10 Intensity of inpatient care over 1 month, country models
EGYPT LEBANON
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Inpatient
Insured (inpatient) 0.437 7.581 1.987* 10.093
(0.588) (4.686) (0.840) (11.236)
Age -0.034* -0.034* -0.063* -0.077*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.033)
Male -0.057 0.369 -1.226 -1.154
(0.605) (0.550) (0.899) (0.909)
Married 1.132* 1.023+ 2.624** 2.855*
(0.569) (0.594) (1.017) (1.177)
Secondary education 0.022 0.066 -2.374* -2.079+
(0.664) (0.648) (1.133) (1.212)
Employed -0.497 -0.186 -0.754 -1.193
(0.604) (0.575) (1.537) (1.866)
Income (log) -0.270 -0.057 0.367 0.965
(0.360) (0.414) (0.686) (1.032)
Self-assessed health -0.019 0.032 -1.109 -1.177
(0.303) (0.314) (0.878) (0.946)
Self-reported pain 0.691* 0.723* 0.700 0.838
(0.327) (0.311) (0.636) (0.708)
Chronic -0.686 -0.616 1.461 2.065
(0.538) (0.535) (1.612) (1.805)
Income*IPInsurance
Constant -1.117
-1.006
(0.682)
-2.791 -18.377**
-1.048
(1.412)
-25.757**
(5.640) (4.747) (6.780) (8.391)
Inalpha
Constant 2.148 1.706 16.775*** 19.251***
(5.296) (4.169) (4.648) (2.144)
N 117 117 48 48
11 -92.894 -92.136 -41.976 -41.730
chi2 19.760 30.171 32.035 35.800
P 0.032 0.001 0.000 0.000
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 ***p < 0.001.
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7.4. Discussion: Effects of economic factors on hospital utilisation
7.4.1. Country effect
The ‘country effect’ represents unobservable factors for which data for this analysis, 
such as universal health care provision, the clinical causes behind seeking health care, 
the type of treatments received, cultural preferences, and other factors. The main 
assumption in this thesis was that clinical practice patterns and cultural preferences 
would largely be the same in the two countries. Hence, the ‘country effect’ may largely 
be explained by differences in access to free, publicly-financed and provided health 
care. Access to hospital care seems relatively income-neutral compared to outpatient 
care, and even pro-poor in some cases. The summary table for this chapter’s results 
shows this pattern, particularly for the probability of accessing care (Table 7.11). First, 
this analysis shows that whilst respondents in Egypt are more likely to be admitted than 
Lebanese counterparts, once admitted, they tend to report fewer subsequent admissions 
than in Lebanon. These results could suggest various phenomena regarding incentives 
to seek care, such as: (a) an overall greater opportunity to access services regardless of 
ability to pay and insurance status in Egypt, (b) a greater supplier-induced demand in 
Lebanon, or (c) a less efficient use of resources in Lebanon.
Whilst individuals may be less likely to be admitted due to a lack of affordability in 
Lebanon, once in the system, they appear to receive more intense services, possibly due 
to the incentives for supplier-induced demand for high-technology services inherent in a 
privately-financed and -provided system. Other possible explanations relate to the 
theory that a more efficient production of health outcomes arises as a result of greater 
awareness of illness, knowledge of lifestyle and health care effects, and the earlier use 
of preventive services. This notion may help to explain the lower probability of 
inpatient admissions in Lebanon, but not necessarily the higher intensity in Lebanon. If 
it is assumed that because a greater proportion of Lebanese respondents had a secondary 
education or higher than Egyptian respondents, it may also be assumed that Lebanese 
respondents tends to be able to produce health without visiting inpatient care as often.
However, these results are obtained after controlling for the effect of education, which 
indicates that the lower probability of admissions in Lebanon may not be due to 
knowledge and health behaviour, unless these are considered unobservable factors that 
are not necessarily captured in the education variable. Nonetheless, if this notion is 
true, then the intensity of services would also be lower in Lebanon; instead, the intensity
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is higher in Lebanon, controlling for all factors including educational level. Therefore, 
the country effect regarding probability is likely due to greater access to free care in 
Egypt, and the country effect regarding intensity is likely due to supplier behaviour in 
Lebanon.
Table 7.11 Summary of multivariate hospital results: income and insurance
Egypt Lebanon Country
Probabilitv Income Insurance Income
Insuranc
e
with greater 
use
Hospital outpatient (x) (x) X Egypt
Hospital inpatient - 12-mo. X (x) Lebanon
Hospital inpatient - 1-mo. (x) X X Egypt
Intensity
Hospital outpatient 
Hospital inpatient -1 -month 
recall
X (x)
X
Lebanon
ns
ns = differences are not statistically significant, (x) = difference is significant in favour of 
uninsured/lower-income. Intensity data not available for inpatient -  12 month.
7.4.2. Effect of income
The effect of income in Egypt depends on the recall period. In Egypt, neither insurance 
nor income played a significant role in determining the probability of inpatient 
admissions for twelve-month recall, but income is significant and negative for one- 
month recall. In Lebanon, income is positive determinant of inpatient hospital care, but 
somewhat reduces the likelihood of hospital outpatient care. In contrast, income 
increases the use of hospital outpatient care in Egypt. Since the range of hospital 
outpatient and inpatient services is vast, these results suggest that there are differences 
across income that may be related to preferences, the use of private or public providers, 
or reasons for using hospital-based care.
7.4.3. Effect of insurance
The effect of insurance in Lebanon depends on the recall period. It exerted a negative 
effect a twelve-month recall, but a positive effect over a one-month recall. Insurance is 
a positive factor in Lebanon determining the likelihood of using hospital outpatient 
units. Since the effect of insurance in Lebanon is typically positive, a one-month recall 
period may not be appropriate to measuring the use of inpatient health care services in 
Lebanon. In Egypt, insurance reduces intensity of hospital outpatient care. Since the 
majority of hospital outpatient care in Egypt is public, individuals with group insurance 
coverage may be substituting subsequent hospital care for private physician or inpatient
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care, as higher-quality, quasi-public and private providers levy co-payments which 
often covered by supplemental insurance.
7.4.4. Interaction between income and insurance
The one-month pooled model detected significant, negative interactions between 
country and income, country and insurance, and the triple interaction term 
simultaneously assessing the relationship between income and insurance by country. 
These results suggest that the effects of income and insurance are greater in Lebanon, 
and that the interaction between income and insurance differed by country, effects that 
are not detected in the twelve-month model. The interaction between income and 
insurance is only significant in Lebanon and only in the one-month model, negatively 
so. These results suggest that pooling the data tends to mask the unique direction and 
strength of the effects of and interactions between income and insurance in each 
country. Furthermore, the one-month recall models appear to be more sensitive at 
detecting effects and interactions than do the twelve-month models. Although some 
effects from the one-month models are statistically significant, they may not be 
significant in an economic sense since a longer recall period may be more appropriate 
for examining inpatient care.
7.4.5. Effects of other factors 
7.4 5.1. Health need
Overall, the effect of health need is prominent in hospital-based care, summarised in 
Table 7.12. The variables for health need are the only significant predictors of inpatient 
admission over 12 months in Egypt and have relatively large effects. In contrast, health 
need is not the only significant factor determining the probability of inpatient admission 
in Lebanon, with demographic factors and employment status also playing a role. 
Regarding the intensity of inpatient admissions, the coefficients of health need variables 
increase in magnitude considerably, particularly for pain. These findings support the 
principal-agency theory by showing that medical need plays a relatively larger role in 
the amount of care than in the probability. Even though the health need variables in 
Lebanon were not statistically significant for intensity, the effect of pain was noticeable. 
The effect of pain may be somewhat inflated, since subjective perceptions of health are 
thought to be influenced by clinical diagnoses. People in greater need of medical care 
may visit providers more frequently; but they are also more likely to report higher levels 
of illness because they visit health care providers often.
246
Table 7.12 Summary of multivariate hospital results: health need
Probabilitv of care
Self-
assessed
health
Pain Chronic
Health
Conditions
Hospital outpatient — X (LEB) X
Hospital inpatient - 12-month recall X X X
Hospital inpatient -1 -month recall X (x) (EGY)
Intensity of visits
Hospital ou^atient — X —
Hospital inpatient - 12-month recall n/a n/a n/a
Hospital inpatient - 1-month recall — x(EGY) —
X = Effect is statistically significant at 95% confidence level, (x) = effect has negative 
direction. — = not significant, n/a = not applicable. Intensity data were not 
collected for 12-month recall inpatient use.
7.4.5.2. Age
Age played a relatively minor role in the use of hospital care, although its effect was 
somewhat more pronounced in Egypt. The chances of seeking hospital outpatient care 
go up as a person grows older; but the frequency of inpatient admissions tends to go 
down with age. These results may be explained by considering the role of age in three 
ways. First, although older individuals may have less frequent admissions, they may be 
in hospital for longer periods of stay at a time due to unobservable health need. This 
has been observed in other research. Second, although the probability of having 
insurance coverage has been controlled for, the nature of insurance coverage has not 
been fully accounted for in the models. Amongst some pensioners who have insurance 
coverage, co-payment rates in plans for retirees or dependents may be higher for certain 
services than co-payment rates in other insurance schemes. This may deter pensioners 
from seeking health care. Finally, older individuals and their families may be less 
willing to be admitted to hospital and detached from social and familial connections, 
particularly in the Middle East.
7.4.5.3. Education
Education played a larger role in determining hospital utilisation in Lebanon than in 
Egypt. This finding is based on the significance and magnitude of the effects on the 
probability and intensity of use. In Lebanon, the lower the educational level, the more 
likely and the more frequent are hospital admissions, with the effect less pronounced in 
Egypt. The educational gap in health is particularly evident for frequency of
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admissions. Individuals who have relatively higher levels of education may be more 
efficient at producing health due to an inherently broader access to knowledge and 
information about health behaviour and preventative care. At the same time, the 
availability of public services evens out the playing field for different educational 
levels.
7.4.5.4. Employment status
In Lebanon, employment does not influence the probability of visiting hospital 
outpatient units nor is it a significant predictor of the frequency of outpatient visits. In 
Egypt, the employed tends to have less frequent visits as compared to their unemployed 
counterparts, all other factors being equal. The opportunity cost of seeking hospital 
care may be higher for the unemployed than the cost of visiting other providers such as 
physicians’ clinics and pharmacies. As shown in chapter six, employment status was 
not as great a factor for these services.
7.4.5.5. Gender and marital status
Females used hospital outpatient services more often than males in both countries. 
Marital status was mainly a factor in Lebanon, where marriage is associated with more 
frequent inpatient admissions. Marital status is an indicator of social capital, such as 
social and family networks. This may convey a similar effect as education in raising 
awareness of illness and financial and non-financial resources for obtaining care. The 
opportunity cost of delaying necessary care may be higher for married individuals who 
care for spouses or other family members, encouraging more use of health care amongst 
married people.
7.5. Chapter summary
This analysis shows that greater economic inequality was found in Lebanon for 
inpatient contact: and in Egypt, for inpatient intensitv and hospital outpatient contact. 
Insurance was a relatively bigger barrier to hospital outpatient contact than inpatient 
contact, which may explain why people in Lebanon are less likely to seek hospital 
outpatient care. The higher intensity of inpatient care in Lebanon may be a function of 
provider behaviour and incentives. In assessing the role of economic barriers to 
hospital care, other determinants should also be considered, such as the complex nature 
of acute health need, treatment patterns, social preferences, and incentives to seek 
certain services over others.
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Policy Implications
8.1. Review of Research Aims
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of economic status as indicated by 
income level and health insurance coverage on the use of health care services in two 
health systems. Two main hypotheses were examined in this thesis. The first 
hypothesis was that the influence of economic status on health care varies between both 
health systems in which the role of the state varies. The second hypothesis was that this 
effect depends on the type of health service. Since different forms of social exclusion 
may persist when income levels rise (Foucault, 1961; Dean, 2003; Sen, 2004), 
economic status was defined as income level as well as health insurance coverage. The 
research questions are shown in Table 8.1 for reference.
Table 8.1 Review of research questions
1. How are health need and out-of-pocket payments for health care distributed across 
income levels in different health financing systems?
2. What are the socioeconomic factors that determine the probability of being covered by 
social and private health insurance schemes?
3. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance coverage 
explain the use of various types of outpatient health services?
4. To what extent do economic factors such as income level and health insurance coverage 
explain the use of various types of hospital-based health services?
5. Based on the study findings regarding economic determinants of utilisation, what are the 
overall policy implications regarding the design of health financing systems towards the aim 
of alleviating disparities in access to health care?
6. For each of the research questions, how does the effect of income and insurance compare 
between Egypt and Lebanon and what are the specific policy implications for each of these 
two health systems?
8.2. Review of Methods
The research questions were examined through quantitative analysis. Household survey 
data on Egypt and Lebanon were obtained from the 2001 Multi-Country Survey Study.
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The study was conducted by the World Health Organization to measure health system 
responsiveness in several countries.
First, the correlation between income and health need was assessed in each country. 
Health need was primarily defined as: (i) self-assessed overall health; (ii) self-reported 
pain; and (iii) diagnosis of chronic health conditions. Three methods were used. The 
difference in ill health between the richest and poorest was compared. The 
concentration index was used to measure overall inequity. The concentration curve was 
used to understand how inequity compares between income groups. Health need was 
also explored by examining the correlation between income and health care use.
Similar methods as described above were used. Health care use was defined as the use 
of: (i) ‘any’ outpatient services, (ii) general practitioners, (ii) specialists, (iii) pharmacy 
care, (iv) hospital outpatient services and (iv) inpatient care.
Next, to understand the economic burden of health care use, two approaches were used. 
First, the correlation between income and health insurance coverage was evaluated. 
Insurance indicators include: (i) ‘any’ health insurance, (ii) outpatient insurance, (iii) 
inpatient insurance, and (iv) out-of-pocket payments to health care. Second, the impact 
of out-of-pocket payments on household economic status was assessed. The impact 
was measured by the frequency of catastrophic expenditures as well as the extent that 
out-of-pocket payments contribute to poverty levels.
Following these bivariate analyses, the effect of income and insurance was 
simultaneously examined in order to explain patterns of utilisation. First, the extent to 
which income determines the chances of having insurance was evaluated. Binary 
regression was used to this end. The three dependent variables were the three types of 
insurance coverage.
Independent variables included: (i) demographic factors, such as age, gender, marital 
status, employment, occupational type, and education; (ii) income; and (iii) health need. 
Next, the relative influence of economic status on access to health care was examined. 
This effect was assessed by simultaneously controlling for the effects of factors 
generally thought to influence the use of health care, as shown in the diagrammatic 
model of utilisation in chapters two and three (Anderson and Newman, 1973). These
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are: (i) predisposing factors, or the demographic factors mentioned above; (ii) enabling 
factors, or income and insurance; and (iii) health need.
The determinants of health care use were assessed through the use of binary and count- 
data regression models. The dependent variable was the use of different types of health 
services, with separate models developed for the health services described earlier. The 
independent variables were predisposing, enabling, and need factors. The probability of 
care and the frequency of visits were assessed. Results were compared across models to 
understand which services and which aspects of utilisation are influenced by income 
and health insurance.
8.3. Summary of main results
Overall, the thesis results validate the main hypothesis, but reveal a complex 
relationship between economic status and access to health care (Table 8.2). Economic 
status posed as less o f a barrier in Egypt, which has somewhat o f a solidarity-oriented 
health system with a universal safety net, than in Lebanon, which has a privately- 
oriented system; but only to an extent.
First, the association between income level and the utilisation o f health care was 
relatively weaker than the association between income level and health status, health 
insurance coverage, and out-of-pocket payments. Income-associated inequity in the 
probability of care was found in outpatient care in Egypt, and in inpatient care in 
Lebanon, based on the concentration index approach; and of the concentration index 
was larger regarding health status (Table 8.3).
Second, the factor that is most closely associated with being covered by group health 
insurance is governmental employment. The effect of government employment was 
especially apparent in Egypt. Education and income were also important determinants 
in both countries. Although more Lebanese had health insurance than did Egyptians, 
most respondents were not covered by insurance. Since governmental jobs are few and 
private health insurance is expensive, a system of health care that is much less 
dependent on market forces would be accessible to more people.
Third, economic status is more closely associated with outpatient care than with 
inpatient care. This conclusion is illustrated by the large effect of insurance on the
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probability of most outpatient services, including hospital outpatient, relative to that of 
inpatient care (Table 8.4 and Table 8.5). This is consistent with most of the literature 
that shows that income and insurance influence the use of preventative and outpatient 
services to a greater extent that of than acute, urgent services (Anderson and Benham, 
1970; Phelps, 1975; Ware et al, 1986; van Doorslaer, 1987; Dowd, 1991; Noro et al, 
1999; van Doorslaer, 2004).
Yet the direction of the effect depends on the type of outpatient service. The thesis 
found that low-income groups are more likely to use general practitioners, and 
occasionally hospital outpatient centres, than high-income groups. This finding is 
consistent with the literature regarding the use of general practitioners in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain (Lengerke et al, 2000; Morris et al, 2005; Gomez and 
Nicolas, 2007). General practitioners may be concentrated in poorer areas or may 
charge relatively lower user fees than other providers.
Similarly, perceptions of ill health may also have a larger effect on the use of outpatient 
care than on inpatient care. Self-reported pain was the prime health determinant for 
physician use. Chronic health conditions were more important for pharmacy care and 
hospital-based care. However, pain exerted a strong effect in the case of hospital-based 
care as it did with physician care. This may support the notion that the use of physician 
services and hospital-based care is correlated (Davis and Russell, 1972).
Fourth, health care use was found to be more closely associated with insurance than 
with income, particularly in Lebanon. Insurance was generally more important than 
income, given the size of the coefficients. Insurance also played a greater role in 
Lebanon than in Egypt for most health services. This was especially the case for 
physician, pharmacy, and hospital outpatient care. These results help to explain why 
the Lebanese were less likelv to use outpatient services than Egyptians, despite the 
Lebanese having a higher income.
The findings are consistent with those from other countries, which indicate that people 
are more likely to use health care in systems that are not heavily based on ability-to-pay 
(Newhouse, 1993; van Doorslaer et al, 2004; van Doorslaer et al, 2006). It also 
supports the notion that insurance is more beneficial to the worse-off (Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer, 2001; Jowett et al, 2003).
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Fifth, the relationship between economic status and utilisation dijfers between the 
probability and the intensity o f care. In Lebanon, income and insurance influenced the 
probability of care, but not necessarily the number of visits. The Lebanese case is an 
example of a market-based financing system. The few who can afford to contact the 
system do; amongst those individuals, intensity is largely determined by health need and 
providers’ choices. This pattern is similar to that found in other market-based systems 
(Anderson and Newhouse, 1973; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Santos Silva and 
Windmeijer, 2001).
By contrast, whilst economic factors matter relatively less in Egypt for the probability 
of use, economic status matters relatively more in Egypt for the intensity of care than in 
Lebanon. The Egyptian case is an example of a two-tiered system. Public services are 
made available, but many people seek care in the private sector. This may be explained 
by evidence that shows quality of care is perceived to be better in the private sector than 
in the public (Rannan-Eliya, 1999; Salem, 2002; World Bank, 2006).
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Table 8.2 Summary of concentration indices
Egypt Lebanon
Pro- Income Income Pro­
Door Neutral^ Pro-rich Pro-poor Neutral rich
Probabilitv of care
Any use of outpatient care X * X
General practitioners X 0
Specialists X X *
Pharmacists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient (12-month recall) X X
Hospital inpatient (1-month recall) 0 X
Intensity of visits
General practitioners X X
Specialists X X
Pharmacists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient (1-month recall) X X
Table 8.3 Summary of multivariate results; effect of income
Egypt Lebanon
Pro- Income Pro- Pro- Income Pro­
poor Neutral^ rich poor Neutral rich
Probability of care
Any use of outpatient care X X
General practitioners X X
Specialists X X
Pharmacists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient (12-month) X X
Hospital inpatient (1-month) X X
Intensity of visits
General practitioners X X
Specialists X X
Pharmacists X X
Hospital outpatient X X
Hospital inpatient ( 1 -month) X X
^ = Income neutral if coefficient not statistically significant at 95% confidence level.
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Table 8.4 Summary of multivariate results; effect of insurance
Egypt
Negative None Positive
Probabilitv of care
Any use of ouQ)atient care x 
General practitioners x 
Specialists x 
Pharmacists x
Lebanon 
Negative None Positive
X
X
X
X
Hospital outpatient x 
Hospital inpatient (12-month) x 
Hospital inpatient ( 1 -month) x
Intensity of visits
General practitioners x 
Specialists x 
Pharmacists x
X
X
X
X
X
X
Hospital ouq>atient x 
Hospital inpatient ( 1 -month) x
X
X
‘Negative’ means effect has a negative sign, indicating those with insurance coverage are less 
likely to use services. ‘Postive’ indicates insurance coverage increases likelihood of using 
services. ‘None’ if insurance coefficient is not statistically significant at 95% confidence 
level.
Table 8.5 Summary of main results
1. The use of health care is somewhat associated with income, but greater income-inequity 
exists in health need, health insurance and out-of-pocket payments.
2. The factors most closely associated with being covered by group health insurance are 
governmental employment, educational level, income level, and gender.
3. Economic status is more closely associated with outpatient care, particularly physician and 
hospital outpatient care, than with inpatient care,
4. Health care use is more closely associated with insurance than with income, particularly in 
Lebanon.
5. The relationship between economic status and utilisation differs between the probability 
and intensity of care.
8.4. Policy implications
Based on the main results, general and country-specific implications are drawn in this 
section (Table 8.6). Following the general implications, each of the countries is 
considered in turn.
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8.4.1. General policy implications
First, the nature o f health insurance coverage can lead to large differences in its effect 
on using services. This includes the probabilty and the intensity of health service 
utilisation. .Demand- and supply-side incentives to use outpatient care in particular 
should be considered carefully in policy-setting. This equally applies to other forms of 
‘insurance’, such as universal, public provision. Although comparisons of aggregate 
expenditures may suggest that the amount of public expenditure is similar between 
countries, the nature of expenditure is often more important (Castles, 2004).
Although the magnitude of inequity in Egypt was found to be less than in Lebanon, 
inequity in Egypt persists despite the existence of a universal social safety net for health 
care as represented by the national health service. This finding leads to questions 
regarding the whether the concentration of public resources on hospital care and in 
relatively well-off areas exacerbates inequity. These issues are common to other tax- 
based systems, such as the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, Portugal, 
Italy, Spain, and Greece (Le Grand, 1993; O’Donnell et al, 1993; Pereira and Pinto, 
1993; Morris et al, 2005; Lopez-Casasnovas, 2007). This highlights that it is not just 
sufficient for the state to spend. It is equally if not more important to spend 
appropriately.
Second, the utilisation o f health care amongst the worst-off citizens should be addressed 
in order to improve overall equality in health care. This research found that the degree 
of inequity in health care was driven by patterns amongst the poorest 20% in Lebanon 
and the poorest 40% in Egypt. The findings on inequity in ill health and out-of-pocket 
payments are consistent with those from other studies on Egypt and Lebanon (Jurjus, 
1995; Ellis et al, 1994; Rannan-Eliya, 1999; Nandakumar et al, 2000). They are also 
consistent with findings from other countries (Deaton, 2002; Muennig et al, 2005; Ross 
et al, 2006; Hemandez-Quevedo et al, 2006), including the concentration of inequity 
amongst the lowest-income groups (Gottschalk and Wolfe, 1993).
Therefore, health insurance schemes and service delivery systems should prioritise the 
needs of those at the lowest-ends of the income ladder. Eligibility criteria for risk- 
pooling schemes are central. Lower-income groups tend to face a higher burden of out- 
of-pocket payments. They are more likely to be pushed further into poverty as a result
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of using health care. Yet insurance coverage tends to be more concentrated amongst the 
well off, which only exacerbates inequity.
Although social values play a part in shaping criteria, nonetheless, the most vulnerable 
should at the very least be relieved of economic burdens associated with care. Because 
the must vulnerable pay for health care does not mean they can ‘afford’ the costs; costs 
extend beyond financial consequences (Russell, 1996). They include opportunity costs 
such as foregoing essential necessities, selling assets, reshuffling family labour 
arrangements, and delaying other health care needs. These consequences have been 
observed in many societies (Russell, 1996; Segall et al, 2002; Russell, 2005). This 
evidence shows that ‘affordabilty’, ‘ability-to-pay’ and ‘willingness-to-pay’ are not 
synonymous. Providing protection from unforeseen health and economic consequences 
should reduce the likelihood that people delay necessary care, which leads to a vicious 
cycle of ill health and poverty.
Third, the role o f State-funded, comprehensive social safety nets fo r health care may 
partially explain why the effect o f income and insurance are relatively smaller in Egypt 
than in Lebanon, particularly fo r outpatient care. Because social safety nets are 
relatively more comprehensive in Egypt, people may be more encouraged to seek care 
when needed regardless of ability to pay or enrolment in health insurance schemes other 
than the national health service system. Although certain types of health care financing 
may not alleviate income inequality per se, universal social safety nets, for example, 
provide a means of alleviating health care inequality for those who are otherwise 
unequal based on income. At the same time, a number of other factors may have 
explained the difference in the effects of income and insurance, such as differences 
between countries regarding the quality of service delivery; the nature and distribution 
of the supply of health services and providers; and social beliefs about curative versus 
preventative care. In this thesis, it was assumed that differences in access to different 
types of services and levels of quality were captured in the ‘income’ and ‘insurance’ 
variables, or in the error terms for each model, since separate indicators for health care 
supply were not available and are likely acting through socioeconomic and 
unobservable factors in each country.
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8.4.2. Implications for Egypt
Several implications arising from the differential effect of income and health insurance 
on the use of various health services in Egypt arise. First, poorer groups tended to have 
a higher probability of inpatient care and intensity of pharmacy visits, and a lower 
probability and intensity of physician care and intensity of hospital outpatient care. The 
implication is that poorer groups are deferring to inpatient and pharmacist care, whilst 
richer groups have greater access to physician and hospital outpatient care. These 
findings imply that poorer groups may be unable to pay for outpatient physician 
services, instead opting to go directly to hospital inpatient care or pharmacies. Since 
hospital inpatient care in Egypt is dominated by the public sector with relatively low 
fees at the point of use, and outpatient care by the private sector funded through direct, 
out-of-pocket payments, increasing the role of the state in financing outpatient services 
which meet the preferences of citizens in Egypt will likely alleviate outpatient 
inequities.
Second, health insurance coverage in Egypt tended to increase the probability of most 
outpatient health services, with no impact found regarding inpatient care. This finding 
suggests that health insurance coverage in Egypt is used mainly to gain access to non­
governmental health services, which are free regardless of insurance coverage. It also 
suggests that health insurance plays a relatively minor role, on aggregate, in access to 
hospital inpatient care. These observations imply that even fo r those at the same income 
level, incentives provided through health insurance to utilise outpatient health services 
should be expanded to those without health insurance coverage.
Third, amongst people who visited outpatient health services, the intensity of specialist 
and hospital outpatient facilities is greater for those without insurance than for those 
with insurance. Insurance did not affect the intensity of inpatient utilisation. These 
finding may seem counterintuitive, since it is assumed that due to moral hazard, 
insurance would increase the overall utilisation of health services due to a reduction in 
the price sensitivity of potential consumers of health care. Since insurance reduces the 
intensity o f outpatient use in Egypt, these results imply that those with health insurance 
may be utilising more effective providers o f health care, thus reducing the number o f  
visits amongst those with insurance coverage.
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The Egyptian health system has an important yet under-resourced asset, a universal 
system of health care provision, which has operated in parallel to several fragmented 
insurance schemes. Recent governmental proposals have called for the expansion of 
social health insurance schemes, although the introduction of social health insurance 
thus far has not been found to have improved overall equity, with the exception of 
equity amongst middle-income groups (Rannan-Eliya, 1999; Yip and Berman, 2001. 
Many of the conditions necessary for an equitable social health insurance system to 
function are lacking in Egypt. These include a large formal employment sector, 
substantial premium rates, well regulated and high-quality service providers, a clear 
separation of purchasers and providers, and well-defined fee structures.
Even in countries where these conditions are met, societies with health insurance-based 
systems struggle to maintain equity, suggesting that more investment in Egypt’s public 
outpatient facilities in recommended. This is due to concerns with insurance-based 
systems such as: (i) cost-escalation and inefficiency associated with administrative 
costs and supplier-induced demand, forcing payers to ration care; (ii) implicit or explicit 
risk selection on the part of insurers; and (iii) discrepancies in benefits covered by 
different schemes (Abel-Smith, 1994; van Doorslaer et al, 2004; Mossialos and 
Thompson, 2007). Given the relative lack of economic barriers to inpatient care in 
Egypt, replicating this success with outpatient health services in Egypt will likely 
alleviate economic inequality in health care.
8.4.3. Implications for Lebanon
In neighbouring Lebanon, the probability of accessing health services, particularly 
outpatient physician care, was lower than in Egypt, all else held equal. Combined with 
the remainder of the findings, the main policy implications for the Lebanese health 
system revolve around reducing economic barriers to health care in general, such as low 
income and lack of health insurance, particularly the probability of care.
First, the low levels of outpatient use in general should be addressed. This thesis 
showed that Lebanese individuals who have health insurance coverage, who account for 
only half of the population, use outpatient services more often than their un-insured 
counterparts. Since outpatient services are perceived to be relatively discretionary, they
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are a classic example of market failure in Lebanon in which intervention by the state 
may alleviate the mal-distribution of access to health services. Currently, the Lebanese 
health system spends relatively little on preventative care by international comparisons. 
These cost-effective services are important to preventing serious illness and the need for 
complex and expensive treatment. These results imply that incentives to utilise 
outpatient services for non-insured individuals should be improved.
Second, this thesis found that economic hurdles to the probability of inpatient care for 
the lowest-income groups exist in Lebanon, regardless of insurance status. Higher- 
income groups had a higher likelihood of inpatient admissions, whilst lower-income 
groups had a higher likelihood of hospital outpatient services. On the one hand, lower- 
income groups may be unable to afford inpatient health care, since the social safety net 
system in Lebanon is not universal and reserved for the most urgent or dire situations. 
On the other hand, higher-income groups may be unwilling to utilise outpatient 
services. These results imply that there may be a substitution effect between outpatient 
and inpatient hospital services in general, which may be resolved through improved 
incentives or better social safety nets to receive the type o f care required.
Third, neither income nor insurance tended to play a role in Lebanon regarding the 
intensity of health service utilisation. Amongst those who were able to access services 
at least once in Lebanon, the findings suggested that health need is the most important 
determinant of the number of visits to health care providers, as expected based on a 
principal-agency framework regarding the utilisation and frequency of health care 
utilisation. These results imply that in Lebanon, inequity in health care is driven largely 
by inequities in the probability o f using services, not the amount o f health care received 
per person. Policy efforts should therefore focus on broadening the ‘reach', not the 
‘depth', o f health care services in Lebanon.
Lebanon is a country that spends nearly the highest percentage of its national product on 
health care in the world; yet has relatively lower levels of access to care and health 
outcomes than expected. The country’s largest social health insurance scheme also 
faces a risk of bankruptcy and reports indicate that hospitals have refused to provide 
health care for patients covered by the scheme (World Bank, 2007b; Challita, 2007).
The price of medical care has been inflating more rapidly than in most other countries 
(World Bank, 2000; Ammar, 2003). Charitable organisations and international donors
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also play a large part in providing care for some of the poorest regions in the country, 
particularly South Lebanon and areas with large refugee communities (Abyad, 1994; 
World Bank, 2000; Ammar, 2003). Overall, the current system is neither sustainable 
nor equitable. Reducing economic barriers related to income and insurance will help to 
increase the likelihood of accessing outpatient and inpatient care in Lebanon.
Table 8.6 Summary of policy implications___________________________________
1. The utilisation of health care amongst the worst-off citizens should, at a minimum, be 
addressed in order to improve overall equity in health care.
2. The role of social safety nets may partially explain why Egyptians are more likely to 
access health care than Lebanese, particularly outpatient care.
3. In Egypt, improving inequity in the intensity and nature of health service utilisation 
may alleviate inequity to an extent, particularly regarding physician outpatient care.
4. Inequity in the Lebanese system may be alleviated to an extent by ensuring more people 
are able to utilise services, particularly the probability of inpatient and outpatient health 
care alike.
8.5. Strengths and limitations of the thesis
This thesis provides evidence on the economic determinants of health care use from two 
countries on which relatively little evidence is available, despite limitations described 
below. First, a cross-national design was useful in testing the role of factors in different 
contexts. Second, the evaluation of different health care services is beneficial to 
understanding whether results can be generalised. Third, the combination of 
quantitative methods improves the validity of conclusions. These methods include: (i) 
pooled versus separate country analyses; (ii) descriptive versus multivariate techniques; 
and (iii) different multivariate approaches. Fourth, to the author’s knowledge, the data 
from the Multi-Country Survey Study have not been used before to empirically compare 
Egypt and Lebanon. Fifth, the use of data from a single source is more rehable than 
from multiple sources in comparative studies. Lastly, since the data are relatively 
recent, the thesis evidence is applicable to current policy debate.
The thesis has various limitations to keep in mind when interpreting results. Many are 
often encountered in similar research. Cross-sectional data were used to infer causal 
relationships to the extent possible. However, longitudinal data are needed to establish 
causal relationships. The use of recognised econometric techniques in this thesis helped 
to overcome this limitation. Qualitative research would have also been useful for a
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detailed understanding how families cope with health care costs in different contexts. 
Collinearity between the independent variables may bias results. In particular, 
collinearity was important to consider between income, educational status, and 
employment; and between health need indicators. However, collinearity in this thesis 
does not appear to be a significant problem, since results were stable for different 
combinations of variables.
Some of the information on dependent variables was limited. Information that would 
have been useful is: (i) the sector where health care was sought, whether public or 
private; (ii) the underlying medical cause of the visit; (iii) the severity of the medical 
cause; (iv) the kind of the treatment received; (v) and the price of care to the 
beneficiary, or amount of out-of-pocket payments paid per visit, per person. Although 
not necessarily crucial to the thesis, it was not possible to make a detailed assessment of 
household health expenditures. This was due to a lack of information on total and 
itemised household expenditures. This includes a lack of data on out-of-pocket 
payments for health services such as: (i) inpatient service; (ii) outpatient service; (iii) 
preventative care; (iv) acute care; (v) tertiary or rehabilitative care; (vi) laboratory and 
diagnostic procedures; (vii) surgical treatment; and (viii) non-physician health care 
providers, such as nurses and therapists.
Data on hospital length of stay and intensity data over a long period of time were not 
available. This would have permitted more understanding of the intensity of care. This 
is because the effect of economic status may differ for the length-of-stay versus the 
number-of-admissions. For example, in tax-based systems with capitated provider 
payments, there may be an incentive to increase the number of visits, whilst reducing 
the length of stay. In systems financed by bundled payments or diagnostic-related 
groups in a retrospective, private reimbursement scheme, there may be an incentive for 
more frequent visits, but even shorter stays. In private, fee-for-service schemes, there 
may be an incentive for less frequent visits, but longer lengths of stay; and so on.
Another limitation is the lack of information on whether the number of visits to health 
care providers was related to the same underlying or initial medical need, or whether 
they were due to different medical needs. This affects how the regression results are 
interpreted. If the visits are not related to the same need, then it may be difficult to 
assume that the intensity results represent the intensity of ‘subsequent’ care. Instead,
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the intensity results may be describing the intensity of ‘all care’ in general. This 
suggests that the principal-agency theory is still valid. It may explain why some people 
have more health care visits than others in general, irrespective of whether they are for 
the same illness or not. Providers (agency) may be influencing those who do seek care 
by increasing the chances that they will seek care/or other illnesses when they occur. 
People may be less likely to consider their economic status in these cases since they 
may be more risk-averse than those who do not seek care.
The data with which to measure income level were limited. In this thesis, reported 
income was used. This may not adequately capture income level due to recall bias and 
respondent reluctance to provide accurate figures. If different income groups behave 
the same way, then the relative income differences do not change, and it makes little 
difference whether there is bias or not. Otherwise, it matters. Since it can be difficult to 
readily confirm this, household consumption expenditure or permanent asset indicators 
can be used instead. They have been shown to be more reliable in some cases than the 
use of reported income. This depends on the type of questions asked. Given the 
relatively large effect of insurance and the minor effect of income, it seems unlikely that 
the use of expenditure data would change results substantially. Although debate is also 
found regarding the handling of missing data, standard univariate imputation techniques 
were adopted to calculate missing income for approximately 20-30% of the sample.
The resulting estimates were consistent with the observed values and with published 
literature.
The meaning of explanatory factors may vary across countries. This may bias results 
(Nord, 2002). This thesis used two relatively similar countries, which increases the 
comparability of variable meanings (Lahelma et al, 1994; Lahelma, 2002; Gusmano et 
al, 2007). In addition, self-assessment of health is generally thought to be sensitive to 
cross-cultural differences in interpretation (King et al, 2003). Egypt and Lebanon are 
considered culturally similar regarding the sick role (Gallagher, 2001; Adib, 2004). 
Although bias may still exist, it is considered relatively low.
Bias arising from endogeneity of explanatory variables can be a problem. In particular, 
endogeneity of the health insurance variable was mainly relevant in this thesis. This 
was tested in the pooled and country-specific analyses, using the recursive bivariate 
probit model. Results show that endogeneity is usually not a significant problem. Since
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one-fifth of Lebanese households have private health insurance (Anunar, 2003), it 
makes sense that endogeneity was occasionally found there. Estimates were corrected 
where this was the case. Based on these findings, endogeneity in the count data was not 
considered to be a significant problem.
Therefore, standard techniques such as the zero-truncated and zero-inflated models 
were considered valid. Analytic techniques for endogeneity in count data that exist are 
generally data-intensive, such as the instrumental variables approach (Windmeijer and 
Santos Silva, 1997; Terza, 1998; Kenkel and Terza, 2001; Terza et al, 2008a; Terza et 
al, 2008b). Information in the survey was insufficient to create such variables. They 
should be factors that determine health insurance, but not utilisation. A general 
household survey may be more useful for this approach. This is applicable to countries 
where voluntary, private health insurance is widespread.
There were some instances in the thesis in which results from different count regression 
models were not the same. For example, the effects of income and insurance may have 
been statistically significant in one model, but not in the other. The differences could 
be explained in two ways. First, the sample size in the zero-truncated model is smaller 
and includes both ‘zero’ and ‘non-zero’ counts. There may be more non-zero users 
(‘potential’ users) than actual users in the sample. This means the model may mix the 
probability and intensity of care for some observations. Income and insurance generally 
play a bigger role in the probability of care.
Second, the zero-inflated model is preferred over the hurdle model in the case of 
inpatient care, which makes sense. The zero-inflated model does not separate the 
decision to seek care from the decision of how much subsequent care to use. For 
inpatient care, the decision to be admitted and how much care to receive is very closely 
tied, since the health need is usually acute and urgent. In contrast, the decision to seek 
outpatient care and how much to receive may be relatively more disconnected. This is 
based on the theory of principal-agency, which considers the initial choice of seeking 
care as driven by the patient, whilst subsequent care depends on provider behaviour. As 
such, the determinants of the first decision are based on need as well as enabling and 
predisposing factors, whilst the second decision is based largely on need. Although the 
results show that this is model is generally true for outpatient care, this may not be the 
case for inpatient care.
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The choice between the hurdle model tested in this thesis and the zero-inflated negative 
binomial model may not make a difference in the case of cross-sectional, health care 
data, where there is not always an opportunity to identify the first and subsequent visits 
for a single spell of illness. The choice may also make little difference in the case of 
datasets that are relatively ‘small’, i.e., containing less than several thousand 
observations. Future research may help to address these methodological limitations.
8.6. Theoretical and methodological implications
From a theoretical perspective, two main lessons arise, which are summarised in Table
8.7. Measures of social stratification other than income may be more relevant for 
identifying economic inequalities in health care in certain contexts. The regression 
approach revealed greater inequality than the concentration index approach. The effects 
of insurance and income also tended to increase after including other variables and the 
interaction effects. In some contexts, health insurance status, educational level, 
occupation, and indicators of social capital or social exclusion might better represent 
social status.
This research also proposes an alternative way of classifying the determinants of health 
care use as either principal or mediating factors, with economic status an example of a 
mediator. The demand for health care arises because of a medical need {principal 
determinant), but the process of obtaining care may be affected by economic status 
{mediator).
This approach builds on the theoretical models developed by Grossman (1972), 
Anderson (1975), and others, which represents an avenue for future research.
Mediating factors such as insurance status, income level, educational level, occupation, 
and the health financing system represent factors that are both influential and potentially 
modifiable in the near-term.
Regarding methodological implications, this thesis proposes several areas that may help 
to address some of the limitations that were encountered. To gauge the relative effect of 
health financing-related factors as compared to other factors such as supply-side 
characteristics, it is important to accurately control for coverage by and the nature of 
different types of health insurance, social safety nets, and supply-side factors over time.
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Longitudinal quantitative evaluations, together with qualitative measures, would help to 
elucidate the causal relationship and the impact of health care financing schemes on 
household utilisation of health services. The comparison of multivariate techniques in 
thesis showed that the hurdle regression and latent class models perform similarly in the 
case of cross-sectional data, but it would be useful to evaluate if this is the case when 
using longitudinal data. This type of comparison will help confirm whether the 
conclusions regarding the probability and intensity of care in Egypt and Lebanon are 
valid over the long run.
Table 8.7 Summary of methodological implications
1. Measures of social stratification other than income may be more relevant for 
identifying economic inequalities in health care in certain contexts, such as health 
insurance status, educational level, and occupation.
2. This research proposes an alternative way of classifying the determinants of health 
care use as either principal or mediating factors, with economic status an example 
of a mediator.
3. Longitudinal and qualitative research will help confirm whether the conclusions of 
the thesis are valid over the long run regarding the probability and intensity of 
care; and the long-term impact of health financing arrangements on households.
8.7. Implications for future research
The role of economic status in health care may depend on other factors that were 
outside the scope of this thesis. These include the quality of care; the nature and 
distribution of supply; and social beliefs about curative versus preventative care. 
Specifically, how do income and insurance affect the use of private versus public 
services? How does the amount of user fees charged influence the use of different 
services? Does the effect of income vary if other indicators for income are used, such 
as expenditure or assets? Finally, how do the effects of economic factors compare 
across gender and a country’s geography? Informing these questions will help further 
in the design of effective health financing policies.
8.8. Thesis Conclusions
Overall, this thesis provides evidence on the way that economic status affects the use of 
health care in different financing systems. The research has lent support to the notion
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that ‘equality of status is more important than equality of income’ (Marshall, 1950). 
Whilst a number of other factors should be considered to improve equity, this thesis has 
illustrated the importance of coherent, state-led health financing policy in three ways. 
First, it has shown that health care coverage systems that rely on risk-pooling are 
associated with greater access to services, particularly for the worse-off. Income status 
may increase the intensity of care once contact has been made. Second, it has indicated 
that improving equity in outpatient care can go a long way towards improving overall 
equity, assuming that this care meets medical needs. Finally, this thesis provides 
comparative evidence from Egypt and Lebanon that highlights the importance of 
comprehensive health financing policy in alleviating economic barriers towards 
accessing health care.
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Appendix
Chapter 3: Methods
A. Currency conversion and inflation factors
Egypt Lebanon
Official exchange rate, 2001 (local currency units to $) (1) 
Purchasing pow er parity (? ? ? )  conversion factor, 2001 (local 
currency units to international $) (1)
Alternative ? ? ?  conversion factor, 2001 (local currency units 
to international $) (2)
Consum er price index, 1993 (3)
Consum er price index, 2001 (3)
Adult equivalence adjustm ent factor (calculated)
3.97 LE* 
1 . 1 1
1.4
67.99
102.22
2.9
1507.50 LL* 
986.79
1579.4
310.31
97.0
2 j#
*Note: LE = Egyptian Pound. LL = Lebanese Lira. Sources: 1. Heston et al, 2006. 2. 
United Nations Statistics Division, 2007a. 3. United Nations Statistics Division, 
2007b.
B. Multicollinearity: Variance inflation factor test (VIF)
The following tables show the degree of collinearity amongst independent variables for 
regression models by country. For individual variables, VIE values greater than 1 show 
a high degree of collinearity with other variables; for overall model, VIF values greater 
than 10 show a high degree of collinearity. Shown below: VIF = regression model type 
(i.e., probit) + dependent variable (i.e., any care) + independent variables + country 
filter (i.e., if country = EGY).
1. VIF: probit anycare anyins age male 
married educlev emplyd loginc_allim p sah 
pain chronic_l if  country== EGYPT 
("EGY")
Variable | VIF 1/VIF Variable 1 VIF 1/VIF
loginc_all~p | 20.11 0.049725 loginc_all~p | 18.62 0.053693
age | 12.14 0.082362 sah 1 12.22 0.081833
sah 1 10.89 0.091836 age 1 10.78 0.092762
pain 1 8.55 0.117019 pain 1 6.91 0.144799
married 1 3.97 0.251833 chronic_l 1 3.53 0.283232
male | 3.59 0.278200 married | 2.96 0.337346
chronic_l | 3.25 0.307525 male | 2.94 0.340232
emplyd | 3.09 0.323259 educlev | 2.87 0.348932
educlev | 2.46 0.405923 emplyd | 2.67 0.374909
anyins 1 2.02 0.494907 anyins | 2.07 0.483074
Mean VIF | 7.01 Mean VIF | 6.56
2. VIF: probit anycare anyins age male
married educlev em plyd loginc_allim p sah 
pain chronic_ l if country== LEBA NO N  
("LB N ”)
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3. V IF probit anycare anyins loginc_allim p if 
country=="EG Y"
Variable | VIF 1/VIF Variable I VIF 1/VIF
anyins I 
loginc_all~p |
1.53
1.53
0.651493
0.651493
anyins | 
loginc_all~p |
1.98
1.98
0.505977
0.505977
Mean VIF | 1.53 Mean VIF | 1.98
5. VIF: probit anycare anyins em plyd if 6. VIF: probit anycare anyins emplyd if
country==" EGY" country==" LBN"
Variable | VIF 1/VIF Variable I VIF 1/VIF
anyins | 1.48 0.674553 anyins I 1.33 0.752941
emplyd | 1.48 0.674553 emplyd I 1.33 0.752941
Mean VIF | 1.48 Mean VIF | 1.33
4. VIF: probit anycare anyins loginc_alIim p 
if country=="LB N ”
7. VIF: anycare loginc_allim p emplyd if 
country=="EG Y ”
8. VIE: probit anycare loginc_allim p em plyd 
if country=="LBN "
Variable 1 VIF 1/VIF Variable | VIF 1/VIF
emplyd 1 1.81 0.551982 emplyd | 1.79 0.559266
loginc_all~p 1 1.81 0.551982 loginc_all~p | 1.79 0.559266
Mean VIF 1 1.81 Mean VIF | 1.79
9. VIF: probit anycare loginc_allim p educlev 10. VIF: probit anycare loginc_allim p educlev
if  country:=="EGY” if country=:="LBN"
Variable 1 VIF 1/VIF Variable I VIF 1/VIF
educlev 1 1.74 0.575002 educlev I 2.30 0.434381
loginc_all~p 1 1.74 0.575002 loginc_all~p I 2.30 0.434381
Mean VIF 1 1.74 Mean VIF | 2.30
11. VIF: probit outpt op_ins age male married 12. VIF: probit outpt op_ins age male m arried
educlev emplyd loginc_allim p sah pain educlev emplyd loginc_allim p sah pain
chronic_l if  country== "EGY” chronic_l if  country== "LBN ”
Variable 1 VIF 1/VIF Variable | VIF 1/VIF
loginc_all~p 1 20.13 0.049677 loginc_all~p I 18.21 0.054905
age 1 11.99 0.083418 sah 1 12.18 0.082079
sah 1 10.87 0.091964 age I 10.75 0.093029
pain 1 8.54 0.117132 pain 1 6.94 0 .144077
married 1 3.98 0.251431 chronic_l I 3.52 0.283711
male 1 3.58 0.279232 married | 2.95 0.339004
chronic_l 1 3.24 0.308380 maie I 2.93 0.341105
emplyd 1 3.06 0.326481 educlev | 2.85 0.350989
educlev 1 2.35 0.424926 emplyd I 2.67 0.375097
op_ins 1 1.65 0.605996 op_ins 1 1.61 0.622715
Mean VIF 1 6.94 Mean VIF | 6.46
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13. VIF: probit inpt ip_ins age male married 
educlev emplyd loginc_allim p sah pain 
chronic_l if  country=="EG Y ”
Variable
loginc_all~p
age
sah
pain
married
male
chronic_l
emplyd
educlev
ip_ins
Mean VIF
20.32
1 2 . 2 0
10 .87 
8 .54
,98
.57
.24
.13
.43
.82
7.01
1/VIF
0.049206
0.081985
0.091966
0.117139
0.251219
0.280151
0.308375
0.319372
0.411623
0.549885
14. VIF: probit inpt ip_ins age m ale married 
educlev emplyd loginc_allim p sah pain 
chronic_l if country=="LB N ”
Variable |
loginc_all~p
sah
age
pain
chronic_l
married
male
educlev
emplyd
ip_ins
VIF
18.49
12.24
10.78
2 . 6 6
2.04
1/VIF
0.054075
0.081683
0.092744
0.144078
0.283744
0.339497
0.341252
0.347859
0.375608
0.491197
Mean VIF | 6.54
C. Estimation results for ‘Any Care'
1. Estimation Results for 'Any Care': RECURSIVE BIVARIATE PROBIT MODEL
Model 1 , Egypt Model 2, Egypt Model 1, Lebanon Model 2, Lebanon
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Any Care
Insured (any care) -0.380 -0.338 -1.366*** -1.851*
(0.394) (0.725) (0.112) (0.366)
Age 0.008* 0.008* -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.206*** 0.201*
(0.072) (0.073) (0.060) (0.059)
Marital status 0.154** 0.154** 0.157*** 0.156*
(0.054) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046)
Educational level 0.350* 0.348* 0.227*** 0.231*
(0.148) (0.154) (0.059) (0.059)
Employment status 0 .141 0.140 0.006 0.004
(0.088) (0.091) (0.064) (0.063)
Log of annual incomeO.008 0.009 0.156*** 0.130*
(0.043) (0.048) (0.030) (0.037)
Self-assessed healthO.216 * * * 0.216*** 0.244*** 0.242*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
Self-reported pain 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.286*** 0.283*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.034)
Chronic health con- s i .402*** 1.403*** 0.359*** 0.357*
(0.064) (0.065) (0.057) (0.055)
Income*AnyInsurance1-0.005 0.061
(0.068) (0.045)
Constant -1.968*** -1.977*** -2.250*** -2.033*
(0.324) (0.360) (0.247) (0.298)
Insured (any care) 
Age 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.304*** -0.304*** 0.219*** 0.219***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060)
Educational level 1.172*** 1.172*** 0.451*** 0.450***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055)
Employment status 0.545*** 0.545*** 0.274*** 0.274***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
Log of annual incomeO.235*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.234***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant -3.754*** -3.754*** -2.652*** -2.662***
(0.258) (0.258) (0.277) (0.278)
athrho
Constant 0.253 0.249 1.207*** 1.238***
(0.245) (0.255) (0.250) (0.250)
N 4116 4116 2732 2732
11 -3831.811 -3831.809 -3219.728 -3218.842
chi2 2402.767*** 2401.550*** 1727.853*** 1746.773***
rho 0 . 248*** 0.244*** 0.836*** 0.845***
2. Estimation results for 'Any Care': PROBIT MODEL
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Model 1, Egypt Model 2,
Coeff. (SE)
Egypt Model 1, Lebanon Model 2, Lebanon
Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE)
Insured (any care) 0 
( 0
Age 0
( 0  
0 
( 0 
0 
( 0  
0 
( 0 
0 
( 0
Male
Marital status 
Educational level 
Employment status
Log of annual income- 
(
Self-assessed healthO 
( 0
Self-reported pain 0 
( 0
Chronic health con~sl 
( 0
Income*AnyInsurance
.043
.059)
.005**
.0 0 2 )
.310**’
.063)
.148**
.054)
.199**’
.057)
.070
.063)
0 . 0 2 0
0.033)
.219**’
.038)
.239**’
.042)
.424**’
.051)
Constant
N
11
chi2
-1.736***
(0.259)
4116
-1844.649
1410.614***
0 . 2 2 2
(0.488)
0.005**
( 0 . 0 0 2 )
0.311***
(0.063)
0.147**
(0.054)
0 . 2 0 0 * * *
(0.057)
0.069
(0.063)
- 0 . 0 1 1
(0.044)
0.219***
(0.038)
0.239***
(0.042)
1.424***
(0.051)
-0.025
(0.066)
-1.800***
(0.330)
4116
-1844.584
1410.318***
-0.058
(0.055)
-0.006*'
( 0 . 0 0 2 )
0.142*
(0.067)
0.215*'
(0.059)
-0.015
(0.061)
-0.167*
(0.068)
0.052
(0.032)
0.315*'
(0.043)
0.378*'
(0.036)
0.488*'
(0.065)
- 2 . 1 0 2 * * *
(0.279)
2732 
-1431.534 
659.188***
-0.543
(0.487)
-0.006** 
( 0 . 0 0 2 )
0.138* 
(0.068) 
0.215*** 
(0.059) 
-0.015 
(0.061) 
-0.171* 
(0.068) 
0.024 
(0.044) 
0.315*** 
(0.043) 
0.377*** 
(0.036)
0 . 488*** 
(0.065) 
0.062 
(0.062) 
-1.885*** 
(0.361)
2732
-1431.024
657.250***
Chayters 3 and 6:
D. Stata output for outpatient regression models
T h e  fo llo w in g  tab le s  show  ex am p le s  o f  the all reg ress io n  o u tp u t in th is  th e s is , u s in g  th e  
case  o f  O u tp a tien t P ro b ab ility , 12 -m onth  reca ll, by  coun try , in c lu d in g  recu rs iv e  
b iv a ria te  p ro b it m odel (all v e rs io n s) and  p ro b it m odel (all v e rs ions).
1. RECtJRSIVE, MODEL 1 (MAIN EFFECTS), "EGY"
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3834.591
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(15)
Prob > chi2
4133
2159.84
0.0000
1
1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
outpt 1
op_ins 1 -.1931162 .5476893 -0.35 0.724 -1.266568 .8803351
age 1 .0061241 .003398 1.80 0.072 -.0005359 .0127841
male 1 .299472 .0694694 4.31 0.000 .1633146 .4356295
married 1 .1701107 .0533093 3.19 0.001 .0656263 .274595
educlev 1 .2751914 . 1630972 1.69 0.092 -.0444732 .5948561
emplyd 1 .0935835 .0861678 1.09 0.277 -.0753024 .2624693
loginc_all~p 1 -.0026164 .0516727 -0.05 0.960 -.1038931 .0986603
sah 1 .2179823 .0372483 5.85 0.000 .144977 .2909876
pain 1 .1823119 .0408977 4.46 0.000 . 1021538 .2624699
chronic_l 1 1.3898 .063267 21.97 0.000 1.265799 1.513801
_cons 1 -1.831444 .3879845 -4.72 0.000 -2.59188 -1.071008
op_ins 1
age 1 .0192046 .0018145 10.58 0.000 .0156482 .0227611
male 1 -.2315722 .0599892 -3.86 0.000 -.3491489 -.1139954
educlev 1 .996973 .052808 18.88 0.000 .8934711 1.100475
emplyd 1 .4084017 .0608541 6.71 0.000 .2891299 .5276735
loginc_all~p 1 .2565685 .0345671 7.42 0.000 . 1888182 .3243187
_cons 1 -3.840618 .2661057 -14.43 0.000 -4.362176 -3.31906
/athrho 1 .1851042 .3279443 0.56 0.572 -.4576548 .8278633
rho 1 .1830187 .3169595 -.4281709 .679327
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(l) = .31859 Prob > chi2 = 0.5725
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2. RECURSIVE, MODEL 2 (MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTION TERM), EGY"
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
Log pseudolikelihood = -3833.6121
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(16) 
Prob > chi2
4133
2121.76
0 . 0 0 0 0
outpt
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .9653815 1.08992 0.89 0.376 -1.170823 3.101586
age 1 .0044185 .0040863 1.08 0.280 -.0035905 .0124275
male 1 .3213649 .0691239 4.65 0.000 . 1858846 .4568453
married 1 .16002 .0556255 2.88 0.004 .0509961 .2690439
educlev 1 .1777748 .2025615 0.88 0.380 -.2192384 .574788
emplyd 1 .0504214 .1011751 0.50 0.618 -. 1478781 .2487209
loginc_all~p 1 .0077112 .0539407 0 .14 0.886 -.0980106 .1134331
sah 1 .2196004 .0371109 5.92 0.000 . 1468643 .2923365
pain 1 .1837522 .0407422 4.51 0.000 . 1038989 .2636056
chronic_l 1 1.400423 .0511713 27.37 0.000 1.300129 1.500717
logincXop_~s 1 -.111227 .0792333 -1.40 0.160 -.2665213 .0440674
_cons 1 -1.87861 .4504975 -4.17 0.000 -2.761568 -.9956507
op_ins 1
age 1 .0192558 .0018038 10.68 0.000 .0157205 .0227911
male 1 -.2310876 .0600864 -3.85 0.000 -.3488547 -.1133205
educlev 1 .9948401 .0537838 18.50 0.000 .8894257 1.100254
emplyd 1 .4102341 .0610517 6.72 0.000 .290575 .5298931
loginc_all~p 1 .2568643 .0348799 7.36 0.000 .1885009 .3252277
_cons 1 -3.845311 .2684078 -14.33 0.000 -4.37138 -3.319241
/athrho 1 -.0187839 .392246 -0.05 0.962 -.7875719 .7500041
rho 1 -.0187817 .3921076 -.6570313 .6351514
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(l) = .002293 Prob > chi2 = 0.9618
3. RECURSIVE, MODEL 1 (MAIN EFFECTS), "LBN"
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
Log pseudolikelihood = -3200.986
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(15) 
Prob > chi2
2752
1036.05
0 . 0 0 0 0
1
1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|zl [95% Conf. Interval]
outpt 1
op_ins 1 1.030297 .2344406 4.39 0.000 .5708021 1.489792
age 1 -.0071323 .0019032 -3 . 75 0.000 -.0108624 -.0034022
male 1 .0574434 .0670797 0.86 0.392 -.0740304 .1889173
married 1 .1798607 .0522212 3.44 0.001 .077509 .2822124
educlev 1 -.1468658 .0606016 -2.42 0.015 -.2656428 -.0280888
emplyd 1 -.2211996 .0638383 -3.46 0.001 -.3463204 -.0960788
loginc_all-p 1 -.0184846 .0331386 -0.56 0.577 -.0834351 . 046466
sah 1 .247476 .0414485 5.97 0.000 . 1662385 .3287135
pain 1 .2975562 .0380827 7.81 0.000 .2229154 .372197
chronic_l 1 .4002903 .0648668 6.17 0.000 .2731537 .527427
_cons 1 -1.454219 .3194405 -4.55 0.000 -2.080311 -.8281275
op_ins 1
age 1 .0051452 .0016774 3.07 0.002 .0018576 . 0084327
male 1 .208766 .0603905 3.46 0.001 .0904029 .3271292
educlev 1 .2991572 .0563268 5.31 0.000 . 1887587 .4095558
emplyd 1 .2467306 .0613378 4.02 0.000 .1265108 .3669504
loginc_all~p 1 .1407201 .0325919 4.32 0.000 .0768412 .204599
_cons 1 -2.069007 .2653632 -7.80 0.000 -2.589109 -1.548905
/ athrho 1 -.7813271 .2465887 -3.17 0.002 -1.264632 -.2980221
rho 1 -.6534678 .1412904 -.8523361 -.2895015
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(l) = 10.0397 Prob > chi2 = 0.0015
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4. RECURSIVE, MODEL 2 (MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTION TERM), "LBN"
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
Log pseudolikelihood = -3200.9668
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(16) 
Prob > chi2
2752
1048.16
0 . 0 0 0 0
Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. P>lz| [95% Conf. Interval]
outpt
op_ins 1 1.129466 .5465909 2.07 0.039 .0581672 2.200764
age 1 -.0071357 .0018991 -3.76 0.000 -.0108579 -.0034135
male 1 .0563736 .0671156 0.84 0.401 -.0751706 .1879178
married 1 .1790147 .052163 3.43 0.001 .0767771 .2812524
educlev 1 -.1482413 .0610401 -2.43 0.015 -.2678777 -.028605
emplyd 1 -.2213486 .0636285 -3.48 0.001 -.3460583 -.096639
loginc_all~p 1 -.0155825 .0374289 -0.42 0.677 -.0889419 .0577769
sah 1 .2464409 .0416927 5.91 0.000 . 1647246 .3281572
pain 1 .2961826 .0386431 7.66 0.000 .2204436 .3719216
chronic_l 1 .3987361 .0652352 6.11 0.000 .2708775 .5265946
logincXop_~s 1 -.010952 .0549921 -0.20 0.842 -.1187346 .0968306
_cons 1 -1.472105 .3377093 -4.36 0.000 -2.134003 -.8102073
op_ins 1
age 1 .0051428 .0016778 3.07 0.002 . 0018545 .0084312
male 1 .2087069 .0603555 3.46 0.001 . 0904124 .3270015
educlev 1 .2991677 .0563209 5.31 0.000 .1887809 .4095546
emplyd 1 .2467144 .0613084 4.02 0.000 .1265522 .3668765
loginc_all~p 1 .1413593 .0330142 4.28 0.000 .0766526 .2060659
_cons 1 -2.073935 .2686143 -7.72 0.000 -2.600409 -1.54746
/athrho 1 -.796106 .2570277 -3.10 0.002 -1.299871 -.292341
rho 1 -.6618542 .1444365 -.86169 -.2842881
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(l) = 9.59361 Prob > chi2 = 0.0020
5. PROBIT, MODEL 1 (MAIN EFFECTS), "EGY"
Probit regression Number of obs 
Wald chi2(10)
4133
1377.36
Log pseudolikelihood = -1922 . 8901
Prob > 
Pseudo
chi 2 = 
R2
0.0000
0.3116
1
outpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>lz| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .1198578 .0589338 2.03 0.042 . 0043496 .235366
age 1 .0044706 .0019699 2.27 0.023 .0006096 .0083316
male | .3172151 .0609617 5.20 0.000 . 1977325 .4366978
married 1 .1660575 .0534802 3.11 0.002 .0612384 .2708767
educlev | .1855941 .0552145 3.36 0.001 .0773757 .2938125
emplyd 1 .0571735 .0611138 0.94 0.350 -.0626073 .1769543
loginc_all~p 1 -.0242732 .0329199 -0.74 0.461 -.0887951 .0402487
sah 1 .2194194 .0370717 5.92 0.000 . 1467602 .2920787
pain 1 .1845492 .0406792 4.54 0.000 . 1048194 .2642791
chronic_l | 1.401586 .0510841 27.44 0.000 1.301463 1.501709
_cons 1 -1.657343 .2540305 -6.52 0.000 -2.155233 -1.159452
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6. PROBIT, MODEL 2 (MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTION TERM), "EGY"
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -1921.691
Number of obs 
Wald chi2 (11) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
4133
1377.33
0 . 0 0 0 0
0.3120
1
OUtpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .917866 .5032249 1.82 0.068 -.0684366 1.904169
age | .0045895 .0019708 2.33 0.020 .0007269 .0084521
male | .3197609 .0611181 5.23 0.000 .1999716 .4395502
married | . 1607409 .0535325 3.00 0.003 .055819 .2656627
educlev | .1870895 .0553715 3.38 0.001 .0785633 .2956157
emplyd | .0543037 .0612189 0.89 0.375 -.065683 .1742905
loginc_all~p I .0092473 .0417695 0.22 0.825 -.0726194 .091114
sah 1 .219625 .0371155 5.92 0.000 . 1468799 .29237
pain 1 .1837078 .0407431 4.51 0.000 .1038529 .2635628
chronic_l | 1.400431 .0511042 27.40 0.000 1.300269 1.500594
logincXop_~s | -.1090931 .0678802 -1.61 0.108 -.2421358 .0239497
_cons 1 -1.89329 .3135841 -6.04 0.000 -2.507903 -1.278676
7. PROBIT, MODEL 1 (MAIN EFFECTS), "LBN"
Probit regression Number of obs 
Wald chi2(10)
2752
614.89
Log pseudolikelihood = -1456 .4384
Prob > 
Pseudo
chi2
R2
0.0000
0.2052
1
OUtpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. 2 P>|2| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 -.0392147 .0562969 -0.70 0.486 -.1495546 .0711252
age | -.0059905 .0020531 -2.92 0.004 -.0100145 -.0019665
male | .1630466 .0665395 2.45 0.014 .0326316 .2934616
married | .2048049 .058741 3.49 0.000 .0896747 .3199352
educlev | -.0422516 .0607448 -0.70 0.487 -.1613092 .0768061
emplyd | -.1403049 .0674478 -2.08 0.038 -.2725001 -.0081097
loginc_all~p | .0386525 .0317464 1.22 0.223 -.0235693 .1008743
sah 1 .2845784 .0419095 6.79 0.000 .2024373 .3667195
pain 1 .3457332 .0352476 9.81 0.000 .2766492 .4148172
chronic_l | .4628502 .0651868 7.10 0.000 .3350865 .5906139
_cons 1 -1.978409 .2774972 -7.13 0.000 -2.522294 -1.434525
8. PROBIT, MODEL 2 (MAIN EFFECTS AND INTERACTION TERM), "LBN"
Probit regression Number of obs 
Wald chi2 (11)
2752
614.97
Log pseudolikelihood = -1456 .3989
Prob > 
Pseudo
chi2
R2
0.0000
0.2052
1
OUtpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>| z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 -.1799035 .4921073 -0.37 0.715 -1.144416 .784609
age | -.005987 .002053 -2.92 0.004 -.0100109 -.0019632
male | .1619881 .0666352 2.43 0.015 .0313854 .2925908
married I .204996 .0587438 3.49 0.000 .0898602 .3201317
educlev | -.0419998 .0607802 -0.69 0.490 -.1611267 .0771271
emplyd | -.1413507 .0675741 -2.09 0.036 -.2737936 -.0089078
loginc_all~p | .0327739 .0398599 0.82 0.411 -.04535 .1108979
sah 1 .2844613 .0419205 6.79 0.000 .2022987 .366624
pain 1 .3457373 .0352531 9.81 0.000 .2766425 .4148321
chronic_l | .4624879 .0651829 7.10 0.000 .3347318 .590244
logincXop_~s I .0179783 .0624594 0.29 0.773 -.1044398 .1403965
_cons 1 -1.932338 .3348245 -5.77 0.000 -2.588582 -1.276094
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Chapters 3, 6 and 7:
E. Effects of additional self-reported health indicators
Additional health indicators include ‘difficulty m oving,’ ‘difficulty with self-care,’ 
‘difficulty with daily work,’ and ‘feeling sadness’. Results for the effects of income and 
insurance are consistent with those presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
1. probit OUtpt if country=="EGY"
Probit regression Number of obs 4126
Wald chi2(15) 1382.27
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -1914.88 Pseudo R2 0.3134
1 Robust
OUtpt 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| (95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .1292446 .0645236 2.00 0.045 .0027808 .2557085
age 1 .0044586 .002032 2.19 0.028 .000476 .0084413
male 1 .3162327 .0638153 4.96 0.000 .1911569 .4413085
married 1 .1748971 .054189 3.23 0.001 .0686887 .2811056
educlev 1 .1903551 .0576725 3.30 0.001 .077319 .3033912
emplyd 1 .0698732 .0715081 0.98 0.329 -.0702802 .2100266
loginc_all~p 1 -.0248062 .0330426 -0.75 0.453 -.0895685 .0399561
sah 1 .2077835 .0385621 5.39 0.000 . 1322032 .2833638
pain 1 .159263 .0577242 2.76 0.006 .0461257 .2724004
chronic_l 1 1.380375 .0512938 26.91 0.000 1.279841 1.480909
gov_i 1 -.0213983 .0832861 -0.26 0.797 -.184636 .1418394
moving 1 .1037468 .0551693 1.88 0.060 -.004383 .2118766
selfcare 1 -.1622405 .0639293 -2.54 0.011 -.2875397 -.0369414
diffwork 1 -.0277729 .0610055 -0.46 0.649 -.1473416 .0917957
sad 1 .0851092 .0509766 1.67 0.095 -.0148032 .1850216
_cons 1 -1.634963 .2549172 -6.41 0.000 -2.134592 -1.135335
2. probit OUtpt if country==''LBN"
Probit regression Number of obs = 2719
Wald chi2(15) 628.73
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -1430.185 Pseudo R2 0.2089
Robust
OUtpt 1 Coef. Std. Err. : P>l z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 -.025029 .058021 -0.43 0.666 -.138748 .08869
age 1 -.0054843 .0020938 -2.62 0.009 -.0095881 -.0013806
male 1 .1589295 .0670982 2.37 0.018 . 0274194 .2904395
married 1 .1960218 .0593672 3.30 0.001 .0796643 .3123793
educlev 1 -.0431082 .0616409 -0.70 0.484 -.1639222 .0777058
emplyd 1 -.156426 .0702532 -2.23 0.026 -.2941197 -.0187322
loginc_all~p 1 .0366343 .0319112 1.15 0.251 -.0259106 .0991792
sah 1 .2937149 .0441238 6.66 0.000 .2072339 .3801959
pain 1 .3623121 .0428172 8.46 0.000 .2783919 .4462323
chronic_l 1 .4499402 .0658554 6.83 0.000 .320866 .5790144
gov_i 1 -.0696007 . 1217449 -0.57 0.568 -.3082164 .169015
moving 1 -.013761 .0574874 -0.24 0.811 -.1264344 .0989123
selfcare 1 -.1526954 .0697668 -2.19 0.029 -.2894358 -.015955
diffwork 1 .0092393 .0498033 0.19 0.853 -.0883733 . 106852
sad 1 .0375361 .0366992 1.02 0.306 -.0343931 . 1094653
_cons 1 -1.889764 .2822714 -6.69 0.000 -2.443005 -1.336522
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3. probit inpt if country=="EGY"
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -788.41219
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(15) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
4126
175.49
0 . 0 0 0 0
0.0942
1
inpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 .0604884 .1036135 0.58 0.559 -.1425903 .2635671
age | -.0029004 .0028797 -1.01 0.314 -.0085444 .0027436
male | -.1138365 .0860728 -1.32 0.186 -.2825361 .0548632
married | .0647714 .0798961 0.81 0.418 -.0918221 .2213649
educlev | -.0819404 .0880655 -0.93 0.352 -.2545457 .0906649
emplyd I -.0964661 . 106797 -0.90 0.366 -.3057843 . 1128521
loginc_all~p | -.0213808 .0472449 -0.45 0.651 -.1139791 .0712175
sah 1 .0816401 .0532101 1.53 0.125 -.0226498 .1859301
pain 1 .0996624 .0718087 1.39 0.165 -.0410801 .240405
chronic_l | .2986849 .0920079 3.25 0.001 .1183528 .479017
gov_i 1 .1026436 . 1468643 0.70 0.485 -.1852051 .3904923
moving | -.0193441 .0664431 -0.29 0.771 -.1495702 .1108821
selfcare I .0215819 .0589896 0.37 0.714 -.0940356 .1371993
diffwork | .1284789 .0680854 1.89 0.059 -.004966 .2619239
sad 1 .0744423 .0599229 1.24 0.214 -.0430044 .191889
_cons 1 -2.222249 .3649149 -6.09 0.000 -2.937469 -1.507029
4. probit inpt if country=="LBN'
Probit regression Number of obs 
Wald chi2(15)
2719
264.17
Log pseudolikelihood = -901 .04471
Prob > 
Pseudo
chi2
R2
0.0000
0.1256
1
inpt 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|2| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 .070914 .0693413 1.02 0.306 -.0649925 .2068204
age | -.0013291 .0024873 -0.53 0.593 -.0062042 .003546
male | .0171008 .0815513 0.21 0.834 -.1427368 .1769383
married | .2674341 .0759344 3.52 0.000 .1186053 .4162628
educlev | -.1451323 .0765734 -1.90 0.058 -.2952133 .0049487
emplyd I -.2032481 .0887214 -2.29 0.022 -.3771389 -.0293574
loginc_all~p | .0607635 .0407568 1.49 0.136 -.0191183 .1406453
sah 1 .1246898 .0512584 2.43 0.015 .0242251 .2251545
pain 1 .096907 .0492044 1.97 0.049 .0004681 .1933459
chronic_l | .3318223 .0875132 3.79 0.000 .1602996 .503345
gov_i 1 .1258156 .1458388 0.86 0.388 -.1600231 .4116543
moving | -.0127202 .0594431 -0.21 0.831 -.1292266 .1037863
selfcare I .0861875 .0647566 1.33 0.183 -.0407332 .2131082
diffwork | .1327391 .0533484 2.49 0.013 .0281783 .2373
sad 1 .0189797 .0409143 0.46 0.643 -.061211 .0991703
_cons 1 -2.679563 .3456612 -7.75 0.000 -3.357047 -2.00208
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Chapters 3, 6 and 7:
F. Effects of disaggregated chronic health conditions
Chronic health conditions include heart disease, diabetes, and depression. Example are 
shown using regression models for frequency of visits, indicating that the results for 
income and insurance are similar those in Chapters 6 and 7.
1. probit ipvisits if country=="LBN": disaggregated variables.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -178 .89733
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(12)
Prob > chi2 = 
Pseudo R2 =
929
21.84
0.0394
0.0532
ipvisits
1
1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 -.0088442 .1480426 -0 . 06 0.952 -.2990024 .2813141
age 1 -.0014913 .0049291 -0.30 0.762 -.0111523 .0081696
male 1 -.3930025 .1665681 -2.36 0.018 -.71947 -.0665351
married 1 -.0388102 .1576107 -0.25 0.805 -.3477216 .2701011
educlev 1 -.199489 .1720102 -1.16 0.246 -.5366227 .1376448
emplyd 1 -.1761073 .1803269 -0.98 0.329 -.5295416 .177327
loginc_all~p 1 .1083042 .078579 1.38 0.168 -.0457078 .2623162
sah 1 .0196803 .1060324 0.19 0.853 -.1881393 .2275
pain 1 .1660382 .075963 2.19 0.029 .0171534 .314923
heartd_i 1 -.1668672 .2193636 -0.76 0.447 -.596812 .2630776
diab_i 1 .2227417 .2342195 0.95 0.342 -.2363202 .6818035
dep_i 1 .2053081 .1516077 1.35 0.176 -.0918376 .5024539
_cons 1 -2.549482 .6960064 -3.66 0.000 -3.91363 -1.185335
2. probit ipvisits if country== "LBN": aggregated variable.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -179 .70784
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(10) = 
Prob > chi2 = 
Pseudo R2 =
921
17.65
0.0612
0.0468
ipvisits
1
1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 -.0075857 .147158 -0.05 0.959 -.2960102 .2808387
age 1 -.001672 .0048661 -0.34 0.731 -.0112094 .0078654
male 1 -.3888224 .1659537 -2.34 0.019 -.7140856 -.0635592
married 1 -.0498246 . 157667 -0.32 0.752 -.3588463 .2591971
educlev 1 -.1832769 .1698171 -1.08 0.280 -.5161123 .1495585
emplyd 1 -.1668179 .1776477 -0.94 0.348 -.515001 .1813652
loginc_all~p 1 .1104862 .0782147 1.41 0.158 -.0428118 .2637843
sah 1 .0572761 .1077879 0.53 0.595 -.1539844 .2685365
pain 1 .185135 .077286 2.40 0.017 .0336573 .3366127
chronic_l 1 -.0957579 .2159219 -0.44 0.657 -.518957 .3274413
_cons 1 -2.557906 .6894742 -3.71 0.000 -3.909251 -1.206562
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3. probit ipvisits if country=="LBN": disaggregated variable and 
interaction term for income*insurance.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -176.78127
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(13) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
929 
29.39 
0.0058 
0.0644
1
ipvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 2.828358 1.334117 2.12 0.034 .2135366 5.44318
age | -.0016736 .0049597 -0.34 0.736 -.0113944 .0080472
male | -.3749396 .1716118 -2.18 0.029 -.7112926 -.0385866
married | -.0433886 .1578631 -0.27 0.783 -.3527947 .2660174
educlev | -.1912581 .1731381 -1.10 0.269 -.5306026 .1480864
emplyd | -.1590194 .1866131 -0.85 0.394 -.5247744 .2067357
loginc_all~p | .238338 .0948642 2.51 0.012 . 0524077 .4242683
sah 1 .0159592 .1063203 0.15 0.881 -.1924247 .2243432
pain 1 .1775756 .0758717 2.34 0.019 .0288697 .3262815
logincXip_~s | -.3630352 .1707271 -2.13 0.033 -.6976542 -.0284163
heartd_i | -.1944453 .2202907 -0.88 0.377 -.6262071 .2373165
diab_i 1 .2321515 .2366458 0.98 0.327 -.2316658 .6959688
dep_i 1 .1981399 .1531152 1.29 0.196 -.1019604 .4982402
_cons 1 -3.576737 . 813381 -4.40 0.000 -5.170934 -1.982539
4. probit ipvisits if country=="EGY": disaggregated variables and 
interaction term for income*insurance.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -232.52852
Number of obs 
Wald chi2 (13) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
465
52.95
0 . 0 0 0 0
0.1208
1
ipvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
ip_ins 1 -.2009412 1.321953 -0.15 0.879 -2.791922 2.39004
age | .0024041 .005276 0.46 0.649 -.0079368 .0127449
male | -.2338258 .1774916 -1.32 0.188 -.5817031 .1140514
married | .1242735 .1629928 0.76 0.446 -.1951865 .4437335
educlev | -.07619 .1869918 -0.41 0.684 -.4426871 .2903071
emplyd | -.253676 .1833956 -1.38 0.167 -.6131248 .1057729
loginc_all~p | -.2241707 .0991776 -2.26 0.024 -.4185552 -.0297861
sah 1 .2050319 .0970522 2.11 0.035 .014813 .3952508
pain 1 .199968 .0810597 2.47 0.014 .0410939 .358842
logincXip_~s | .0714942 . 180659 0.40 0.692 -.2825909 .4255794
heartd_i | .5125315 .2607752 1.97 0.049 .0014216 1.023641
diab_i 1 -.3744661 .2333359 -1.60 0.109 -.8317961 .0828638
dep_i 1 -.5570236 .1766147 -3.15 0.002 -.9031821 -.2108651
_cons 1 .0346548 .7310516 0.05 0.962 -1.39818 1.46749
5. probit opvisits if country=="LBN": disaggregated variables and 
interaction term for income*insurance.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -238 .61955
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
930
35.13
0.0008
0.0761
1
opvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .179569 .2089585 0.86 0.390 -.2299821 .5891201
age | -.0080116 .0045011 -1.78 0.075 -.0168337 .0008104
male I -.2828291 .1457088 -1.94 0.052 -.5684132 .002755
married I -.0132449 .1397121 -0.09 0.924 -.2870756 .2605859
educlev | -.1221248 .1392045 -0.88 0.380 -.3949605 .150711
emplyd | -.0326951 .1591664 -0.21 0.837 -.3446555 .2792654
loginc_all~p | -.0174049 .0799726 -0.22 0.828 -.1741483 .1393386
sah 1 -.0690431 .0909973 -0.76 0.448 -.2473945 .1093083
pain 1 .1952486 .0721357 2.71 0.007 .0538652 .3366319
logincXip_~s I .0209342 .0271218 0.77 0.440 -.0322236 .074092
heartd_i | .603076 .1724332 3.50 0.000 .2651132 .9410388
diab_i I .2309191 .200176 1.15 0.249 -.1614186 .6232568
dep_i 1 .1400165 .1357638 1.03 0.302 -.1260757 .4061087
_cons 1 -1.286082 .6257973 -2.06 0.040 -2.512622 -.0595418
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6. probit opvisits country=="LBN": three disaggregated variables 
(heart disease, diabetes, and depression) ._________________________
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -238.88415
Number of obs 
Wald chi2(12) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2
930
35.00
0.0005
0.0751
1
opvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .3106334 .1254788 2.48 0.013 .0646996 .5565673
age I -.0076368 .0044603 -1.71 0.087 -.0163788 .0011053
male | -.277568 . 1455117 -1.91 0.056 -.5627658 .0076297
married I -.0044654 .140932 -0.03 0.975 -.280687 .2717562
educlev 1 -.1114556 .1391646 -0.80 0.423 -.3842131 .161302
emplyd I -.0303657 .1588373 -0.19 0.848 -.3416812 .2809497
loginc_all~p | -.0021476 .0771145 -0.03 0.978 -.1532892 .148994
sah 1 -.0720522 .0911311 -0.79 0.429 -.2506659 .1065615
pain 1 .1950306 .0721791 2.70 0.007 .0535621 .3364991
heartd_i | .602412 .1726128 3.49 0.000 .2640971 .940727
diab_i 1 .2372571 .2008151 1.18 0.237 -.1563332 .6308475
dep_i 1 .1451488 .1367202 1.06 0.288 -.1228178 .4131155
_cons 1 -1.399081 .6080113 -2.30 0.021 -2.590762 -.2074009
7. probit opvisits if country= ="LBN" : four disaggregated variables
(high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes , and depression).
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -237 .06011
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2 = 
Pseudo R2 =
929
40.28
0.0001
0.0819
1
opvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>l z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .3227305 .1257774 2.57 0.010 . 0762114 .5692496
age I -.0104149 .0047974 -2.17 0.030 -.0198176 -.0010123
male I -.3003798 .1466996 -2.05 0.041 -.5879058 -.0128539
married I -.007228 .1404681 -0.05 0.959 -.2825404 .2680845
educlev | -.1129149 .1397212 -0.81 0.419 -.3867633 .1609336
emplyd I -.0522408 .1613983 -0.32 0.746 -.3685757 .264094
loginc_all~p | -.0009292 .0769703 -0.01 0.990 -.1517882 .1499298
sah 1 -.0920491 .0918131 -1.00 0.316 -.2719994 .0879013
pain 1 .2014668 .0718275 2.80 0.005 .0606876 .342246
hbp_i 1 .3085157 .1669738 1.85 0.065 -.0187469 .6357783
heartd_i | .5444506 .1725873 3.15 0.002 .2061857 .8827154
diab_i I .1691239 .2084498 0.81 0.417 -.2394302 .5776781
dep_i 1 .1419551 .1379176 1.03 0.303 -. 1283584 .4122687
_cons 1 -1.295079 .6211854 -2.08 0.037 -2.51258 -.0775777
8. probit opvisits if country== "LBN": aggregated variable.
Probit regression
Log pseudolikelihood = -240 .21728
Number of obs = 
Wald chi2(10)
Prob > chi2 = 
Pseudo R2 =
922
23.28
0.0098
0.0586
1
opvisits 1 Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .3097448 .1261423 2.46 0.014 .0625104 .5569792
age I -.0045365 .0042567 -1.07 0.287 -.0128795 .0038065
male | -.3125125 .1464854 -2.13 0.033 -.5996186 -.0254065
married | -.0291917 .1405324 -0.21 0.835 -.3046301 .2462468
educlev | -.0824413 .1417268 -0.58 0.561 -.3602206 .195338
emplyd | -.0756686 .161616 -0.47 0.640 -.3924302 .2410931
loginc_all~p | -.0353599 .0803831 -0.44 0.660 -.1929079 .1221882
sah 1 -.0468189 .0901663 -0.52 0.604 -.2235416 .1299038
pain 1 .1756576 .0723719 2.43 0.015 .0338112 .317504
chronic_l | .5806205 .2309333 2.51 0.012 .1279996 1.033241
_cons 1 -1.604186 .6601626 -2.43 0.015 -2.89808 -.3102906
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9. probit opvisits if country=="EGY": aggregated variable.
Probit regression Number of obs 
Wald chi2(10)
628
26.46
Prob > oh 12 = 0.0032
Log pseudolikelihood = -414 .75994 Pseudo R2 0.0328
1 Robust
opvisits 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P> 1 z 1 [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 .1427467 .1322977 1.08 0.281 -.1165521 .4020455
age | .0001932 .0040785 0.05 0.962 -.0078006 .008187
male | -.3090975 .1329378 -2.33 0.020 -.5696508 -.0485441
married | .0070112 .1211005 0.06 0.954 -.2303414 .2443639
educlev | .0547152 .1332407 0.41 0.681 -.2064319 .3158622
emplyd | -.0504553 .1361542 -0.37 0.711 -.3173126 .216402
loginc_all~p I -.06952 .0713971 -0.97 0.330 -.2094556 .0704157
sah 1 -.0187472 .0701203 -0.27 0.789 -.1561804 .118686
pain 1 .1323612 .0676873 1.96 0.051 -.0003033 .2650258
chronic_l I .4789597 .1799381 2.66 0.008 .1262876 .8316319
_cons 1 .1449309 .5690546 0.25 0.799 -.9703956 1.260257
10. probit opvisits if country=="EGY'': disaggregated variable and
interaction term.
Probit regression Number of obs 628
Wald chi2(ll) 26.64
Prob > chi2 0.0052
Log pseudolikelihood = -414 .63841 Pseudo R2 0.0331
1 Robust
opvisits 1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
op_ins 1 -.3775136 1.093094 -0.35 0.730 -2.519939 1.764911
age | .0000571 .0041006 0.01 0.989 -.0079799 .0080942
male I -.3149768 .1339594 -2.35 0.019 -.5775324 -.0524212
married | .0106639 .1213975 0.09 0.930 -.2272709 .2485986
educlev | .0511363 .1334559 0.38 0.702 -.2104325 .3127052
emplyd I -.0543478 .1366164 -0.40 0.691 -.3221111 .2134155
loginc_all~p I -.0922681 .0862658 -1.07 0.285 -.2613459 .0768097
sah 1 -.019796 .0700621 -0.28 0.778 -.1571152 .1175231
pain 1 .132532 .0676845 1.96 0.050 -.0001272 .2651911
chronic_l I .4861592 .1807801 2.69 0.007 .1318368 .8404817
logincXop_~s | .0710984 .1486235 0.48 0.632 -.2201983 .362395
_cons 1 .3090114 .6729336 0.46 0.646 -1.009914 1.627937
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Chapters 6 and 7;
G. Marginal effects for pooled analyses for the probability of any care, 
outpatient and inpatient care.
. dprobit anycare anyins agesq male married educlev emplyd loginc_allimp sah pain 
chronic_l egypt_i logincXa
> nyins egyptXanyins egyptXloginc, robust nolog
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects
Log pseudolikelihood = -3361.5273
Number of obs = 6848
Wald chi2(14) =1973.13 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2898
anycare
1
1 dF/dx
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>l zl x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
anyins* 1 -.0948106 .1422699 —0 .66 0.506 .389457 -.373655 .184033
agesq 1 -4.73e-06 6.16e-06 -0.77 0.442 1845.18 -.000017 7.3e-06
male* 1 .0928721 .0179833 5.15 0.000 .540596 .057626 .128119
married* 1 .0705418 .0155347 4.54 0.000 .699328 .040094 .100989
educlev* 1 .0280186 .0164287 1.70 0.088 .463493 -.004181 .060218
emplyd* 1 -.0177825 .0183322 -0.97 0.332 .442027 -.053713 .018148
loginc-p 1 .0129215 .0159033 0.81 0.416 7.39156 -.018248 .044091
sah 1 .0936613 .0109074 8.58 0.000 2.00409 .072283 .115039
pain 1 .1246639 .0107752 11.53 0.000 1.68093 .103545 .145783
chroni'l*1 .4073606 .0138872 26.74 0.000 .578271 .380142 .434579
egypt_i* 1 .3989314 .1178785 3.09 0.002 .601051 .167894 .629969
log-yins 1 .0076086 .0179896 0.42 0.672 2.98295 -.02765 .042867
egyptXa-* 1 .0852511 .0312693 2.68 0.007 .19816 .023964 . 146538
egyptX-c 1 -.0228826 .0178334 -1.28 0.199 4.29579 -.057835 .01207
obs. P 1 .531396
pred. P 1 .5444048 (at x-bar)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change iof dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>1z 1 correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
. dprobit OUtpt op_ins agesq male married educlev emplyd loginc_allimp sah pair
chronic_l egypt_i logincXop_
> ins egyptXop_ins egyptXloginc, robust nolog
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects Number of obs 6885
Wald chi2(14) =1872.98
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -3464.1967 Pseudo R2 = 0.2739
1 Robust
OUtpt 1 dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
op_ins* 1 .123933 .142767 0.86 0.392 .29557 -.155885 . 403751
agesq 1 -6.43e-06 5.99e-06 -1.07 0.283 1844.96 -.000018 5.3e-06
male* 1 .0998465 .0177027 5.61 0.000 .539869 .06515 .134543
married* 1 .0704332 .0154198 4.55 0.000 .698765 . 040211 .100655
educlev* 1 .0237073 .016129 1.47 0.142 .464488 -.007905 .05532
emplyd* 1 -.0133824 .0180155 -0.74 0.458 .441975 -.048692 . 021927
loginc-p 1 .0162185 .0151167 1.07 0.283 7.39271 -.01341 .045847
sah 1 .0885775 .0107303 8.25 0.000 2.00203 .067547 .109609
pain 1 .108512 .0105144 10.31 0.000 1.6793 .087904 .12912
chroni-1*1 .4009523 .0138166 26.26 0.000 .576906 .373872 .428032
egypt_i* 1 .3879782 .1167011 3.03 0.002 .60029 .159248 .616708
l~op_ins 1 -.0191934 .0183523 -1.05 0.296 2.26298 -.055163 .016776
e~op_ins* 1 .0825683 .0325936 2.51 0.012 .153667 .018686 . 146451
egyptX-c 1 -.0183626 .017752 -1.03 0.301 4.29076 -.053156 .016431
obs. P 1 .5092229
pred. P 1 .5109223 (at x-bar)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change iof dummy variable from 0 to 1
2 and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
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. dprobit inpt ip_ins agesq maie married educlev emplyd loginc_allimp sah pain chronic_l 
egypt_i logincXip_i
> ns egyptXip_ins egyptXloginc, robust nolog
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects 
Log pseudolikelihood = -1724.7617
Number of obs = 6885
Wald chi2(14) = 458.29 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1290
1
inpt 1 dF/dx
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>|z| x-bar [ 95% C.I. ]
ip_ins*1 -.0808714 .0484283 -1.51 0.131 .355701 -.175789 .014046
agesq | 7.69e-07 2.20e-06 0.35 0.727 1844.96 -3.5e-06 5.1e-06
male* | -.0052391 .0068986 -0.76 0.446 .539869 -.01876 .008282
married*| .0198674 .0058108 3.26 0.001 .698765 .008478 .031256
educlev*| -.0127725 .0067883 -1.87 0.061 .464488 -.026077 .000532
emplyd*I -.0162741 .0070541 -2.28 0.022 .441975 -.0301 -.002448
loginc-p | -.0001362 .0057336 -0.02 0.981 7.39271 -.011374 .011102
sah 1 .0175042 .0040781 4.27 0.000 2.00203 .009511 .025497
pain 1 .0241193 .0035456 6.87 0.000 1.6793 .01717 .031069
chroni-1*| .034249 .0070496 4.69 0.000 .576906 .020432 .048066
egypt_i*I -.0162835 .0564473 -0.30 0.768 .60029 -.126918 .094351
l~ip_ins 1 .0131245 .0078344 1.67 0.094 2.7235 -.002231 .02848
e~ip_ins*| .0154904 .0148714 1.11 0.268 .166594 -.013657 . 044638
egyptX-c | -.0057247 .0073497 -0.78 0.436 4.29076 -.02013 .008681
obs. P 1 
pred. P 1
.0836601
.0600932 (at x-bar)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
282
Chapters 3, 6 and 7:
H. Examples of output for zero-inflated negative binomial model
1. HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT VISITS: EGYPT
Z ero-inflated negative binomial regression
Inflation model = probit 
Log likelihood = -864.1402
Number of obs 
Nonzero obs 
Zero obs 
LR chi2(ll) 
Prob > chi2
628 
359 
269 
53 .04 
0 . 0 0 0 0
C o e f . Std. Err. P > | z  I [95% Conf. Interval]
opvisits
op_ins 1 -.1605826 1.060325 -0.15 0.880 -2.238781 1.917616
age | -.0039596 .0038387 -1.03 0.302 -.0114833 .003564
male I -.5193871 .1291651 -4.02 0.000 -.772546 -.2662282
married | .0023529 .114959 0.02 0.984 -.2229626 .2276684
educlev | .0353185 .1284697 0.27 0.783 -.2164775 .2871144
emplyd | -.2173504 .1326718 -1.64 0.101 -.4773823 .0426814
loginc_all~p | .115304 .0844659 1.37 0.172 -.0502461 .280854
sah 1 -.0804194 .0636822 -1.26 0.207 -.2052342 .0443954
pain 1 .3070046 .0621979 4.94 0.000 .185099 .4289103
chronic_l | .1403294 .2066784 0.68 0.497 -.2647528 .5454117
logincXop_~s | -.0023105 .1445885 -0.02 0.987 -.2856987 .2810776
_cons 1 -.7527771 .6693335 -1.12 0.261 -2.064647 .5590925
inflate
op_ins 1 2284 .413 7236675 0.00 1.000 -1.42e+07 1.42e+07
age I 3.588444 8905.988 0.00 1.000 -17451.83 17459
male | -1.166049 79228.13 -0.00 1.000 -155285.4 155283.1
married | -23.68139 105486.9 -0.00 1.000 -206774.1 206726.7
educlev | -.1849868 76768.88 -0.00 1.000 -150464.4 150464.1
emplyd | 9.809671 28478.02 0.00 1.000 -55806.09 55825.71
loginc_all~p | 320.0842 971095.5 0.00 1.000 -1902992 1903632
sah 1 -82.05164 234084.9 -0.00 1.000 -458880.1 458716
pain 1 -14.21667 14611.22 -0.00 0.999 -28651.68 28623.24
chronic_l | -158.121 463867.5 -0. 00 1.000 -909321.8 909005.5
logincXop_~s | -284.9652 905939.8 -0.00 1.000 -1775894 1775325
_cons 1 -2516.171 7662815 -0.00 1.000 - 1 .50e+07 1.50e+07
/Inalpha | -.6622219 .166652 -3.97 0.000 -.9888538 -.3355901
alpha 1 .5157042 .0859431 .3720028 .7149161
Vuong test of zinb vs. standard negative binomial: z = 4.25 Pr>z = 0.0000
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2. HOSPITAL OUTPATIENT VISITS: LEBANON
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression
Inflation model = probit 
Log likelihood = -315.8905
Number of obs 
Nonzero obs 
Zero obs
LR chi2(ll) 
Prob > chi2
922
73
849
40 .59 
0 . 0 0 0 0
C o e f . Std. Err. P>|2| [95% Conf. Interval]
opvisits
op_ins
age
male
married
educlev
emplyd
loginc_all~p
sah
pain
chronic_l
logincXop_~s
cons
: _ 1  I
2.545924
.0006015
-.0030745
.557895
.1385679
-.0748893
.0906441
-.0241794
.5634377
.4536703
-.2722575
-4.733108
2.612554 
.0099701 
.3549622 
.3232864 
.3425592 
.3562416 
.1893367 
.2002042 
.1531557 
.5506045 
.3358449 
1.723606
0.97 
0.06 
- 0 . 0 1  
1.73 
0.40 
- 0 . 2 1  
0.48 
- 0 . 1 2  
3.68 
0.82 
-0.81 
-2. 75
0.330
0.952
0.993
0.084
0 . 6 8 6
0.833
0.632
0.904
0 . 0 0 0
0.410
0.418
0.006
-2.574587
-.0189396
-.6987877
-.0757347
-.5328358
-.77311
-.2804491
-.4165725
.2632581
-.6254947
-.9305014
-8.111312
7.666435 
.0201426 
.6926387 
1.191525 
.8099716 
.6233315 
.4617372 
.3682136 
.8636174 
1.532835 
.3859863 
-1.354903
inflate
op_ins 1 2233.956 5849930 0.00 1.000 - 1 .15e-K07 1.15e+07
age I1 15.01389 36893.19 0.00 1.000 -72294.3 72324.33
male 1 608.109 1210516 0.00 1.000 -2371959 2373175
married |1 1109.318 2753122 0.00 1.000 -5394911 5397129
educlev |1 485.8841 1231670 0.00 1.000 -2413544 2414515
emplyd |1 119.456 141458.3 0.00 0.999 -277133.7 277372.6
loginc_all~p |1 376.7443 917631.5 0.00 1.000 -1798148 1798901
sah 1 245.4015 519078.3 0.00 1.000 -1017129 1017620
pain 1 82.95651 216098.1 0.00 1.000 -423461.6 423627.5
chronic_l |1 -813.8128 1906019 -0. 00 1.000 -3736543 3734916
logincXop_~s I1 -306.7729 807637.6 -0.00 1.000 -1583247 1582634
_cons 1 -5679.49 1 .33e-t-07 -0.00 1.000 -2.60e+07 2.60e+07
/Inalpha |1 1.9673 .2107945 9.33 0.000 1.554151 2.38045
alpha 1 7.151345 1 .507464 4.731068 10.80977
Vuong test of zinb vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.36 Pr>z = 0.000
I. Goodness-of-fit tests for count regression models
Shown are results based on Note: PRM = Poisson regression model; NBRM = negative 
binomial regression model; ZINB = zero-inflated negative binomial
1. Hospital outpatient visits, pooled analysis
Tests and Fit Statistics
PRM BIC= -8013.147 A1C= 2.138 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NBRM BIC= -8446.784 
AIC= 1.855 
LRX2= 4 40.9 82
dif=
dif=
prob=
433.636
0.283
0.000
NBRM
NBRM
NBRM
PRM
PRM
PRM
Very strong
p=0.000
vs ZINB B1C= -8414.580 
A1C= 1.834
dif=
dif=
401.433
0.304
ZINB
ZINB
PRM
PRM
Very strong
NBRM B1C= -8446.784 A1C= 1.855 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB B1C= -8414.580 
A1C= 1.834 
Vuong= 3.8 07
dif=
dif=
prob=
-32.204
0.021
0.000
NBRM
ZINB
ZINB
ZINB
NBRM
NBRM
Very strong
p=0.000
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2. General practitioner visits, pooled analysis
Tests and Fit Statis tics
PRM BIC= -7771.427 AIC= 2.379 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NBRM BIC= -8126.926 
AIC= 2.149 
LRX2= 362.860
dif= 
d if= 
prob=
355.499
0.230
0.000
NBRM
NBRM
NBRM
PRM
PRM
PRM
Very strong
p=0.000
vs ZINB BIC= -8065.714 
AIC= 2.147
dif=
dif=
294.287
0.232
ZINB
ZINB
PRM
PRM
Very strong
NBRM BIC= -8126.926 AIC= 2.149 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC= -8065.714 
AIC= 2.147 
Vuong= 2.824
dif=
dif=
prob=
-61.212
0.002
0.002
NBRM
ZINB
ZINB
ZINB
NBRM
NBRM
Very strong
p=0.002
3. Specialist visits, pooled analysis
Tests and Fit Statistics
PRM BIC=-10221.236 AIC= 2.839 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NBRM BIC=-10321.623 
AIC= 2.789 
LRX2= 108.051
dif=
dif=
prob=
100.387
0.050
0.000
NBRM
NBRM
NBRM
PRM
PRM
PRM
Very strong
p=0.000
vs ZINB BIC=-10255.293 
AIC= 2.788
dif=
dif=
34.057
0.051
ZINB
ZINB
PRM
PRM
Very strong
NBRM BIC=-10321.623 AIC= 2.789 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC=-10255.293 
AIC= 2.788 
Vuong= 0.755
dif=
dif=
prob=
-66.331
0.001
0.225
NBRM
ZINB
ZINB
ZINB
NBRM
NBRM
Very strong 
p=0.225
4. Pharmacy visits, pooled analysis
Tests and Fit Statistics
PRM BIC= -6768.802 AIC= 3.239 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NBRM BIC= -7637.522 
AIC= 2.706 
LRX2= 876.122
dif=
dif=
prob=
868.720
0.533
0.000
NBRM
NBRM
NBRM
PRM
PRM
PRM
Very strong
p=0.000
vs ZINB BIC= -7593.182 
AIC= 2.693
dif=
dif=
824.381
0.546
ZINB
ZINB
PRM
PRM
Very strong
NBRM BIC= -7637.522 AIC= 2.706 Prefer Over Evidence
V S  ZINB BIC= -7593.182 
AIC= 2.693 
Vuong= 3.367
dif=
dif=
prob=
-44.339
0.012
0.000
NBRM
ZINB
ZINB
ZINB
NBRM
NBRM
Very strong
p=0.000
5. Hospital inpatient visits, pooled sample
Tests and Fit Statistics
PRM BIC= -8457.861 AIC= 1.073 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NBRM BIC= -8657.073 
AIC= 0.925 
LRX2= 206.442
dif=
dif=
prob=
199.211
0.148
0.000
NBRM
NBRM
NBRM
PRM
PRM
PRM
Very strong
p=0.000
vs ZINB BIC= -8597.623 
AIC= 0.923
dif=
dif=
139.762
0.150
ZINB
ZINB
PRM
PRM
Very strong
NBRM BIC= -8657.073 AIC= 0.925 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC= -8597.623 
AIC= 0.923 
Vuong= 2.531
dif=
dif=
prob=
-59.450
0.002
0.006
NBRM
ZINB
ZINB
ZINB
NBRM
NBRM
Very strong
p=0.006
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Chapters 3, 6 and 7:
J. Estimates summary for zero-inflated negative binomial models
Pooled analysis*
country ( 1 = Egy; 0 = Leb) 
Country-specific analyses
logincome
insurance
logincomeXinsurance
age
male
married
educlev
employed
sah
pain
chronic
_cons
Intensity amongst potential users
Pooled analysis*
country ( 1 = Egy; 0 = Leh)
Country-specific analyses
logincome
insurance
logincomeXinsurance
age
male
married
educlev
employed
sah
pain
chronic
cons
Hospital Outpatient
-9.635 
EGY LEB
320.084 64.838
2284.413 223.956
-284.965 -306.773
3.588 15.014
-1.166 608.109
-23.681 1109.318
-0.185 485.884
9.810 119.456
-82.052 245.402
-14.217 82.957
-158.121 -813.813
-2516.171 -5679.490
R  Hospital Outpatient
-2.787 
EGY LEB
0.115 0.091
-0.161 2.546
-0.002 -0.272
-0.004 0.001
-0.519 -0.003
0.003 0.558
0.035 0.139
- 0.217 -0.075
-0.080 -0.024
0.307 0.563
0.140 0.454
-0.753 -4.733
GP
-12.323
EGY
314.773
3248.354
-442.077
-3.585
71.618
-41.547
-99.341
-247.841
135.279
-159.927
30.932
-2433.036
GP
LEB
54.005
334.946
-34.748
-11.797
145.798
68.967
145.007
239.526
-127.468
-147.604
0.193
-128.199
-2.196
EGY
0.299
3.056
-0.472
-0.016
-0.330
0.284
-0.353
- 0.212
0.017
0.170
0.215
-1.905
LEB
-0.065
0.409
-0.056
0.000
- 0.020
0.050
-0.205
0.185
0.001
0.298
0.042
-0.880
Specialists
4.059
EGY
-145.216
-2474.283
321.502
-7.397
83.457
-256.748
167.408
-128.428
150.533
-60.686
84.185
620.888
LEB
-63.555
172.085
-5.207
-10.422
-358.608
203.331
67.357
-291.270
-174.244
45.518
-217.808
1027.764
SpeciBi^
-0.760
EGY LEB
0.029
0.329
-0.043
-0.003
0.005
0.018
0.085
- 0.112
-0.008
0.082
-0.072
0.195
-0.038
0.788
-0.082
- 0.001
-0.248
0.049
-0.034
-0.296
-0.147
0.277
-0.189
0.035
Pharmacists Inpatient
4.184 
EGY LEB 
-1.040 -0.070
1763.723 -1.887
-268.101 0.214
6.644 0.010
-139.064 0.018
-76.236 -0.189
79.469 0.027
-329.272 0.042
-56.408 0.008
-54.181 -0.062
-70.264 0.081
47.953 -0.780
Pharmacists
EGY
0.703
LEB*
0.111 -0.015
2.728 -1.628
-0.417 0.214
-0.015 -0.014
-0.347 0.043
0.291 0.024
-0.114 -0.053
-0.147 0.149
0.070 0.222
0.307 -0.044
0.322 0.418
-0.813 0.167
-5334.377
EGY
311.222
1207.698
-172.322
-0.812
-58.405
151.463
-20.568
-76.953
112.170
-182.607
90.475
-2382.956
LEB
-1956.187
-13329.920
1972.876
-35.682
2601.136
-496.829
-623.008
2611.818
1278.379
-1447.326
404.071
12523.450
Inpatient
3.461
EGY LEB
0.025 
1.285 
-0.151 
-0.006 
-0.263 
0.498 
-0.153 
-0.561 
0.299 
0.224 
-0.571 
-1.588
0.082
3.730
-0.343
-0.032
0.024
0.004
-1.168
0.852
0.553
-0.024
0.210
-3.025
*For Pooled analysis, only the country effect is presented for brevity, with other effects shown for country-specific models. BOLD: Statistically significant at 95% level.
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